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ABSTRACT 
This thesis attempts to develop the use of the trade 
flow model in the evaluation of economic integration in 
the third world. We concentrate on three inter-related 
issues. 
(i) What is the role of economic integration 
in the third world, and is it adequate to 
base third world integration on the 
traditional theory. 
(ii) Given the theoretical role of integration 
in the third world, what methods and 
general approach should the evaluation of 
these schemes be based on. 
(iii) To what extent does the trade flow model 
isolate the effects of economic integration 
on trade flows. 
We develop the trade flow model as one of the aspects 
of the evaluation framework, and use it to estimate the 
effects of integration on trade flows in the Caribbean 
Community (Caricom), over the period 1967 to 1976. We 
extend the use of the trade flow model from the aggregated 
form of the equation to estimates of intra and extra 
regional trade flows, total imports and exports of the 
region and to the trade flows of the individual member 
countries. 
Based on these results and the evaluation of Caricom 
we were able to determine the extent to which the model 
isolates the effects of economic integration on trade flows. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION - ECONOI~C INTEGRATION AND THE THIRD WORLD 
~ection 1.1. Introduction 
Since the end of the second world war, international 
economic integration and cooperation schemes in one ferm 
or another nave incorporated practically every nation in 
tne world. The maJority of attempts at economic 
integration nave been in the third world, where they have 
been viewed as one of the few alternatives to accelerate 
9rowth anti development. Integration is not a new concepti 
the political unification of both Germany and Italy in the 
nineteenth century, as well as the formation of the USA 
proviae earlier examples, and the history of practically 
every countDJ in Europe involved forms of integration, 
although prior to the twentieth century this was based 
more on conquest than agreement and negotiation. Within 
tile British Empire, integration usually took the form of 
imposing administrative structures on colonies, this being 
the case for example in East Africa and the British West 
Indies. 
With the independence of most third world countries 
within the last thirty years, economic integration has 
changed in that rather than being externally imposed, the 
initiative has tended to be indigeneous. Furthermore, with 
political independence came the desire and need for 
economic independence, in particular from the industrial-
ised countries. However, for the smaller developing 
cuuntries in particular, economic independence was not 
easily attainable ana integration was seen as providing one 
method through which greater independence could be 
1 Economic integration is basically a cooperative or 
coordinating eiiort, and generally refers to the 
formation of a free trade area, a customs union 7 a 
common market, or an economic union among a group of 
countries. 
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achievea. However, the majority of integration schemes 
in the third world have faced problems that in some cases 
has lead to their complete failure, and in most to a 
reassessment of the integration process. 
The general success of integration in the EEC and 
Scandinavia and of federalism in the USA and Australia 
for example, although encouraging, may not be directly 
comparable to third world economic integration, as the 
objectives of integration and the initial conditions are 
different. In Europe, integration was concerned with the 
promotion of trade and more efficient resource allocation 
and utilisation, whereas in the third world, objectives 
are based on the diversification of production structures 
and the general enhancement of development prospects. 
For many third world countries then, development in 
cooperation with other similar neighbours may prove to 
be the only viaole alternative to achieve growth, 
industrialisation and political and economic independence, 
However, if economic integration schemes in the third world 
are to develop we need to have a method of evaluation that 
isolates those effects of integration that are relevant to 
development objectives. Evaluation and the effects that 
we look for are determined by theory, and this theory has 
to be relevant to the problems and objectives of integrat-
ion in the third world. 
'The content of integration theory has developed from 
the customs union theory of Viner (1950), which concentra-
ted on a limited range of welfare effects, to the more 
recent debates on the rationale (2) and role of economic 
integration in the third world. 
Concurrently, the approach to the evalutation of 
economic integration has tended to be based on partial 
analysis of the effects of integration, usually in the 
context of the industrialised countries. A common approach 
in evaluating integration is based on the assumption that 
the majority of the effects of integration can be derived 
2. For example Cooper and Massell (1965) and Johnson (1965) 
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Irom changes in trade flows. Although this may be the 
case for the orthodox theory of customs unions, in the 
context of the third world, integration has to be conside-
red in broader terms of growth and development, and it 
must be recognised that many of the effects of integration 
including those on industrialisation, employment and 
income growth for example, would not necessarily be 
reflected in trade flows even in the long run. 
To develop an approach to evaluation that is 
relevant to the third world we first have to determine the 
extent to which the traditional theory is applicable, and 
from this determine what the role of economic integration 
is in the thira world. Based on tnis we can then outline 
a framework for evaluation that takes these factors into 
account. If past experience is to be useful in the 
analysis and. development of other groupings, then some 
yenerally applicable framework of evaluation that would 
allow a cOillparable analysis of the effects of integration 
on other groupings is desirable. 
In this thesis we evaluate the effects of economic 
integration on the Caribbean Community (Caricom). Caricom 
was chosen because it highlights the types of problems 
that typically face small nations in their attempts to 
develop. For Caricom the problems faced derive from small 
size, economic fragmentation and extensive dependence on 
extra-regional markets. This integration movement in the 
Caribbean represents the closest approximation to the best 
combination of economic viability and political autonomy. 
The three main objectives of the thes~s are to:-
(i) evaluate the effects of economic integration on trade 
flows in the CariDbean as part of an exercise to determine 
the success of economic integration in the context of the 
third world, 
(ii) to de-tennine the extent to which the trade flow model 
can isolate the effects of economic integration on trade 
flows, 
(iii) to ~evelop the trade flow model beyond the basic 
aggreyated torm of equation. 
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It is Dnportant to note here that we are not attempting a 
cost benefit study, but rather an analysis of the effects 
of integration on trade patterns. 
The trade flow model has not been generally used in 
the evaluation of economic integration although it do·:s 
have certain aavantages over the standard methods used. 
In particular the integration effect is measured directly 
by a dummy variable, and other autonomous effects on trade 
flows th~ough income growth for example are accounted for 
directly in the equation. 
This thesis makes the following contributions in 
extending the use of the trade flo~v model. First, by 
using adjacent 7ear regressions (3) we are able to 
estilnate the effects of economic integration on bo·th intra 
and extra regional trade whereas earlier studies only 
estimated the effects on intra regional trade. Second, 
the model is extended beyond the straight forward aggregate 
estimation to equations of intra trade, extra trade, 
regional exports, regional imports, as well as estimates 
of trade flow equations for the individual members of 
Caricom. These provide information on the effects of 
integration on various aspects of trade flows and as they 
are d±saggregated give a better indication of the ways in 
which economic integration is affecting trade flows. ~ve 
also attempt to outline a possible general framework for 
evaluating integration schemes, in which trade flow 
analysis is only one part. 
The purpose of the next section is to examine the 
extent to which integration has been a successful strategy 
in the third world, the nature of the problems faced and 
in general to suggest the lessons that can be derived from 
previous integration programmes. This exercise is import-
ant as a background to Carifta/Caricom, as well as to 
sugyest possible approaches to integration in the future. 
The survey of third world integration covers four main 
integration groupings - East African Community, Latin 
3. Adjacent year regressions are discussed in chapter 5. 
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American Free Trade Area, Andean Pact, and the Central 
American Common Market - that together provide an 
indication of the major problems that are likely to face 
third world integration attempts. 
Section 1.2: Lessons from Third World Economic Integration 
a East African Co~nunity (EAC} (4) 
In 1967 the Treaty for East African Cooperation 
establishing the East African Community was signed between 
Kenya. Tanzania and Uganda. This was the cuL'TIination of a 
history of cooperation within the region that was evident 
at least by 1917 when Kenya and Uganda formed a customs 
union. The three countries were eventually tied by a 
common currency, con~on external tariff l common services, 
university and res.earch services, however I 'the motivation 
of such integration was not the outcome of a belief in 
African unity or African development. It was established 
for the smooth runn~ng of the British administration and 
for the security and interest of colonial power! 
Prior to independence, the established 'colonial 
integration' scheme was not satisfactory to the extent that 
~it was firmly believed in Tanzania and Uganda that the 
arrangements worked overwhelmingly to the benefit of 
Kenya. I· (5) 
The EAC was established with the aim 'to strengthen 
and regulate the industrial, commercial, and other 
relations of the partner states to the end that there shall 
be accelerated, harmonious, and balanced development and 
sustained expansion of economic activities; the benefits 
whereof shall be equitably shared. I (6) nowever, although 
the accelerated and balanced develoyment of the region was 
important I the problem oi achieving an acceptable 
distribution of the resulting benefits was central to the 
4. Further discussion of the EAC can be found in Robson 
(1960), Hazlewood (1975) and Newlyn (1965). 
5. hazlewood in El-Agraa (1982) p.l~3 
6 . Eken ( 1979) p. 37 
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success or failure of the EAC. To this end the main 
features were: the introduction of the transfer tax to 
give limited protection for industries in the less 
developed states (Tanzania and Uganda) against competition 
from those in Kenyai the establishment of an East African 
Development Bank (EADB} which was to allocate its 
investments disproportionately in favour of Tanzania and 
Uganda, and the relocation of some of the headquarters of 
the common services. However r the EAC did not provide for 
the free movement of labour and capital, nor did the 
provisions of the treaty extenQ to agricultural products. 
The transfer tax was designed to overcome the 
disadvantages of the two ldc's vis-a-vis Kenya by gi~ing 
lImited protection to the manufacturing sectors of Tanzania 
ana Uganda and thus attaining some measure of industrial 
balance between the member states. In theory it was 
applicable only to those industries where additional plants 
could operate effiCiently on a scale provided by their 
national markets. 'For these industries, the encouragement 
of duplication was the whole purpose of the 'transfer tax .. ', 
(7) but in practise the distinction between industries 
that could be supported by the national market and those 
large scale industries that the regional market could only 
support one plant, was not clear cut. The consequence was 
the inefficient duplication of industries, although as 
Hazlewood (1982t points out this cannot be blamed on the 
transfer tax. These measures, that should have encouraged 
industrial growth in the Idc's were never really given a 
fair chance or used properly, and led to discrL~inatory 
purchasing by state trading corporations and quantitative 
restrictions on L~ports. 
The EADB was established as a means of providing 
financial and technical assistance, giving priority to 
industrial development in Tanzania and Uganda, so as to 
reduce the substantial imbalance between the m~~ber states. 
Tanzania and Uganada were each to receive 38.75% of EADB 
7. HazleWOOd in El-Agraa (1982) p.147. 
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investments and Kenya 22.5%. However, with the emphasis 
on industrial investments, building, transport, tourism and 
agriculture (except for the processing of agricultural, 
~orestry and fisheries products) were excluded. Further-
more, the E~~B's funds were very limited when compared to 
the annual invesonent in industry in the three members, and 
on average the annual commi~~ent of funds by the bank 
accountea for no more than 4% of industrial investment in 
the partner states. As a result EADB could only exert a 
limited influence on industrial development. By the end 
of 1975, BADB's investments in total were little more than 
twice the original contribution of the partner states, and 
the actual allocation of funds was different from those 
envisaged with Tanzania receiving 39.2%, Kenya 34.5% and 
Uganda only 26.2%. 'The most important role of the bank 
could be seen as to act as a catalyst for complementary 
industrial development rather than to undertake a major 
part of industrial inves~~ent itself. And in that respect 
tnere is certainly reason to question its effectiveness. 
The projects in which the EADB invested (textiles, sugar, 
paper, tyres r cement) do not appear particularly relevant 
to the aD~ of making the economies of the partner states 
more complementary.t (8) 
Overall the EADB did not appear bo be particularly 
successful and 'as a result, unequal benefits derived from 
unequal growth rates in the manufacturing sectors of the 
three countries created tensions in the operations of the 
EAC. t (9) 
It was also hoped that the relocation of the 
headquarters of the common services combined with some 
aecentralisation of their operations would also act as a 
mechanism for a fairer redistribution of the benefits of 
cooperation. However, the greater part of the local 
expenditures made by the services, and of the employment 
proviaed by than, continued to benefit Kenya. By the early 
8. Hazlewood in EI-Agraa (1982) p. 147-148 
9. Eken (1979) p.39 
• 
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1970's more than half of all the activities of the common 
services were in Kenya, and one third in Tanzania, while 
Uganda v/ith less than one fifth of the total received 
least from the arrangements. 
A major chanye in this distribution could only occur 
in the longer run with relatively greater economic growth 
in Tanzania and Uganda although the increased costs imnosed 
.I,; 
by the relocations and decentralisations posed a serious 
problem. 
Although ,the EAC was initially successful, relations 
started to deteriorate in the early 1970's, and by the 
middle of 1977 when the partner states failed to approve 
the 1977-78 budget for the Community; the EAC was 
effectively broken down. This final situation arose for a 
variety of reasons, although it is not possible to pinpoint 
anyone cause of failure. The main reasons include: 
(i) the decision making functions of the EAC rested with 
the 8residents, and as such the system relied too much on 
harmonious relations between them so that control of the 
EAC collapsed when relations became bad, and the source of 
initiative for the continuation and development of 
cooperation died. This situation arose after 1971 when Idi 
Nain ousted Milton Obote in Uganda, and President Nyerere 
refused to meet with him. As a result the East African 
Authority never met again and a vacuum in the decision-
making functions in the EAC was created. 
(iii There was a general feelillng by the member states, in 
particular by Tanzania and Uganda that the distribution of 
benefits was unequal. The instruments devised to aid a 
more balanced development had failed to come up to 
expectations, and the EAC was still effectively relying on 
the reallocation effects of the free trade area. 
consequently, the problem of polarisation of industrial 
activity in Kenya was not alleviated. Although studies (10) 
have shown that Uyanda for example was marginally better 
off being a member of the EAC, even more important than the 
10. For example Newlyn (1965) 
• 
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objective situation was the perception of the partner 
states about the costs and benefits of the system. 
'·Economic integration has to be based on a positive sum 
game it it's to r~~ain in being. However as time went on 
the par~ner states increasingly behaved as if they believed 
it was in fact a zero or even negative sum game'. (11) 
Although this view may to some extent be justified as the 
benefits from the common market began to disappear with 
the duplication of industries, and the benefits of the 
common services were dissipated in inefficiences and 
financial difficulties, the belief that the EAC was not 
equitable certainly worsened the situation. 
(iii) Other general 20ints that probably contributed to the 
failure of the EAC include, balance of payments and foreign 
exchange problems that combined with the oil price 
increases of 1973/74 led to restrictions on regional trade; 
the growing ideological division between 'capitalist' 
Kenya and 'socialist' Tanzania, and transport coordination; 
which was an old issue left unsettled by the treaty in 
which the absence of a settlement led to strains between 
the partner states. 
b Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) (12) 
The Treaty of Montevideo in 1960, establishing LAFTA 
was essentially a compromise of two regional projects under 
discussion in the late 1950's. First, there were the 
efforts of the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America (ELCA) as the major proponent of progranuned 
import substituting industrialisation. Within the region 
many countries had adopted deliberate policies of L~port 
substitution. However, during the 1950's, nationally 
based import substitution began to face serious constraints. 
Import substitution based on consumer manufactures was 
close to its limit, and the cost of financing the 
industrialisation process grew faster than import capacity. 
11. 
12. 
Hazlewood in EI-Agraa (1982) p.156 
Further discussion of LAFTA can be found in EI-Agraa 
(1982), Vaitsos (1978), Cole (1969) and Tussie (1982) 
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These problems were further exacerbated by deteriorating 
terms of trade after the Korean War. 
To encourage industry the ECLA argued the importance 
of economic integration as a solution to the problems of 
insufficient domestic demand and as a method to aid the 
industrialisation process including the manufacture of 
consumer and capital goods. By 1957 there was a 
commitment in principle to establish a Latin American 
Cormnon Market to promote import substitution on a regional 
rather than national baSis, with the emphasis on trade 
liberalisation as the vehicle rather than regionally 
planned industrialisation. 
However, the process of economic integration was 
complicated by the appearance in 1959 of a second 
integration scheme. During the 1940's and 1950's the 
Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Brazill Chile and 
Uruguay} had developed an important mutual trade in 
primary commodities which had deteriorated after 1955. 
The Southern Cone countries therefore proposed a scheme 
for a free trade area with the objective of stimulating 
the declining level of intra regional trade. 
Overall the initiative lay with the Southern Cone as 
they had an urgent, short term objective in view. As a 
result LAFTA ca~me into being as a hybrid:it was an 
emergency solution to immediate problems affecting a 
nucleus of its members, but in order to transcend this 
limited purpose it was adapted to form the first stage in 
the movement towards a common market. 
The main objective of the Treaty was the establishment 
of a free trade area within twelve years, and to achieve 
this three mechanisms were to be used. 
(i) National Schedules which listed commodities on which 
member countries separately made concessions applicable to 
all other members. 
(ii} The Common Schedule which listed commodities on which 
regional free trade was to be progressively established in 




(iii) Industrial Complementary Agreements to facilitate 
the integration and complementation by products or sectors 
of economic activity. 
As the negotiations for the adoption of national 
lists during the first few years covered mainly 
traditional trade items there were few serious difficulties. 
furthermore, a substantial proportion of the concessions 
granted comprised lists of products which appeared in pre-
LAFTA bilateral trade treaties, in particular those 
covering agricultural commodities between the Southern 
Cone countries. However, once the traditional flows of 
intra-regional trade had been consolidated and increased, 
the national schedule concessions became more difficult to 
make, as an advance toward the liberalisation goals laid 
down required the incorporation of non-traditional 
products, which were generally manufactures for which 
there was a decided tariff protection in most countries of 
the area. 
Apart from these problems the national schedule did 
not necessarily create a regional market in any commodity 
since there was no reason why more than one member should 
reduce tariffs on a particular commodity, while it did 
allow any two countries to stimulate trade relations 
between themselves. 
In 1964 the first round of negotiations on the common 
schedule incluaed mainly agricultural products. However, 
it was decided in advance that although inclusion of a 
co~~odity on the common schedule was irrevocable, it was 
not necessary to activate any part of the schedule until 
1973, and thus the establishment of a regional free trade 
in any commodity might be postponed until then. Thus the 
liberalisation principle was further weakened. 
In 1967 the second round of the common schedule failed 
to be concluded as opposition was encountered to the 
inclusion of wheat and crude oil in the schedule, although 
to maintain the target rate of trade liberalisation these 
commodities had to be included. The negotiations were 




As a result a process of assessment of LAFTA took 
place in 1969 resulting in the Caracas Protocol. Basically 
it was a compromise between those countries who were 
pressing ror machinery to secure a better distribution of 
the benefits of the integration process and in favour of 
measures to create a common market, and the relatively 
more developed countries who favoured stengthening the 
free trade area before moving onto more complex forms of 
economic integration. The result was an extension of the 
deadlines for the free trade area I as \vell as an 'Action 
Plan t. to study the conditions for the establishment of a 
Latin American Common Market. 
The regime of industrial complementarity; which 
provided for tariff reductions applicable to industrial 
sectors, or to the international operations of a single 
company, was not fully structured until 1964. By 1979, 
over 3,500 tariff concessions had been negotiated under 
the scheme, in a range of industrial sectors including 
chemicals and petrochemicals, electrical generation and 
transmission equipment, glass products and office 
equipment. The regime was a facility passively offered 
to industrial groups in member countries, and implied no 
national industrial programming. Only one of the twenty 
five agreements has been signed by more than five 
countries, wnereas seventeen have been signed by only two 
or three countries. It is not surprising that the most 
highly industrialised countries of the area signed the 
majority of the agreements, since those agreements were 
intended precisely to speed up the process of tariff 
reduction for industrial goods, and the growth of trade 
in manufactures and semi-manufactures benefitted the 
larger countries in the area. 
Since 1~67 LAFTA has been in a state of crisis, and 
the Caracas Protocol was just a marking of time. 
Dissatisfaction with LAFTA manifested itself in 1969 when 
five Andean countries signed the Cartagena 
-
13 
Agreement creating the Andean Pact, and further debilitat-
ing LAFTA. 
A second major reaction to the crisis in LAFTA has 
been ~he growtn OI bilateralism among the countries not 
involved in the An.dean Pact. By 1977/78 there was a 
broad consensus regarding the need to revitalise LAFTA. 
In Montevideo in August 1980, a new treaty was signed which 
set up the Latin American Integration Association. 
Although it can be argued that LAFTA failed, it has 
also been sugogested that the 'limi ted and specific 
objective of the Southern Cone group for which it was 
created ... was more or less satisfactorily met: the renewal 
OI traditional trade flows.' (13) However, for the other 
less developed members, LAFTA did not meet their 
aspirations for development. Although intra-regional 
trade flows did increase from 6.6% to 13% of total trade 
in 1979, this largely benefitted the Southern Cone 
countries and only reinstated the share of regional trade 
to pre-LAFTA levels. 
It also has to be remembered that the process of 
liberalisation at the regional level very quickly ran into 
trouble ana was effectively circumvented by agreements to 
delay im~lernentation of decisions. In fact the result of 
tne National and COhunon Schedules had an effect similar to 
a series of bilateral agreements rather than of a free 
trade area. In this respect LAFTA has to be considered a 
failure at least in terms of the stated objectives. 
Finally, a major problem was the obvious split within 
the region between the Southern Cone countries with the 
objective of expanding regional trade in certain primary 
products, ana the lesser developed members (who formed the 
Andean Pact} who were more concerned with regional 
industrialisation. 'A glance at the membership of LAFTA 
inaicates the existence of a fundamental obstacle. While 
it is not 2ossible, objectively, to define the optimum 
size of an integrated area, LAFTA was probably too big. 
13. Finch in E1·,Agraa (1982) 1? 224 
-
1"+ 
The optimal grouping is most influenced by the need for 
wide acceptance of the goals of integration. As public 
goods are to be provided, notably including planned 
industrialisation, the wa¥s and means must be generally 
agreed.' (14) 
c Andean Pact (AP) C151 
As a result of their dissatisfaction with LAFTA, 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and Chile 
through the Cartagena Agreement of 1969 formed the Andean 
Pact. The main objective entailed the promotion of 
balanced and harmonious integration, in such a way as to 
ensure equitable distribution of the benefits of integrat-
ion among the member states. The AP presented several 
features that made it in some ways unique in third world 
integ"ration. 
The measures used included~-
(i) harmonization of policies, 
(ii) ~rogramme for the liberalisation of trade and the 
common external tariff; 
(iii) sectoral development planning and rationalisation of 
industry, 
(iv) progranunes for the development of agriculture and 
infrastructure; 
(v) preferential treatment for Bolivia and Ecuador and, 
(yi) channelling of resources into integration programmes. 
Certain features of the Cartagena Agreement are of 
~articular interest including the establishment of an 
automatic liberalisation of trade which covered all the 
products of the subregion and provided for the elimination 
of all tariff changes and restrictions by not later than 
December 1983. This process began in 1970 Non tariff 
barriers on intra~,·AP trade were eliminated at the start of 
the 'automatic' intra trade liberalisation programme. 
14. Macbean and Snowden (1981) p.184 
15. Further discussion of the AP can be found in EI-Agraa 
(1982} 
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The AP tariff policy comprised two phases, the first 
a common minimum external tariff and the second a cornmon 
external tariff. 
However despite the progress made towards introducing the 
CET, it was not possible to meet the target dat2. The 
automatic dismantling of intra-AP trade barriers was 
accompanied by an increase in intra-regional trade from 
61.9mn US dollars in 1969 to 1/4l8mn US dollars in 1980, 
although 43% of this was accounted for by Colombia. In 
1979 non-traditional exports and manufactures accounted for 
74% oi total Andean Trade. 
The Cartagena Agreement considered induserial 
programming a fundamental mechanism for the promotion of 
"balanced and harmonious' development in the subregion. 
Joint industrial development progrfu~ing was to be achieved 
through two mechanisms: sectoral industrial development 
programmes, and programmes for the rationalisation of 
existing industry. The former are aimed at locating 
industrial plant in member countries, with each country 
respecting the allocation of) such plants to others. The 
latter are intended to L-npvove the conditions for the 
subregional industries whose products are not covered in 
the sectoral programmes and which are therefore subject to 
competition. 
Although sectoral industrial development programmes 
were approveu in the metalworking, petrochemical and 
automobile'inuustries, the metalworking and automobile 
production was allocated to member countries where 
production facilities were already in existence. Indeed 
allocations were easier to make on a 'regional' basis only 
with regard to industries that did not exist at all within 
the AP and little has actually materialised here. 
The ideal of an equal distribution of industry has 
been undermined by the varying levels of development of the 
countries concerned and the inability of those most lacking 
in infrastructure to exert any influence on decision making 
in the face of resistance to the closin~ of existing plants 
16 
for fear of reductions in employment levels. 
One of the main instruments for harmonisation of 
economic policy was the common system of treatment for 
foreign capital ~ decision 24. This system is designed to 
establish a balance between foreign investors and the And-
ean countries, so that the former receive an adequate 
return on investments and the advantages of a subregional 
market, while the latter benefit from emphasis on priority 
sectors and national participation in the capital and 
management of enterprises set up with foreign capital. The 
system: entered into force in 1971. 
Although foreign capital grew initially, since 1975 
direct foreign investment fell abruptly, between 1975 and 
1978 by 700mn US dollars. (16) In part this was associated 
with the withdrawal of Chile from the AP in 1976 as well as 
fears of future instability in the AP. 
By 1980, the AP was virtually defunct and once again 
the concern with the unequal distribution of the benefits, 
the duplication of inefficient plant and the 'lack of 
political will' all contributed to the failure of the AP' 
Basically, although the approach could have been 
successful the instruments were not given a fair chance 
nor always used to their best advantage. 
d Central American Conunon Market (CACM) (17) 
With the start of the secular decline in prices of 
Central America's traditional exports (coffee, bananas, 
cocoa and sugar) in the mid-1950 t s, there was increasing 
interest in the ECLA inspired import substituting 
industrialisation model of development. It was agreed 
that siven the size of the region's economy, 
industrialisation could only be carried out at the regional 
level if dupliation of high cost inefficient plants was to 
16. EI-Agraa and Hojman in EI-Agraa (1982) p.232 
17. Further discussions of CACM can be found in EI-Agraa 




In 1958 the five countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) approved the Agreement 
on the Regime for Central American Integration Industries 
and at the same time signed the Multilateral Treaty on Free 
Trade and Central American Economic Integration, followed 
in 1960~ by the General Treaty on Economic Integration 
which established the CACM. 
A prime objective of the CACM was industrialisation by 
stL~ulating the development of the industrial sector as 
part of a process of extra-subregional import substitution. 
The industrialisation objective was pursued through the 
freeing of trade within Central America (effectively 
restricted to industrial products) subject to a cornmon 
external tariff. An important feature of the 
liberalisation regime was that it was carried out quickly, 
74% of all items listed in the tariff schedule entered 
intra regional trade free of all restrictions as soon as 
the General Treaty went into effect. Where tariffs were 
reduced over a period of years this was done automatically. 
As a result the progress made under the free trade 
regime was considerable. Intra regional trade, which over 
1952-60 had grown at an annual rate of 14.9%, achieved an 
annual growth rate of 24.8% over 1960-70. In 1960 intra 
regional traders share of total trade was 7.5%, by 1970 
this stood at 26.9% although by 1980 it had fallen 
slightly to 24%. At the same time the structure of 
regional trade changed; with manufactures increasing their 
share from 19% in 1960 to 86% in 1978. This seems to have 
the most successful aspect of the CACM. 
The 1958 Regime for integration industries was 
designed to encourage industry as well as avoid the 
probl~ns of polarisation. The Agre~~ent has two main aims, 
(i) to establish certain industries in the area to act 
as a focus for industrial development and (ii) to prevent 
industries from concentrating in one country and thus to 
ensure that the benefits of industrialisation were enjoyed 
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by all countries concerned, thereby achieving balanced 
industrial development in the region. Firms receiving 
status as integration industries received duty free 
treatment on inputs while being guaranteed free access to 
the regional market, at the same time, the sarne products 
produced by firms not accorded integration industry status 
would be subject to trade taxes within the region. The 
Reg~~e therefore conferred a virtual monopoly position on 
any firm that received its benefits, although in return it 
would be subject to price and other controls. 
However, the regime had very little effect on Central 
American industrial growth, and few industries took 
advantage of it. Its lack of success has been attributed 
to various factors including:-
(1) the1list of industries was not well planned and did 
not represent an industrialisation programme for the 
integration area, 
(ii) the Syst6U was cumbersome to operate; 
(iii) there was a lack of promotional maohinery, 
(iv) other measures dln the integration programme lessened 
the attraction of the integration industries and it was 
never given a chance to operate; 
(v) there was strong external opposition to the system 
from sources of financing in third countries (ie the USA) 
and from foreign industrial groups, which viewed the 
integration industries as potential monopolies. (18) 
The regime was effectively destroyed by the signing of 
the General TreatYI which established free trade on a 
product basis thereby leaving little room for protection by 
plant. Deprived of its principal mechanism for ensur±ng an 
equal distribution of benefits the CACM was left with only 
a number of minor instruments for achieving this objective. 
Although the CACM achieved initial successes, 
difficulties arose as a result of the loss of government 
revenue caused by net trade diversion and prohibitively 
18. In particular see Vaitsos (1978) p.726 for an 
extensive discussion of the influence of foreign 
government on regional groupings 
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high tariffs on imports from third countries. This 
resulted in the San Jose Protocol (1967) which allowed 
countries to increase revenues by L~posing a surcharge of 
30% on the CET. Then in 1969 the 'guerra inutil' between 
El Salvador and Honduras led to Honduras' departure from 
the CACM in 1970. From then on the CACM lost its 
dynamism. In 1978 the integration process was further 
affected by the political situation in Nicaragua which led 
to bhe closing of the frontier with Costa Rica. In Harch 
1980 the Declaration of San Jose, reiterated the political 
will of the Central American states to restructure the 
integration process. 
Although by the late 1970's, the CACM could have been 
considered a failure bhere were still many positive 
features incorporated in the original treaty, that as in 
the Andean Pact were perhaps never given a fair chance to 
work. In particular the Regime for Integration Industries 
could have been a very useful instrument in regional 
industrial growth. Not only did the free trade area help 
expand regional trade considerably, and increase the share 
of manufactures in regional trade, it also helped to 
increase the share of industry ·in GDP from 9%-14% in 1950 
to an average of 18% in 1978. 
Other problems also contributed to the decline in the 
CACM including: 
(i) Industry was not really carried beyond the 'easy' 
stage of consumer goods production so that growth was tied 
to growth of real disposa~le income. 
(iil As a result industry became very import intensive. 
(iii) In the early 1970's the sharp increase in the price 
of Central America's traditional exports revealed that the 
choice was not between investments in industry but between 
the industrial sector and agriculture. (19) 
(iv) Failure to evolve a framework within which further 
industrialisat~on could proceed. 
(v) Unequal distribution of net benefits (which also was 
19. Bulmer-Thomas in EI-Agraa (1982) p.251. 
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a further reason for Honduras' departure). 
In summary, the Central American integration process 
led to unequal participation in the benefits of the wider 
market with negative effects in relative terms on the rate 
of growth of domestic product, disequilibria in the balance 
of trade and few industrialisation opportunities for the 
relatively less developed countries. 
Section 1.3: Conclusions 
Although we have taken only a small sample of the 
total number of attempts at economic integration in the 
third world, they do indicate some of the more serious 
problems and pitfalls that can be a cause of failure. 
They also suggest certain instruments that could be 
potentially important in regional development. In section 
1.2 we suggested some of the possible causes of failure in 
regional integration in the third world. We will now 
discuss the general lessons that can be derived from their 
experience. 
First, we have to consider the compatability of the 
res'pecti ve members of a reg ional grouping. This pOint was 
raised in the context of LAFTA where it was suggested that 
the overall size of the grouping was too large and led to 
problems associated with a lack of a common approach or 
obJective that could be agreed upon. In this instance it 
was the Southern Cone versus the less developed members. 
It certainly seems to be important that if a grouping is 
to succeed that there should be agreement on the main 
objectives and instruments, for,without this concensus some 
of the msubers will eventually feel that they are suffering 
from an uneoual distribution of the benefits. This leads 
J. 
onto the second point associated with the perceived 
distribution oi the benefits of integration. In all the 
four examples discussed above some of the members were 
dissatisiied with their share or lack of benefits. In the 
case oi the CACM, Honduras left the grouping; in LAFTA the 
dissatisfied members formed the Andean Pact. Although most 
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of the groupings had aome mechanism to encourage a balanced 
distribution of the benefits through the allocation of 
industries or special regimes for the Idc's, these systems 
were either inadequate or misused. 
It is generally held that negative integr2tion (ie the 
removal of barriers to trade) is easier to achieve, and in 
general is attained in practise. However, as seen in the 
case of LAFTA this was not the case. The series of 
negotiations creating the free trade area either broke down 
or were circumvented. In contrast, in the case of both 
the Andean Pact and the CACM the creation of the free trade 
area was either immediate or automatic, and as a result the 
~roblem of incompleted negotiations was avoided. In the 
case of the CACH especially, this allowed a very large 
expansion in regional trade. It would appear that greater 
success in creating a free trade area may be possible the 
more 'automatic' the system. Of course changing 
circ~~stances may mean the system has to be amrnended( but 
in general the less that is left open to negotiation the 
more is likely to be attained. 
However, the major problem area seems to be that of 
'posi tive '0 integration, in particular the development of 
industry_ Apart from the greater choice of industry 
avai1able to a regional grouping, industrial policy is also 
concerned with and is viewed as a means of distributing 
the gains of integration. This dual purpose of regional 
cooperation, in allowing a greater range of industry as 
well as a method to distribute the benefits of integration, 
can face serious constraints. On the one hand the most 
efficient method of industrialisation for the region as a 
whole may ilnply concentration of plant in a limited 
number of states or regions. On the other hand, an 
equitable distribution of benefits implies the opposite. 
If industry is left to free market forces the result is 
likely. to be polarisation - as in the case of the EAC -
especially if there is initially a wide distribution in the 
level of development between the member economies. To 
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overcome the problem of polarisation various forms of 
industrial allocation have oeen devised. These include 
not only the allocation of plants but various concessions 
- such as duty free inputs, tax incentives etc - to 
encourage industry in general. However, in all of the 
examples above the instruments used have faced problems in 
implementation ~ in the EAC the trans.f er tax was to 
encourage industries that could be supported nationally, 
in practise inefficient plants that could not be supported 
nationally were set up. Although the Regime for Integrat-
ion Industries in Central A~erica was effectively made 
redundant by the General Treaty, Vaitsos (1978) also 
suggests that tne USA was a major factor in discouraging 
the integration industries regime. This type of pressure 
is liable to affect most third world countries, where 
threats of stopping aid (as in the case of the CACM) 
means that they do not always have the economic and 
political independence to allow integration schemes to 
fulfill the aspirations of the region. 
Perhaps many of the problems that confront regional 
cooperation are unavoidable, but the experience of other 
groupings can at least give an indication of likely areas 
of conflict. As will be seen in the case of CARIFTA/ 
CARICOM there are many similarities with the above 
examples that can provide useful information in the 
analysis of problems in the West Indies. 
Section le4~ Outline of Thesis 
In chapter two we provide an economic background to 
the Caribbean region and describe the integration process, 
instruments and objectives of Carifta/Caricom. To provide 
a basis for the methods of evaluation in this study, in 
chapter three we examine the standard theory of economic 
integration to determine the extent to which it can provide 
a basis for evaluating third world economic integration. 
Given the limited application of the standard theory we 
then suggest a possible role for economic integration in 
the third world based on the idea of integration as a 
framework for development and development policies. 
Based on the role of economic integration in the third 
world j we derive in chapter four an approach to evaluation 
that would isolate those effects of integration that are 
important for the third world. However, we do not intend 
to attempt a full cost benefit study and instead concentr-
ate on those effects associated with trade patterns. We 
present a trade flow model to be used in isolating the 
effects of integration on trade flows, with the ultimate 
objective of assessing the extent to which the trade flow 
model can isolate these effects. 
In chapter five we present the empirical results of 
the trade flow mOdel, the expenditure share approach and 
the changes in income' elasticities of import demand. 
These results provide the basis for evaluating the effects 
of economic integration on the West Indies. 
Chapter six is an attempt to evaluate Carifta/Caricom 
on the basis of and to the extent allowed by the results 
of chapter five. This is not an attempt to measure the net 
welfare position of regional integration, but rather an 
evaluation of the success or failure of a limited number of 
areas of economic integration with particular emphasis on 
trade patterns. 
Finally, in chapter seven we draw together the main 
points of the thesis and discuss the extent to which the 
trade flow model was capable of isolating the effects of 
economic integration on trade flows. 
CHAPTER TWO 
BACKGROUND TO THE CARIBBEAN REGION 
Section 2.1: Introduction 
Chapter two has two main objectives. First, we 
provide a general background to the economy of the 
Caribbean Community, supplemented by a more detailed 
analysis of the individual economies in Appendix A. 
Second, we describe the reg~onal instittutions and 
integration process in the region, outlining the 
objectives and instruments created by the Caribbean Free 
Trade Area (Carifta) and the Caribbean Community (Caricom). 
Both of these, sections are required as a background to the 
evaluation of Caricom in chapter six and as a complement 
to the estimated results, allowing their interpretation in 
the context of the integration process in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean. 
Section 2.2: Economic Background of the Commonwealth 
Caribbean 
Caricom consists of twelve British Commonwealth 
Caribbean territories: the more developed countries 
(MOC's) - Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Tr~nidad-Tobago, 
and the less developed countries (LDC's) - Belize, the 
three Leeward Islands - Antigua, Montserrat and St.Kitts-
Nevis, and the four Windward Islands - Dominica, Grenada, 
St. Lucia and St. Vincent. 
These territories share a common heritage as former 
British Colonies. Historically the dominant economic 
activity was the sugar plantation based on slave and later 
indentured labour and a secure metropolitan market. Under 
the colonial plantation system; the size of an island was 
not a relevant factor as they all could support at least 
one plantation at an efficient level given the prevailing 
technology. However, with the abolition of slavery and 
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was no longer viable. Ultimately with technological 
change and increased competition from Asian and African 
producers of agricultural goods the small size of the 
islands became a severe impediment to their economic 
development. 
Caricom had a total population of just over five 
million in the early 1980's, ranging from 12,000 in 
Montserrat to 2.3 million in Jamaica. Geographic area 
ranges from 39.5 square miles for Montserrat to 83;000 
square miles for Guyana, with ten of the twelve 
territories being islands. With their small geographic 
and population sizer and high degree of openess they are 
all extremely vulnerable to external economic events, in 
particular among the LDC" s, small size has been a severe 
constraint on economic development. Population densities 
vary greatly, and in all territories except Guyana and 
Belize, the ratio of labour to arable land is high. 
The LDC ,. s and Barbados depend on agricultural 
exports and tourism for their foreign exchange earnings, 
while raw or processed minerals are important in the other 
lvlDC's: bauxite-alumina in Jamaica and Guyana, and 
petroleum in Trinidad-Tobago, 
Although agriculture's importance has declined, it 
still remains one of the most important sources of 
employment, income and foreign exchange; for the region 
as a whole accounting for 10% of GDP and 30% of employment 
This sector plays a major role in Guyana and the LDC's, 
but in terms of income and employment is less important 
for Trinidad-Tobago and Barbados. 
The two major export crops are sugar, produced in 
the four MDe's, Belize and St.Kitts, and bananas, grown in 
Jamaica and the Windward Islands, and more recently in 
Belize. 
Agriculture has traditionally been divided into 1. 
large private estates or plantations, making use of the 
best land and have been the source of the region's , 
traditional exports, primarily sugar, as well as bananas 
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and citrus fruit, and 2. large numbers of peasant farms 
occupying a small proportion of the total land area, 
produci~g mainly sUbsistence crops and contributing 
only marginally and inefficiently to output for export. 
This pattern has changed, with most sugar plantations 
now publicly owned, and a higher share of total 
production coming from small cane growers. The smaller 
farms now also account for a larger share of the 
production of banana, citrus fruit and coconut 
production. 
The sector suffers from several structural and 
institutional weaknesses, that are a basic obstacle to 
development. The distribution of landholdings between 
the large estates and small farm holdings has 
constrained the development of this sector. The small 
size and fragmented nature of holdings worked by peasant 
farmers are often too small to be efficient as well as 
suffering from poor and inadequate use of inputs such as 
fertilizers, and the absence of proper soil conservation 
and irrigation methods. The combined effect of the small 
size of holdings, insecurity of tenure, sporadic 
~rovision of complementary services, and poor agronomic 
~ractices makes the smallholders one; of the poorest 
groups in the region. 
Estate agriculture also suffers from major 
inefficiences because of the volume of land that remains 
uncultivated. Estates typically cultivate one crop on 
the most suitable sections of their total holding, and 
land that becomes too marginal for the main crop may lie 
idle. Therefore the particular export crop, related as 
it often is to the needs of the parent company, is not 
necessarily the most appropriate crop for the land. 
There has been a significant movement of population 
away from the land, creating a chronic shortage of labour 
for the estates. This has been caused by the social 
stigma attached to plantation work, the attraction of 
high wages in the modern non-agricultural sector a~d ~y the 
comparatively more strenuous nature of agricultural work 
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especially where traditioftal methods are used. This 
labour shortage has led to the adoption of mechanised 
cultivation and other harvesting practises that have in 
some cases cut total output and yield. 
As a result, agricultural output has stagnated, and 
consequently the region's negative trade balance in 
foodstuffs has continued to worsen. Agricultural 
production for export fell by about 40% from the mid-
1960"s to the mid-l~70ts. 
The pattern of industrial development in Caricom has 
been restricted by the generally small size of the 
national markets, the lack of intermediate goods and 
except for the existence of bauxite and petroleum, by the 
scarcity of natural resources. As a result, manufacturing 
tends to depend substantially on imported inputs, local 
value added is small and few linkages have been generated 
within the domestic economies. Market size is reduced 
still further for individual items by product 
differentiation. 
Among the Caricom members a broadly similar pattern 
of industrialisation has arisen, although the timing and 
extent of their industrial development has varied. The 
extent of industrialisation ranges from the relatively 
developed manufacturing sectors of the MDC's especially 
in Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago, to the very simple and 
enclave type of industries in most of the LDC's. 
The development of industry in the Caribbean can be 
viewed as three successive layers. First, a group of 
products including clothes, low-quality furniture, cement 
blocks etc., that are labour intensive, use simple 
technology, can be produced economically on a small scale, 
and in many cases, a~e faced by a high cost of transport 
from external production centres. These types of goods 
are produced by most of the LDC's. Second, consumer 
goods( requiring larger scale production and more 
sophisticated technology. This category includes semi-
mass production shoes( margarine, beer, Cigarettes, soap 
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and various mixing and paekaging operations, such as 
those involving paints, fertilizers, cosmetics, 
pharmaceuticals and paper products. Guyana and Barbados 
have reached this stage of industrialisation, \vhile one 
or two of these industri,es are to be found in some LDC' s. 
Third, intermediate and consumer goods, requiring still 
larger scale production and greater technology. These 
include basic mass consumption intermediate products such 
as woven textiles, cement, bottles, tin cans, and locally 
assembled consumer durables including the assembly of 
bicycles, domestic electrical appliances and motor cars. 
Jamaica and Trinidad~Tobago have reached this stage. 
In general, industrial growth in the Caricom 
countries has basically involved import substitution in 
the case of final products, but greater import intensity 
in the case of inputs. 
Manufacturing has been actively encouraged since the 
1940's through a combination of government measures 
including fiscal incentives, and both quantitative and 
tariff restrictions on manufactured imports. A number of 
industrial development corporations have been established, 
to administer and guide the process of industrialisation. 
Governments have seldom provided capital either free or 
at preferential rates to prom0te industry. However, for 
approved activities, tax holidays, provisions for losses 
to be carried over, and liberal allowances for duty-free 
imports of investment goods and some intermediate inputs 
have been allowed. 
Rapid economic growth in the industrial countries in 
the early 1960's encouraged the development of a tourist 
industry. During the early 1970·s however, tourism was 
badly hurt by the simultaneous ~pact of the energy 
crisis and of sporadic civil disorders. 
Although tourism has provided the region with a 
significant portion of its foreign exchange earnings and 
created many jobs .. the ambivalent atti tude of the HDC' s 
toward tourism seems to have hardened into resentment. 
jO 
The 14DC's, with their relatively diversified economies, 
can perhaps afford to take a critical stand with respect 
to tourism, the LDC's cannot. To them it offers one of 
the very few available opportunities to develop their 
economies. 
Section 2.3: Regional Institutions and Integratio~ 
Regional cooperation is not a new concept within the 
Commonwealth Caribbean, attempts having being made since 
the early seventeenth century up to and including the 
formation of the West Indian Federation in 1958. The 
majority of these attempts failed, and it is interesting 
to note that most were inspired from outside of the 
Caribbean. 
~The course of parochialism has been long 
ingrained, and can be said to be a part of 
the political culture of the British West 
Indies. The concept of closer association, 
for the most part germinated and developed 
within the Colonial Office in London. Seldom 
in the nineteenth century did federation have 
local support or local encouragement'. 1. 
The earliest forms of cooperation were within the 
framework of systems of regional administration. In 1625 
Charles I granted authority to Thomas Warner as Royal 
Lieutenant in St.Kitts, Nevis, Barbados and Montserrat to 
create laws and establish a court system, but it was not 
until 1682 that Sir William Stapleton called a General 
Assembly with representatives elected from each of the 
islands and ~it might be said that the first session in 
1682 at Nevis was the first formal federation in the 
British West Indies.' (2) In 1711 the Federation 
1. Knowles (1972), p.3l. Knowles presents an extensive 
discussion of the history of federalism and 
integration in the British West Indies up to the 
formation of Carifta. 
2, Knowles (1972), p.23. 
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dissolved itself, this act being claimed as the 'most 
decisive of its career. t (3) 
A subsequent attempt at administrative cooperation 
between Grenada, Dominica, st. Vincent and Tobago met with 
a similar fate. 
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
and up to the interwar period this pattern continued. In 
1816 a govenor was appointed for St.Kitts, Nevis, 
Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands, and another for 
Montserrat, Antigua and Bermuda, but there was little 
political association between the islands. The attempts 
to federate the Windward islands in 1875 failed, in 
Barbados there were riots protesting against the 
imposition of federation. 
In 1889 Tobago was federated with Trinidad and 
shortly amalgamated, 'at the insistence of the British 
Government. I, (4} 
Over this period the indigenous opposition to 
federation was striking, even the proposal for the 
creation of a common Chief Justice for Grenada and St. 
Vincent in 1891 caused so much excitement that a 
warship had to be sent to maintain order, 
The opposition to and failure of the attempts at 
cooperation can be attributed to many factors. The fact 
that cooperation was imposed from London, rather than 
developing indigenously is obviously important, especially 
when 'what was involved was nothing more than an 
administrative consolidation of separate governments to 
suit Britain's purposes~. (5) To a large extent 
opposition to cooperation was based on the fear of the 
dominant local "ruling classes' of losing power. 
Opposition within St,Kitts against Federation in the late 
3 . Knowles (1972), p. 23. 
4. Williams (1962}, p. 147. 
s. Williams (1962), p. 249. 
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nineteenth century was expressed in terms of 'the fear 
that their affluence would be used to subsidise the 
economies of the less wealthy, more bankrupt islands'. (6) 
This is similar to the fears of some islands at the time 
of the West Indies Federation of 1955. 
The geography of the area also acted as a hinderance 
to cooperation, with the islands being scattered over a 
wide area, and the means of transport and communications 
being directed toward the metropolitan power rather than 
within the West Indies. The nature of the regional 
economy has compounded this problem as the major economic 
links have traditionally been between the individual 
islands and the U.K. All of these factors have lead to 
an insularity of mind, jealousy of internal power and 
the fear of "the imperialistic designs of the not so 
large neighbour". C71 
By the end of this period tthe very name of 
Federation was associated in the public mind with 
weakness, division, and misrule, instead of strength, 
union and good government t • (S) 
The idea of federation arose out of frustration 
with the slow progress of democracy under colonialism. 
Federalism was initially fostered by contacts among 
trade unionists and was seen as a vehicle for developing 
more democratic institutions. During the 1950's, the 
movement towards local autonomy advanced faster than 
that of Federalism among the larger Caribbean 
territories. By the time of its establishment in 1958, 
the West Indies Federation was no longer viewed as a 
necessary instrument of reform and when Jamaica withdrew 
in 1962 the Federation fell apart. 
6. Knowles (1972), p.26. 
7. Knowles (1972), p.12. 
8. Knowles (1972):, p.2S. 
a) Caribbean Free Trade Area (Carifta) (9) 
With the collapse of the West Indies Federation and 
the subsequent granting of independence to Jamaica and 
Trinidad~Tobago in 1962, a new era of cooperation in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean commenced. The idea of 2. regional 
economic association (modelled largely on EFTA) was 
revived in the mid-1960\s by Guyana. The establishment 
of Carifta on May 2nd 1968 was unique in that it was 
inspired indigenously rather than imposed by Britain. 
This was an important step in the realisation that 
economic independence at the national level could not be 
secured by political independence alone. 
The agreement provided for the gradual elimination 
of tariffs and quotas between the member states and a 
harmonisation of industrial incentives within the area. 
The objectives as stated in article 2 of the agreement 
are: 
(i) to promote the expansion and diversification of 
trade in the area of association. 
(ii) to secure that trade between member territories 
take place in conditions of fair competition. 
liii)to encourage balanced and progressive 
development of the economies of the area. 
(iv) to foster the harmonious development of 
Caribbean trade and its liberalisation by 
removal of barriers to it. 
LV} to ensure that the benefits of free trade 
are equitably distributed among the member 
countries. 
Although at this stage Carifta was based on the 
freeing of regional trade, it was also viewed as a 
dynamic process, which could lead to the following up of 
economic intergration and ultimately a Caribbean 
community. Carifta was to be one of several instruments 
for the broader aim of cooperation in the Caribbean. 
9. See Unctad (1982a), EI-Agraa (1982) and Chernick 
(1978) for further discussion of objectives and 
instruments of Carifta. 
At the same time the Eastern Caribbean islands 
(the relatively less developed members) were developing 
closer forms of cooperation which culminated in the 
formation of the Eastern Caribbean Common Harket (ECCM) 
in June 1968. 
In the first five years of Carifta's existence, intra 
~ regional trade increased considerably, but a large part 
of this increase occured in the MDC's,.while the LDC's 
were not able to expand their exports. It was felt in the 
LDC's that free trade benefitted only the MDC's who had a 
more developed industrial base and ~by 1972 Carifta was 
generally seen as inadequate to meet the needs of 
economic integration among the member states'. As a 
result the decision was taken in 1973 to replace 
Carifta with a new organisation the Caribbean Community 
(Caricom) - that would provide addi tional 
opportunities for economic integration, with an emphasis 
on obtaining greater benefits for the LDC~s. 
b) Caricom (10) 
Caricom was formally established on July 4th 1973 
by the prime ministers of Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and 
Trinidad~Tobago. Although the Treaty of Chaguaramas came 
into effect on August 1st 1973, Carifta was not formally 
superseded until May 1st 1974, by which time all former 
members of Carifta except Antigua and St.Kitts-Nevis had 
acceded to the new grouping. Antigua joined on July 5th 
1974 and St.Kitts~Nevis on July 26th. 
Caricom has three basic objectives: economic 
integration; functional cooperation in sectors such as 
transport, health, education, labour, information and 
services; and coordination of foreign policy. 
Economic integration is to be based on the common 
market, the coordination of common economic programmes, 
10. See Unctad (1982a), E1-Agraa (1982 and Chernick 
(1978) for further discussion of objectives and 
instruments of Caricom. 
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common action on extra subregional trade and related 
activities, and a special regime for the LDC's. 
The main instruments of the common market are the 
liberalisation regime and the common protective policy. 
These include both a common external tariff, removal of 
non tariff barriers as well as other institutions to 
promote ma~ket integration. 
The treaty provided for immediate liberalisation 
of trade in products originating in the region apart from 
products included in a reserve list. Duties were to be 
completely abolished by 1983, the LDC's being allowed a 
longer period to remove all duties. All quantitative 
restrictions - import quotas and licences - and other non 
- tariff barriers affecting intra-regional trade of goods 
originating within the region were to be eliminated and 
export duties, apart from those included in a special 
list; were to be abolished. In general, government aid 
that amounted to export subsidies was prohibited, and 
rules were established to deal with restrictive business 
practices, dumping; and other measures which might 
affect the free movement of goods within the common 
market. 
The common protective policy consists of the 
common external tariff and a regime for regional 
quantitati~e restrictions. At the time of signing the 
treaty, the four MDCts also signed an agreement 
establishing the common external tariff (CET) I which 
came into force on 1st August 1973. The LDC·s were to 
retain current import duties until 1977, and to have 
adopted the CET by 1981. However, in practice there are 
four separate tariffs l the CET for the MDC's, tariffs for 
the ECCM, the Belize Tariff and the Montserrat Tariff. 
The basic principle underlying the structure of the CET 
has been to charge very low rates of duty (6%-8%) on the 
capital goods and raw materials which Caricom needs for 
its industries, slightly higher rates on semi-manufactured 
articles and the hi9h~st rates on final products. 
The widespread, but differing national practices of 
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exempting certain industrial products from import 
duties present a special problem for the operation of 
the CET. To overcome this difficulty the CET Agreement 
established an Exemptions List of those industries 
where member countries would continue to allow, on a 
discretionary basis, duty exemptions for imported inputs. 
This list is, in fact, a consolidated list of all the 
nationally exempted industries and covers, therefore 
almost every existing industrial activity in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. 
The common protective policy (CPP) is complemented 
by the adoption of a regionwide quantitative import 
restrictions regime in place of separate national 
provisions. Under Article 33 of the Treaty, members 
undertake to administer their quota regulations and to 
consult on harmonisation with a view to attaining common 
regional quantitative restrictions as soon as possible 
after 1981. However, the differences between the 
national quota regulations combined with those of the 
Exemptions list provisions make for a regional trade 
regime which is not very rigorous. 
The other'~nstitutions required to promote market 
integration include a system of product origin and 
monetary cooperation. 
In a bona fide common market where once a product 
has entered any part of the common market and paid the 
CBT, it is allowed to circulate freely. However, in 
Caricom an important aspect of trade liberalisation is 
the system of product origin. Article 14 of the annex to 
the treaty laid down a set of rules of origin applicable 
to products marketed in the subregion. Under this system 
free access (within the region} was accorded to goods 
wholly produced within the common market, and to those 
in which any materials imported from outside of Caricom 
did not exceed 60% of the export price for the ~DC's and 
any other member 50% of export price. 
Because many raw materials and intermediate inputs 
were not produced in the regiQn, some two hundred 
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linported items were incorporated in a Basic Materials 
List, and treated as though they were of regional origin 
when used in the manufacture of products exported to 
other countries within the region. This value-added 
system has the disadvantage that it is possible for a 
manufacturer merely to increase his profit margins to 
satisfy the minimmn value-added requirement. The 
regional value-added of 50% is high by the standards 
of average levels of national and regional value-added in 
the MDC~s. Largely because of the Basic Materials List, 
it is estimated that the actual local value added 
component has been about 25 - 35% of final output value. 
Thus, the manner in which the percentage value-added rule 
has been designed and applied may have been conducive to 
inefficient production. 
The disputes arising from these practices led the 
Conunon Market Council in 1977 to adopt a new origin sys.tem 
based on a process criterion by which goods in order to 
qualify for free trade treatment would have to undergo 
specific processes. Apart from removing the controversy 
associated with the value added criterion, the new origin 
system was intended to encourage the greater use of 
regional raw materials in the manufacture of goods. 
In 1976 a Council of Quality Standards (COMSC) was 
established to advise on and harmonise quality standards 
in the subregion, particularly with regard to new products 
for export outside of the region. In 1977 the statutes 
of the Council were approved, fifteen proposals for 
quality standards in the common market countries were 
prepared and information was assembled on the nature and 
scope of services existing in the Community for the 
testing of samples, with a view to the compilation of 
a list that could be used by buyers and sellers. 
The members of Caricom engage in a modest degree of 
monetary cooperation. 
participate jointly in 
Authority (ECCA} which 
The Windward and Leeward Islands 
the Eastern Caribbean Currency 
issues the Eastern Caribbean dollar. 
Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago and Barbados all have 
separate currency issuing central banks. 
A number of agreements have already been reached to 
reduce the cost of the financial transactions between 
Caricom members, and to economise on country's holdings 
of international reserves. Since 1969, special 
arrangements have been in force for payments between 
member countriea/' These have taken the form of a series 
of bilateral agreements between member countries, whereby 
each monetary authority grants a line of credit to other 
members which can be drawn on to make day to day payments 
needed for intra-regional trade. This arrangement was 
modified in 1976 by relating credits to intra-regional 
trade flows, and in 1977, it was agreed to merge the 
network of bilateral credits into a multilateral clearing 
arrangement. Only the overall regional deficits would 
have to be settled in sterling or US dollars, thereby 
economising on scarce foreign exchange. 
The objectives of this agreement were; to facilitate 
payments among participants on a multilateral basis; to 
promote the use of national currencies and achieve 
economies in the recourse to currency reserves; and to 
promote monetary cooperation with a view to expanding 
trade and economic activity in the region. 
Given the small economic size of the individual 
member states, the industrialisation process was to be 
based on the region rather than on the national economies. 
One of the main benefits of integration in the region 
was expected to derive from the coordination of economic 
policies and development planning. Measures for the 
coordination of common economic programmes included:-
(i) the promotion of industrial development by 
the programming of industries; 
(ii) the adoption and application of the plan 
for the rationalisation of agricultural 
production; 
(iii) the development of natural resources and; 
(iv) cooperation in the sphere of tourism. 
For the application of these measures a number of 
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instruments including subregional programmes and projects, 
harmonisation of laws and regulations and the common 
regime for Caricom enterprises were implemented. 
The objectives for industry are based on greater use 
of raw materials from the region; the promotion of the 
development of interconnected industries both within each 
country and among member countries; finding ways and means 
to reduce the number of products and to obtain economies 
of scale corresponding to the size of the expanded market, 
which will promote greater industrial efficiency; the 
promotion of the export of industrial products to markets 
both within and outside the zone; and the promotion of an 
equitable distribution of the benefits of 
industrialisation, with particular emphasis on the need 
to set up industries in the LDC·s. 
However, in the area of industrial programming 
progress has been much slower than in agriculture. 
Substantial technical work has been done on the pulp and 
paper, and the cotton and textile industries, but the 
institutional framework has not yet reached the point 
where these studies can be implemented. 
By 1978, with plans to establish jOint development 
projects having been abandoned by most member 
governments, oil rich Trinidad-Tobago decided to embark 
on its own development programme. 
Beyond the expectation that Caricom would implement 
complementary production structures, it was also 
anticipated that there would be greater harmonisation and 
coordination of econmic policies in the specific areas of 
fiscal incentives to industry, intra and extra regional 
double taxation agreements, monetary payments and 
exchange rate policies, and the ownership and control of 
regional resources. In general the arrangements do not 
really contemplate formal convergence of these policies. 
The 'Agreement on the Harmonisation of Fiscal 
Incentives to Industry', signed in July 1973 by all the 
MDC's, now covers all twelve members of Caricom. 
Basically, there is an undertaking to offer fiscal 
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concessions to industrial investment and exporting. The 
Agreement allows a standard package of investment 
incentives similar to the various national programmes of 
incentives it replaces which emphaSise tax holidays and 
duty free imports of capital goods. A major feature of 
the new package however, is a variation in the length of 
tax holidays offered according to the level of 
industrialisation of the country and the degree of local 
or regional value-added in the activity qualifying for 
incentives. Exporting industries of the enclave type 
(exporting 100% of output) are treated specially, being 
given the longest tax holidays. In cases where activity 
has 10 - 50% local value-added, but where 100% of output 
is not exported, the MDCts can only offer investment 
incentives to 'pi(i)neer~ industries; however, the LDCts 
do not face this constraint. 
This agreement is supplemented by a series of Caricom 
double taxation agreements which are to encourage intra-
regional investment by ensuring that investments by 
Caricom nationals in other Caricom countries will not be 
discouraged by unfavourable treatment of repatriated 
income. 
In addition, tax concessions on exports were 
introduced in 1973. This common approach to export 
incentives was a significant new departure for the 
Commonwealth Caribbean countries, replacing specific 
export incentive laws in the case of Barbados and 
Jamaica, and minor concessions in the case of Trinidad-
Tobago. The new export concession is the same for all 
Caricom member countries and consists of a partial 
rebate of tax paid on income from exports. The rebate is 
proportional to the share of export profits in total 
profits, increasing as profits from the export share 
increases. 
There was also approval of a common regime for 
Caricom enterprises. The need for generally applicable 
legal rules facilitating the establishment of multinati-
onal enterprises in the Carib~ean zone arose because of 
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the many different legal regimes for existing enterprises 
in the subregion. This situation led to the approval of 
the regime for community enterprises. 
The regime lays down the requirements for the status 
of a community enterprise; such enterprises must be under 
subregional control and subregional objectives. The 
regime also prescribes the statutory procedure of 
rnultinational enterprises of Caricom and the treatment 
and advantages which member countries agree to accord 
such enterprises, 
One of the most important development strategies for 
the region is the Caribbean Regional Strategy for 
Agriculture. Its principle objective is to raise 
agricultural output tin particular in food crops) , 
employment and inoome. A number of strategy and policy 
decisions and agreements have been reached, including, 
the Agricultural Marketing Protocol (AMP), the 
Guaranteed Ivlarket Scheme (GMS) , the Oils and Fats 
Agreement COFA) and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
The AMP signed at the same time as the Carifta 
treaty, contains a series of provisions for the marketing 
of agricultural products, under which certain specified 
products are traded on the basis of agreed prices. The 
protocol also regulates import quotas to countries in 
surplus or deficit. In practice priority is given to the 
surpluses of the LDC's, over those of the MDC's, and 
member countries may be authorised imports from outside 
the region only when regional supplies are not 
available. 
The AMP was supplemented by a plan for guaranteed 
markets in 1972. Under the GHS, the MDC's undertook to 
acquire specific quantities of certain agricultural 
products from the LDC '0 s. Diff icul ties were encountered 
in applying the N1P, mainly due to such factors as 
inadequate means of transport, insufficient information 
on markets and the absence of efficient production plans 
permitting specialisation of agriculture. As a result, 
the Council of Ministers decided in 1978 to revise these 
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instruments. 
The OFA plays a similar function for oils and fats 
as the AMP does for other agricultural sectors. The OFA 
is quite important for the region, as the agricultural 
and manufacturing activities of the oils and fats industry 
taken together represent an estimated 5% of regional GDP, 
and trade within the region is greater than are imports 
from outside of it. 
The Treaty of Chaguaramas created new instruments 
and institutions for the promotion of agricultural 
development. A regional food plan (RFP) was approved in 
1975, aimed at achieving greater subregional self-
sufficiency in the production of foodstuffs, thus 
improving the regions balance of payments position, 
reducing the use of foreign exchange on food imports, 
and also raising the nutritional standards of member 
states. The plan is intended to supplement national 
programmes for agricultural development. Based on the 
objectives of the plan, the following subsectors were 
selected for priority attention: 
(i) livestock products, sheep, milk, mutton, 
lamb, and hatching eggs, 





cereals and grains; 
fruit and vegetables; 
animal feeds; 
production and/or bulk purchasing of 
agriculatural inputs. 
The Caribbean Food Corporation (CFC) is the 
implementing agency of the RFP. Although it was 
established in 1976, it was not until 1979 that some 
Caricom countries took legislative action to give the 
CFC an operational status. The CFC's function is to 
prepare, carry out and finance regional food programmes, 
and can make investments; establish, administer and 
operate enterprises, acquire, process, transport, market 
and distribute products; and partiCipate in any other 
activities in pursuit of its objectives. It is 
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anticipated that the CFC would, over a period of ten 
years, replace more than one billion Eastern Caribbean 
dollars in regional food imports. 
To overcome the problems of a widening income gap, 
the Caribbean Community has devised several schemes in 
favour of the LDC's. The special provisions for the LDC's 
can be divided into three sets of measures: (i) measures 
to facilitate LDC exports to the common market, (ii) 
measures to confer greater benefits on the LDC's in 
certain policy coordination instruments; and (iii) 
measures to promote a greater flow of resources into the 
LDC ~s. Some of the.se instruments were established since 
the inception of Carifta in 1968i many more were 
introduced as a "new deal' in 1973 when the common 
market was formed, 
The LDC's can obtain free entry for their manufact~ 
ured products in the markets of the MDC's if local value 
added is 40% as compared with a requirement of 50% local 
value added for goods produced in the MDC's. There has 
also been considerable strenghthening of the provision in 
Article 39 of the original Carifta agreement which allows 
the LDC's to introduce tariffs on goods imported from the 
MDC's in order to encourage the development of an industry 
in anyone of them. In future, the LDC's can impose 
quantitative restrictions as well as tariffs in such 
cases and the MDC t, S (except Barbados) will no longer have 
the right to retaliate, as they had under Article 39 of 
the original Carifta agreement. 
Furthermore, the LDC's will be allowed to grant 
export allowances (in respect of income tax) on goods 
exported to the MDC's (except Barbados) while the MDC's 
will be debarred from granting such allowances on exports 
to the LDC"s. These instruments are in addition to the 
continuing operations of the Agricultural Marketing 
Protocol, the Oil and Fats Agreement and the Guaranteed 
Markets Scheme for certain crops in the MDC's. 
In sum, the objective of the special regime for the 
LDC" s is to take capital and development (in both 
agriculture and industry) to the LDC's. Caricom does not 
impose an obligation on member countries to allow freedom 
of movement of persons, but, it has sought an effective 
substitute for such freedom of movement of persons in a 
planned and regulated movement of both public and private 
sector capital from the MDC's to the LDC's. 
ct East Caribbean Conunon Market (ECCM) 
In 1968, the seven islands of Antigua, Dominica, 
Grenad~, Montserrat, St.Kitts-Nevis, St.Lucia and St. 
Vincent formed the East Caribbean Common Market, with the 
idea of presenting a united front for all further dealings 
with Car.i.fta, which they joined at the same time. 
The ECCM Agreement aimed at a much more advanced 
form of economic integration among its members than the 
Cariita agreement, by providing for a common external 
tariff, freedom of movement of labour and capital, and 
for a far reaching coordination in agricultural, industrial 
and tourism development, and in development planning 
generally and for an extensive program of financial and 
fiscal harmonisation among the islands. 
The ECCM tariff has been drafted in such a way as to 
maintain on the whole, existing relations with the U.K. 
and Canada. In addition the tariff has been designed as 
an instrument for industrial development, while ensuring 
adequate budgetary returns to all member states. This is 
reflected in the structure of the tariff, which provides 
for duty free treatment (or very low rates of duty) for 
imports of commodities and machinery not available in the 
area. Goods which are, or could be, produced locally are 
protected by higher rates of duty. As a social instrument 
the tariff also provides for very low rates of duty ort 
prime necessities (basic foods and medicaments) and higher 
rates of duty on luxury items. 
In the industrial field, the ECCM in 1974 adopted a 
resolution instructing the Secretariat to prepare a list 
of thirty five industries (five in each membe=) to be 
established in the area. Thia list was approved and the 
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projects are financed by the Caribbean Development Bank 
(eDB - CARIBANK) and the Caribbean Investment Corporation 
(eIC} at an approximate cost of 12.5 million dollars. 
On June 18th 1981, the seven members of the EeCM 
signed a treaty establishing the Organisation of Eastern 
Caribbean States (~ECS1, which is intended to aid 
cooperation among the signatories and thereby enhance 
therr position within Caricom. 
d) Caribbean Development Bank CDB~CARIBANK 
The CDB was established on 18th October 1969, and 
began operations in January 1970. Its purpose is to 
~contribute. to the harmonious economic growth and 
development of the member countries in the Caribbean,and 
to promote economic cooperation and integration among 
them, having special and urgent regard to the needs of 
the less developed members of the region'. To th~s end, 
the Bank can assist its members in the coordination of 
their development programmes, mobilise additional 
financial resources within and outside the subregion, 
finance projects and programmes contributing to the 
development of the region or any of its Caribbean members, 
provide technical assistance, promote public and private 
investment in development projects by, among other means, 
aiding financial institutions in the subregion and 
supporting the establishment of consortia, and encourage 
the development of capital markets within the subregion. 
As an institution for financing subregional 
development, the Bank is responsible for channelling and 
granting loans to the countries of the area, so as to 
foster their economic development and strengthen the 
subregional integration process. The Bank devotes most 
of its financial resources and its technical assistance 
to the relatively less developed countries. The loans 
approved for 1970 -79 amounted to a total of 256 million 
dollars, of which 50,8% correspond to the LDC's. 
The Bank's loans for economic and social development 
have mainly been earmarked for projects directly connected 
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with agriculture, industry, tourism and infrastructure 
works. 
The aid programme to manufacturing industry in which 
the bank is engaged, mainly consists of direct financial 
ana technical assistance to the Governments so as to 
develop infrastructure for industry, give support to 
workshops and small industries and furnish direct loans 
to large~capacity enterprises. 
Over the period 1970 to 1979, 51% of all loans had 
been earmarked for the infrastructure sector, including 
energy, roadbuilding, port development, drinking water 
supply, sea and air transport and housing construction. 
e} Caribbean Investment Corporation (CIC) 
The crc was established in 1973, with the aim of 
promoting manufacturing and agro-industrial enterprises 
in the less developed countries. It is the main 
executing mechanism in the Caricom system for the 
promotion of the industries allocated to the LDCts, and 
complements CDB assistance by encouraging the flow of 
private investment. 
The corporation provides medium and long term 
development finance for suitable projects, primarily by 
subscribing to the equity of the firm concerned, but also 
through long term loans or by providing (guarantees for 
suppliers credits. 
By December 1978, the CIC had committed a total of 
870,000 US dollars, for the partial financing of twenty 
one industrial development projects in the LDC's. 
fl Functional Cooperation and Coordination of FOI:leign 
Policy 
Functional cooperation has concentrated on the 
health, education, culture and training, transport and 
energy sectors. There has been a Declaration on Health 
Policy, and a number of health development programmes 
have been initiated. In education and culture, there 
has been activity in fields such as adult education, 
research and the framing of cultural policy. There is 
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also a standing committee to deal with labour problems, 
and other programmes have been initiated in collaboration 
with the ILO and UNESCO. One of the major priorities of 
Caricom is the development of a transport system. In 
1.9.75, the West Indies Shipping Corporation (WISCO) was 
established, and operates as a commercial maritLffie 
transport enterprise, providing direct transport services 
for the LDCt·s. The Caribbean energy project is aimed at 
reducing the region"s dependence on energy supplies by 
develo:t?ing regional energy capacity and promoting and 
adapting technologies based on non-traditional energy 
sources. 
One of the tasks of Caricom is the coordination of 
foreign policy. Article 17 of the treaty of Chaguaramas 
established a standing committee of the member states' 




The Theory of Economic Integration 
Section 3.1: Introduction 
The evaluation of int2gration in the third world is 
central to this study, and the method of evaluation chosen 
and the effects of integration in which we are interested 
should be based on a theory that is relevant in the context 
of the third world, and in particular the Caribbean. I. 
Theory is built on assumptions that allow isolation of the 
variables and processes considered to be important and of 
interest so that when the theory is applied the assumptions 
should be relevant to the problems being considered. 2. 
To provide a basis for the methods of evaluation used 
In this study, we examine the standard theory of economic 
integration to determine the extent to which it can provide 
a useful basis for evaluating third world integration or 
whether the assumptions required by the theory render it 
inappropriate. In general, the assumptions of the basic 
theory do not conform to the preconditions found in the 
third world, and the requirements for successful integration, 
as suggested by Viner (1950), are not usually fulfilled by 
developing countries. 
Given the limited application of the standard theory we 
suggest a possible role for economic integration in the third 
world based on integration as a framework for development and 
development policies. Economic integration can provide 
certain prerequisites for development, in particular for 
industrialisation, which include for example a larger protected 
market and access to a greater resource base, as well as 
1. Although integration theory has evolved in different 
forms, appropriate methods of evaluation have not 
always developed concurrently. For example, there is a 
tendency in empirical studies to emphasise the trade 
flow pattern of integration, and to interpret them 
according to the orthodox theory, thus producing only 
a partial description of the process. 
2. In some cases the theory itself may assume away important 
and relevant problems. For example, orthodox theory 
assumes that no resources are unemployed; this is 
obviously contradicted in many third world countries 
where unemployed and underemployed resources are a 
major problem. 
providing a framework for exploiting both scale and dynamic 
economies. Essentially economic integration is viewed as a 
catalyst for regional development that creates conditions 
that are conducive to development planning. 
Once an appropriate theoretical approach is established, 
and we are aware of the likely effects of integration on a 
region, a relevant method of evaluation can be derived. 
Section 3.2: Concepts and Definitions 
The term 'international integration' has been used to 
refer to almost every conceivable aspect of international 
economic, social and political relations. It has also been 
defined as a process and as a state of affairs reached by 
that process. In this study although we are concerned 
principally with the economic aspect of integration, non-
economic factors, specifically societal and political, are 
.3. 
lmportant. Not only does economic integration require a 
certain degree of political integration, but the coordination 
of many economic policies involve essentially political 
decisions. Although political commitment to the concept of 
economic integration is crucial for its success, there has 
rarely been true integration of national political processes 
and institutions into regional institutions. What has tended 
to develop are parallel processes and institutions at the 
political level that provide a framework for the administrat-
ion of policies designed to achieve economic integration 
objectives. Furthermore, the emphasis is on political 
cooperation rather than political integration, principally 
because the majority of independent states wish to maintain 
their sovereignity as far as possible. As such, there is a 
basic conflict between regionalism and nationalism, the balance 
maintained being determined by the institutional requirements 
of cooperation objectives. In general, economic integration 
requires the parallel development of social and political 
integration as a necessary pre-requisite for the optimal 
functioning of the regional economy. 
30 See Nye (1971) and Orantes (1981) 
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Machlup (1977) has traced the origins of the concept 
of integration as used in economics. Although the term was 
first used in industrial organisations referring to the 
combination of business firms, he concludes that the term In 
the sense of international economic integration made its 
appearance between 1939 and 1942. It is generally accepted 
that the theory of customs unions and integration is dated 
from Viner's study in 1950, by which time the term was being 
'used more specifically ... to denote a state of affairs or 
a process involving the combination of separate economies into 
1 ", 4. arger economlC reglons 
The earlier work on international economic integration 
concentrated almost exclusively on customs unions and free 
trade areas, although it is now more common to subdivide 
economic integration into:-
Free Trade Area which involves the removal of 
quantitative restrictions and customs tariffs 
on the trade among the members of the grouping; 
Customs Union that incorporates a free trade 
area and unifies the tariffs of the member 
countries against non-members; 
Common Market that incorporates a customs unlon 
and abolishes all restrictions on factor move-
ments within the area; 
Economic Union that incorporates the common 
market and also provides for a certain degree 
of harmonization of economic, monetary, fiscal, 
social and counter-cyclical policies. 
These definitions imply a natural progression through 
the stages of integration from the liberalization of trade, 
to freedom of factor movement, coordination of policy and 
eventually total integration of member nations. 
5 
The first three definitions correspond to Tinbergen's 
'negative integration' incorporating those aspects of 
integration that involve the removal of discrimination and 
restrictions on trade and the movement of factors of production. 
4. Robson (1980) 
5. Tinbergen (1965) 
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An economic union on the other hand involves aspects of 
'positive integration' concerned with the 'modification of 
existing instruments and institutions and the creation of 
new ones for the purpose of enabling the market to function 
effectively and also to promote other broader policy ob-
jectives in the union' .6. 
Given this framework, economic integration can be defined 
both as a process and as a state of affairs. According to 
Balassa (1966) 'economic integration as a process, represents 
various measures leading to the suppression of discrimination 
between economic units of national states, and the resulting 
forms of economic integration can be characterized by the 
absence of discrimination in various areas .... the theory of 
economic integration will be concerned with the various 
forms of integration, the measures required for accomplish-
ing these objectives, the economic effects of integration 
and problems of optimization in an integrated area'. Alter-
natively, Kitamura (1966) refers to economic integration as 
a 'process in which an attempt is made to create a desirable 
institutional framework for the optimization of economic 
policy as a whole'. Pinder (1968) defines economic integrat-
ion 'as both the removal of discrimination as between economic 
agents of the member countries, and the formation and applicat-
ion of coordinated and common policies on a sufficient scale 
to ensure that major economic and welfare objectives are 
fulfilled' . 
For the purpose of this study we can consider two 
approaches to economic integration. First, economic in-
tegration can be considered as an objective in itself and 
consists of the 'process' of removal of restrictions on 
trade and factor movements within a region. The end result 
of this process is a state of affairs referred to as economic 
integration which is characterised by the absence of dis-
crimination in trade and factor movements. Second, economic 
integration can be considered as a method or framework with-
in which other objectives can be attained, the final objective 
in this case is not the creation of a form of integration as 
6. Robson (1980) p. 1. 
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such, but the solving of economic problems within a region, 
using economic integration as a tool in this process. 
Economic integration as an objective in itself including 
the associated resource allocation effects of trade 
liberalisation has rarely proved an effective approach to 
the problems of the third world. The removal of discriminat-
ion may be an important and generally necessary pre-requisite 
for successful integration, but unless we can assume a 
perfect neo-classical world, direct positive measures are 
required to obtain the desired benefits in a regional group-
ing. In the case of the third world the simple removal of 
trade restrictions has produced few benefits except for those 
members or subregions that are at a relatively more advanced 
level of development and are able to gain from trade 
diversion and creation. 7 . If integration is to be useful in 
the development of the third world, it should be treated as 
an approach to economic development rather than as a tariff 
issue and as such is important as a basis for development 
strategies at the regional level. Finally, it should be 
noted that the traditional hierarchical structure of stages 
of economic integration has in practice been confusing as 
the features of these stages are interwoven with no clear 
dividing lines. Furthermore, imposing a rigid structure of 
this sort in practice is unlikely to prove helpful in pro-
moting development objectives which may be achieved by more 
ad hoc approaches. 
Section 3.3: The Theory of International Economic 
Integration 
Prior to Viner's study 1n 1950 there had been little if 
any systematic treatment of economic integration, and it is 
generally recognised that his work provided the basis for 
modern customs union theory. 
Viner was concerned with the question 
' ... in so far as the establishment of the customs 
union results in change in the national locus of 
production of goods purchased, is the net c~ange 
one of diversion of purchases to lower or h1gher 
money-cost sources of supply'. 8. 
7. In particular, polarisation of industrial activity 1n 
certain regions has limited the distribution pf the bene-
fits of integration. This was the case for example 1n 
the East African Community. 
8. Viner (1950) 
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The removal or adjustment of intra-union tariffs 
effectively changes the relative prices of goods in the 
markets of the member countries and between member and non-
member sources of supply. This in turn affects the subse-
quent production, consumption and trade patterns. 9. Viner 
isolated two forms of change in trade patterns that re-
flected the removal of tariffs within an economic grouping. 
First, there would be those goods that prior to integration 
had been produced in a protected domestic market, but with 
the removal of intra-union tariffs were now obtainable from 
another union member at a lower cost. According to Viner 
(1950) 'where the trade creating force is predominant,one 
of the members at least must benefit, both may benefit, the 
two combined must have a net benefit, and the world at large 
benefits' . Second, there would be those goods that prior to 
integration were imported from a third (non-union) country, 
but with the removal of the tariffs on intra-union trade, 
were now imported from other union members. The competitive 
disadvantage of higher production costs experienced by the 
new union supplier is reduced by the removal of the intra-
un~on tariff and the creation of the common external tariff 
(CET) effectively raising the relative price of non-union 
goods. From the free trade point of view 'where the trade 
diverting effect is predominant, one at least of the member 
countries is bound to be injured, both may be injured, the 
two combined will suffer a net injury, and there will be 
injury to the outside world' .10. 
The welfare effects of the customs union were evaluated 
in terms of the resource cost of the new supplier, trade 
creation being a reduction in resource costs and therefore a 
benefit and trade diversion an increase in resource costs 
and considered a cost. The relative magnitudes of these two 
effects determining the net welfare change of the customs 
union. 
9. Assuming no economies of scale etc. the free trade 
area and common external tariff are effectively a 
once and for all relative price change. 
10. Viner (1950) 
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Meade (1956) criticised Viner's analysis for not pro~ 
viding a method for weighting the gains from trade creation 
and losses from trade diversion to produce a measure of net 
welfare of a customs union. Furthermore, Viner implicitly 
assumed constant costs of production and zero elasticity 
of demand for commodities, thereby excluding the possible 
price and income effects on demand of the change in relative 
prices. Meade relaxed these assumptions thereby allowing 
the possibility of substitution among commodities on the 
demand side. Under these new assumptions the formation of a 
customs union would not only influence the location of world 
production as analysed by Viner, but in addition the induced 
changes in relative prices would affect the pattern of world 
consumption. Union members would increase consumption of 
products imported from their partners while reducing their 
consumption of other products from the rest of the world. 
Lipsey (1957) developed a similar analysis of consumpt-
ion effects employing a modified general equilibrium approach, 
with ordinal community indifference curves. Within this 
framework he demonstrated that national and even world wel-
fare may be improved by a trade diverting customs union if a 
favourable consumption effect were to outweigh an unfavour-
able production effect. 
Although Meade and Lipsey's objections were valid for a 
general theory of customs unions, Viner's purpose had been 
misunderstood to an extent, and as suggested by Krauss (1972), 
' ... a correct interpretation of Viner requires the 
assumption that his purpose was not to establish 
a universal a priori law of customs unions based 
on production effects, but rather to focus 
attention on one particular aspect of the customs 
union problem that he deemed important'. 11. 
Based on these earlier works the traditional theory of 
economic integration is analysed in a comparative static 
framework under the following assumptions:-
(i) There is pure competition in commodity and 
(ii) 
factor markets; 
Factors are mobile within, but not between 
countries; 







Transportation costs are ignored; 
Tariffs are the only form of trade 
restrictions; 
Price accurately reflects the opportunity 
costs of production; 
Trade i~ balanced; 
Resources are fully employed. 
Under these conditions, a customs union based on the 
removal of intra-union tariffs and the creation of a common 
external tariff changes the relative prices of goods in the 
markets of the member countries and thereby alters product-
ion, consumption and trade patterns. Essentially the theory 
concentrates on the welfare effects of resource reallocation 
resulting from the price changes induced by the customs 
union. 
To illustrate the effects of an orthodox customs union 
we can consider a simple example of trade creation and trade 
d ' , 'h d l12· c . d B lverSlon In a tree country mo e. ountrles A an re-~ 
present the two union members, and country C the rest of the 
world. 
Referring to diagram 3.1:-
OW is world price, 
CET is common external tariff, 
OT(A) is pre-integration tariff levels, 
D is demand, 
S is supply, 
M(A) is imports from A. 
Before forming a customs union with B, country A is 
protected by a prohibitive import tariff of WT(A), and 
produces and consumes OS of the good. Country B is pro-
tected by an import tariff WT(B) and prior to integration 
domestic demand would be met partly by domestic production 
and partly by imports. In this case quantity demanded would 
be OP and quantity supplied from domestic sources would 
Imports from the rest of the world (C) would equal OM. 
therefore equal OP - OM. Furthermore, total tariff 
12. For this and further examples see Robson (1980) 
chapter 2. 
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revenues accruing to B would equal MP x WT(B). 
Countries A and B form a customs union with a common 
external tariff WCET. Country A would still produce and 
consume OS but as the common external tariff is less than 
world price including the pre-union tariff, country A will 
replace the rest of the world in supplying B's import demand. 
Country B now faces a combined supply curve S(B) + M(A) 
which includes potential imports from A. With the reduct-
ion in the price faced by consumers in B from OT(B) to CET, 
demand in B will expand to OQ, domestic production falling 
to OL and imports from A will equal OQ - OLe 
As a result country B will experience both production 
and income effects. In the first place production in B 
has fallen from OM to OL resulting in a saving in production 
costs equal to the area ~ Second, consumption has ex-
panded from OP to OQ with an associated consumer's surplus 
of ~ These two effects together constitute the trade 
creation aspect of the customs union. At the same time 
product formally imported from the rest of the world 
(OP - OM) is now imported from a higher resource cost source 
involving an increase in outlay in respect of the initial 
import amounting to (OP - OM) x WCET - this is the trade 
diversion effect. The net welfare change is therefore 
determined by the demand and supply elasticities as well as 
the intial tariff level and the common external tariff. 
Subsequent developments in the theory were based on the 
relaxation of assumptions as well as longer term effects. 
In particular terms of trade effects and economies of scale 
were incorporated. If it is assumed that the supply curve 
for the rest of the world is not perfectly elastic then 
b 'd d 13. possible terms of trade effects have to e conSl ere . 
If the formation of the customs union affects the demand 
for imports from the rest of the world, there will be a tend-
ency for the unions' terms of trade with the rest of the 
world to improve. The removal or reduction of intra-union 
tariffs will improve the terms of trade of partner countries 
with respect to both the tariff reducing country and the rest 
of the world, but the terms of trade of the tariff reducing 
13. See for example Mundell (1964) 
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country may improve or deteriorate with respect to third 
countries. Furthermore, the improvement in the terms of 
trade is greater the larger the tariff cut. It is not at 
all clear though if a customs union will provide a larger 
terms of trade gain than a non-discriminatory tariff re-
duction. 14 . 
With the removal of trade restrictions the effective 
enlargement of the market within the regional grouping will 
provide opportunities to exploit economies of scale. This 
is essentially a static concept, internal to the firm, re-
sulting in 'falling costs as the scale of output at any 
point in time increases with given factor prices,~5. 
Viner was aware of this 'one qualification in favour 
of customs unions'. 
'There is thus a possibility -that if the unit 
costs of production falls as the result of the 
enlarged protected market consequent upon 
customs union there will be a gain from customs 
union for one of the members, for both the 
members, and/or for the union as a whole, but 
there is the possibility - and often a probabil-
ity - that there will be a loss in each 
case'. 16. 
To take account of these static economies of scale 
effects Corden (1972) incorporated a downward sloping cost 
curve for domestic producers, as opposed to the upward 
sloping supply curve of the traditional analysis. This 
allowed the introduction of the concepts of trade suppress-
ion and cost reduction, the former reflecting the decrease 
in welfare following the replacement of imports from their 
most efficient source by less efficient domestic producers; 
similar to trade diversion in that a dearer source replaces 
a cheaper one, but differs In that the dearer source is a 
newly established domestic producer. The latter concept, 
cost reduction, reflects the increase in welfare associated 
with the reduction in the average cost per unit of domestic 
output when such output expands upon the formation of a 
customs union and average cost per unit is falling . 
14. See Arndt (1968) 
15. Cord en (1978) p. 249 
16. Viner (1950) 
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Essentially, the incorporation of economies of scale 
implies an extension of the concepts of trade creation and 
diversion ln much the same way as Viner's definitions were 
extended by Meade and Lipsey. 17. 
A major criticism levelled at the traditional theory 
has been its inability to provide a rationale for the 
formation of a customs union. It has been shown that all of 
the desired benefits of a customs union can be attained at 
less 'cost' (in a neoclassical framework) by more direct 
methods, for example non-discriminatory tariffs 18. 
Most of the earlier studies were concerned with the free 
trade aspects of a customs union, success being judged in 
terms of trade creation and other manifestations of more 
efficient resource use. A customs union may appear to be a 
step in the right direction for a free trader, but only with 
respect to intra-union trade. In practice however, customs 
unions are rarely considered as the initial stages of 
eventual world-wide free trade. There are more direct and 
efficient methods of achieving free trade objectives - even 
to attain economies of scale based on a larger regional 
market, a customs union is not necessarily the most efficient 
solution - therefore a free trader cannot logically support 
the formation of a customs union over other methods. 
Viner considered the customs union problem as one of 
free trade versus protectionism and argued 
'although with less conviction because it 
involves judgements about quantities in 
the absence of actual or even possible 
measurement, that with respect to most 
customs union projects the protectionist 
is right and the free trader is wrong in 
regarding the project as something, given 19. 
his premises, which he can logically support'. 
The free trade or classical Viner-Meade-Lipsey approach 
was shown by Cooper and Massell (1965a) and others to fail 
to provide a rationale for the formation of a customs union 
as it does not 'explain why a customs union would ever be 
'ff I' , 20. preferred to a non-preferential tarl po lCY . 
17. Economies of scale are discussed in more detail below. 
18. See Corden (1978) 
19. Viner (1950) 
20. Cooper and Massell (1965a) 
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They argue that a customs union is necessarily inferior to 
an appropriate policy of non-preferential protection in 
terms of trade liberalisation, and so could not be justified 
as a method for more efficient allocation of resources. 
From a free trade point of view participation in a 
customs union would have to be interpreted as irrationality 
on the part of the government and our welfare evaluation is 
in effect the costs of this irrationality. But, as argued 
by Johnson (1965) 
' ... the economist is left without a theory 
capable of explaining a variety of important 
and observable phenomena, such as the nature 
of tariff bargaining, the commercial policies 
adopted by countries, the conditions under 
which countries are willing to embark on 
customs unions, and the arguments and 
considerations that have weight in persuading 
countries to change their commercial policies'. 
To provide a rationale for participation in an in-
tegration scheme based on protectionist arguments within 
the orthodox framework, it first has to be established that 
protection is necessary to achieve an objective and second, 
it has to be shown that economic integration ~s the best 
available method of providing protection. 21 . In many cases 
economic integration is not the first best policy, but be-
cause of other factors notable political feasibility, in-
tegration may prove to be the more acceptable solution. 
Protection can be justified, given the existence of 
divergences between private and social costs and benefits. 
If the assumption that prices accurately reflect opportunity 
costs of production is relaxed then there is a case for in-
troducing subsidies or taxes to correct the distortion. 
Corden (1978) has shown that there is an hierarchy of 
policies available to correct a distortion, subject to 
certain assumptions about collection costs etc. 
21 . 
22. 
'For any given marginal divergence, or set of 
divergences there is a first best policy or 
set of policies. Essentially this policy 
involves making the appropriate correction 
as close as possible to the point of divergence'. 22. 
Robson (1968) p. 36 argues that 'if there is no case 
for protection, there is in terms of pure theory, no 
case for integration'. 
Carden (1978) p.28. 
61 
In most cases tariffs are not a first best policy. As 
you move down the hierarchy of options each policy introduces 
greater 'by-product distortions', and there would normally be 
a first best tax or subsidy with less by-product distortion. 
In terms of efficiency in correcting a distortion a non-
preferential tariff reduction is preferable to a customs 
union. 
However, this approach is product-by-product, assuming 
no collection or distribution costs and is not presented in 
terms of a general trade and development package. It may be 
the case that although a tariff has an associated by-product 
distortion, this may be outweighed by the low cost of 
collection of a tariff in comparison to a first best tax or 
subsidy. Therefore, in terms of correcting more than one 
distortion at a time a customs union may be the best frame-
work within which a tax-subsidy package could be executed. 
Johnson (1965) and Cooper-Massell (1965) independently 
tackled the problem of the rationale for a customs union by 
including public goods in terms of consumption of domestically 
produced goods in preference to imported goods. If there is 
a divergence between social and private costs, intervention 
lS required to achieve an efficient allocation of resources. 
In terms of the traditional model it is necessary to adjust 
the supply curve by the amount of the divergence. 
'An important by-product of the Johnson analysis 
is his demonstration of the potential superior-
ity of customs unions as compared with unilateral 
tariff policy when public goods are included in 
the communities social welfare function'. 23. 
Cooper-Massell emphasised the industrialisation aspect 
of customs unions, 'a principle objective of economic in-
tegration among less developed countries is to foster in-
dustrial development and to guide such development along more 
economic lines'. 24. Their analysis is based on the assumpt-
ion that there may be a social preference for particular 
types of economic activity,compared with other forms of 
activity. In this case they assume that the planners may be 
23. Krauss (1972) p. 427. 
24. Cooper and Massell (1965b) p. 462. 
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willing to accept a reduction in national income to achieve 
an increase in industrial production. In other words one 
dollar worth of home produced industrial output has a 
greater social value than one dollar of a similar import. 
To compare alternative production pos3ibilities, not 
only the national income, but the level of industrial pro-
duction associated with each must be taken into account. 
There is a demand function for industry which expresses the 
prlce (in terms of national income foregone) that planners 
are willing to pay for each increment to industrial pro-
duction. On the supply side there is a cost for each local 
industry which is defined as the amount by which the average 
cost of producing the industry's output exceeds the price of 
a comparable imported good. At the point of intersection of 
the demand and supply curves there is a tariff that provides 
enough protection to induce local production in the relevant 
industries. 
Cooper-Massell then consider the case of two countries 
who form a customs union, each country having a development 
plan consisting ofa list of industries to be developed. By 
pooling markets they are able to produce a given level of 
combined industrial output at a lower cost in terms of income 
foregone, each country concentrating on the industries in 
which it has a cost advantage. 
Andic et al (1971) expanding on this approach consider 
the two shortages in developing countries, the foreign ex-
change gap and the savings gap. First, the loss in national 
income will be counter-balanced by the savings in foreign 
exchange resulting from substitution of locally produced goods 
for imports. Second, the savings gap can be reduced 
differentially by the establishment of activities which use 
least capital or generate most savings. From these two 
benefit and two cost curves can be derived a net cost 
aggregate curve for each country. All industries where 
costs are greater than benefits are not considered. If the 
two countries form a customs union, the country with the 
least cost production now produces for both. 
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The Cooper-Massell approach presents the customs union 
as the most efficient method of achieving protection. 
Krauss (1972) has pointed out though, that although a 
customs union may be more effective than a non-preferential 
tariff when a public good is included, this does not mean 
that it is the first best policy. A direct subsidy or tax 
at the point of distortion is more effective than a customs 
union or tariff. Therefore a customs union is only to be 
preferred when direct subsidies are not available for 
political or other reasons; but a customs union could not 
be generally justified on these grounds. Krauss concludes 
that 
'The public good argument fails to provide a 
general economic argument for customs unions, 
and thus reinforces the validity of the 
Viner ian approach that customs unions are 
best viewed as essentially noneconomic 
institutions'. 25. 
As with the free trade case, the arguments for a 
customs union based on protection do not provide an undis-
puted rationale for participation in a customs union. 
Section 3.4: Problems of Orthodox Theory in the Third World 
It is not at all clear that the orthodox theory~ 26 
given its comparative static approach and restrictive 
assumptions is relevant to the third world. 27. It is not 
capable of answering the questions that are most important 
to developing countries, specifically, how would the process 
of integration dynamically change the structural conditions 
of production and technology, the composition of investments 
and the capacity to absorb externalities. 
The traditional theory of economic integration con-
centrates on the attainment of static efficiency, the 
analysis being confined to welfare gains and losses arising 
from varying degrees of specialisation resulting from the 
reallocation of given inputs of resources and shifts in the 
existing trade patterns under static assumptions. These 
assumptions require that inputs of factors of production 
25. Krauss (1972) p. 430. 
26. 
27. 
That is the theory based on Viner (1950), 
Meade (1956) and Lipsey (1957) 
For a similar conclusion see Robson (1968) p.32. 
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the state of technical knowledge, and the tastes and the 
forms of economic organisation to be constant; that trade 
within each country is perfectly competitive; that 
transport costs, external economies and diseconomies are 
considered negligible or ignored; that all factors are 
fully employed; that trade is balanced and prices 
accurately reflect the opportunity costs of production. 
The economic conditions and structure in the third 
world do not in general correspond with these assumptions, 
and perhaps more importantly the assumptions· remove 
features or problems of the third world. Third world 
market structures tend to involve a narrow industrial and 
market base that is underdeveloped; historically determined 
comparative advantage concentrates production and trade on 
a limited range of usually low technology goods; unemploy-
ment and under-employment of factors of production remain 
a major problem; distortions imply that prices do not 
always reflect the opportunity costs of production, and 
trade tends to be unbalanced, the general feature of the 
system being disequilibrium. 
It is therefore not surprising that 
'attempts to establish a theoretical basis for 
the doctrine of ... integration plans in the 
under-developed regions, should clash with the 
neoclassical theory of international trade 
that originated in the industrial centres and 
was extended to the field of integration .. I 28. 
It is not necessarily sufficient to reject the 
assumptions of the orthodox theory based on the observations 
that they do not hold in a particular situation. Restrictive 
assumptions are necessary to isolate fundamental processes 
or effects from other non-essential data. Relaxation of 
some of the assumptions to accommodate other factors may 
not substantially change the implications of a theory and 
to an extent this has been the case when static economies 
of scale and public goods were included in the standard 
integration theory. 
28. Wionczek (1966b) 
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It was recognised at an early stage that the pre-
conditions for successful integration within the neo-
classical framework were not in general evident in the 
third world. According to Viner a customs union is more 
likely to operate in the free trade direction 
1. the larger the economic area of the customs 
union and therefore the greater the potential 
for internal division of labour; 
2. the lower the 'average' tariff level on 
imports from outside the customs union 
area as compared to the level in the 
absence of a customs union; 
3. the greater the degree of rivalry of the 
member countries with respect to protected 
industries prior to customs union; 
4. the greater the difference in unit costs 
for protected industries and therefore 
the greater the economies to be derived 
from free trade with respect to those 
industries; 
5. the greater the range of protected 
industries for which an enlargement of 
the market would result in unit costs lower 
than those at which the commodities concerned 
could be imported from outside the customs 
unlon area; 
6. the smaller the range of industries for which an 
enlargement of the market would not result in 
unit costs lower than those at which they could 
be imported from outside the customs union but 
which could expand under customs union. 
Following the neoclassical model the essence of in-
tegration would consist of the freeing of regional trade, 
a common external tariff no greater than the average exist-
ing formerly at the national level, the prevalence of market 
forces with any new allocation of production factors based 
on comparative advantage, and limitation of industrial 
specialisation agreements that could create monopolistic 
29. 
situations, trade distortions and a loss of welfare. 
For an economy with an already established industrial 
base and with developed industries these recommendations 
may improve the allocation of resources and contribute to a 
higher rate of growth, but for an underdeveloped economy 
the result would be damaging to growth and overall develop-
ment p~ospects. 
29. See Wionczek (1966b) 
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The outcome of a third world customs union based on 
the removal of intra-union tariffs and the creation of a 
common external tariff will to an extent depend on the 
level of industrialisation and the geographic location of 
economic activities. 
First, the liberalisation of intra-regional trade Vla 
the removal of tariffs and other barriers to trade is un-
likely to contribute toward the growth or development of the 
region. The members are likely to be engaged in producing 
similar types of traditional products which have a limited 
capacity to expand in trade, production being concentrated 
on export markets in the industrialised countries. It is 
possible that the effective extension of the market for 
semimanufactured and consumer goods may have a positive 
effect on competition but is more likely to result in 
domination of the market by the more efficient producers. 
With no intervention in the market system it is unlikely 
that industrialisation will expand beyond import sub-
stitution of a limited range of consumer goods. 
It is usually the case prior to integration among third 
world countries that the prospective members are at differ-
ing levels of development and stages of industrialisation. 
One consequence of the total removal of barriers to trade 
under these circumstances lS a tendency towards concentration 
of industrial activity in a limited number of geographical 
areas. Industrial plants are not homogeneously distributed 
in any economic area, but tend to concentrate in certain 
regions, producing 'growth poles'. The main feature of a 
growth pole is the dynamic inter-action between production 
and the generation of savings, technological development 
and external economies. By imposing their growth rate 
throughout their zone of influence and by their dynamism 
they attract factors of production from other regions. 
The geographical location of these growth poles is 
originally determined by such factors as communications 
facilities, infrastructure and important natural resources. 
In terms of the efficient allocation of resources the ex-
istence of growth poles may be optimal but with the 
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associated distribution of perceived costs and benefits it 
may be unacceptable to some of the member countries especi-
ally those with little or no industry. This presents a 
dilemma, as the most efficient way to maximise the regions 
growth rate may be to allow plants to establish themselves 
according to free market principles with the consequent 
risks of polarisation. On the other hand, countries do not 
readily accept the concentration of economic activity, 
particularly industry, beyond their frontiers in some other 
member country and so urge the need for a degree of decen-
tralisation and geographical distribution of plants, even 
if this prevents the region as a whole from attaining the 
highest possible growth rate. Furthermore, the distribut-
ion of income is closely correlated with the distribution 
of industrial activity so the distribution of industry will 
have a negative economic impact on non-growth-pole areas. 
As growth poles tend to sustain and reinforce their growth 
there will be an increasing tendency toward polarisation 
of industry and income. 
Although theory would indicate that free market forces 
produce the most efficient allocation of resources, to 
build an industrial base this system will favour those 
states (or regions within a state) that already have an 
advantage through existing infrastructure and supporting 
industry. 
Any attempt to extend the industrial base will not 
only require the creation of new skills but, unless the 
developing country has its own capital goods industry, 
will involve the importation of necessary investment goods 
and machinery. Apart from loans and aid, foreign exchange 
sufficient to finance these imports will have to be earned 
by the export of traditional products. It was found in the 
case of Latin America in the 1950's that the import capacity 
ceased to grow at the rate needed to finance the expanding 
cost of industrialisation. Not only will Third World 
countries have to face the problem of polarisation of 
industrial activity within the region but their ability to 
extend the industrial base will be limited by the ability to 
earn foreign exchange from traditional exports. 
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Associated with the expansion of the manufacturing 
sector may be a contraction in the agricultural sector 
caused by various factors including the expected gains from 
working in the industrial sector and a bias toward industry 
ln new investment. This can lead to a decline in the out-
put of this important sector that may restrict both the 
growth of regional demand and the ability of the region to 
produce sufficient food for local demand. Continued 
deterioration of agriculture will inevitably lead to the use 
of scarce foreign exchange to import food rather than on 
capital and other imports. 
Free trade within a third world grouplng will there-
fore tend to increase inequality within the region. Although 
in theoretical terms this geographically unbalanced growth 
may achieve overall regional growth, in practice it has 
tended to produce tensions within regions that have eventua-
lly led to the breakup of attempts at integration. 
An integration program based solely on the freeing of 
trade will not ensure a fair distribution of the associated 
benefits and costs. This is a problem of the misapplicat-
ion of an approach to a situation in which the desired 
results are effectively different from thoseof the theory. 
'Those who would entrust the fate of a customs 
union of countries in the process of develop-
ment to the forces of free competition are 
endeavouring, quite superficially, to extend 
to the rest of the world doctrines based on 
certain historical experience accumulated in 
very limited fashion and under substantially 
different circumstances by the economically 
advanced countries'. 30. 
Section 3.5: The Role of Economic Integration in the 
Third World 
It is generally recognised that the orthodox theory of 
economic integration, concerned with the attainment of 
static efficiency through the reallocation of a given stock 
of factors of production in response to a change in relative 
prices, may not always correspond with economic development 
objectives. Although the significance of integration for the 
30. Wionczek (1966b) p.lO 
third world lies in potential dynamic effects 31 and 'pros-
pective gains from rationalising the emergent structure of 
production',32 it is also accepted that a theoretical 
case for integration has not been established. From both 
the free trade and protectionist approaches to integration 
it has been shown that there are more efficient methods of 
achieving stated objectives. For example, although a 
customs union may be more efficient in creating an indust-
rial base than national protectionism, it would be more 
efficient still to use export subsidies. However, to judge 
the merits of economic integration we have to be aware both 
of the economic objectives and the available methods of gain-
ing these objectives. In many cases the choice of frame-
work is perceived as being between national and regional 
protection. 
At the most general level, the objective of economic 
integration is to promote economic development; more 
specifically, three broad key areas can be identified. 
1. The creation and growth of an industrial base 
including heavy capital goods as well as manu-
facturing. 
2. Increasing and improving the skills and employ-
ment potential of the population. 
3. Development of the agricultural sector as a 
supplier of inputs to and as a market for the 
products of the industrial sector, as well as 
providing a secure source of food supply. 
Although industrialisation and development should not 
be equated, the two processes are closely associated and 
'in another sense industrialisation denotes a set of policies 
31. These dynamic effects include those associated with 
mastery of new technology, learning how to use it, 
adapting it and stretching it. The direct effects 
would be reflected in higher productivity resulting 
from use of the particular technology, but much of 
the impact spills over into related activities. 
'The cumulative sequence of technological changes 
which have been observed to follow the establishment 
of a new activity may be more important than the 
initial establishment of the activity'. See Westphal 
(1981) p.7. Westphal discusses dynamic effects in the 
context of infant industry protection. 
32. Robson (1980) p.146. 
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which, more than any other broad set of policies is seen as 
a means towards economic development' .33 In most cases 
economic development involves structural changes which trans-
form a country from a predominantly agricultural society to 
one with a bias toward manufacturing. Whatever the causal-
ity between industry and economic development, industrialisat-
~on is recognised as the most important dynamic factor in 
the process of accelerated economic development and growth; 
it 'usually provides a focal point in the development 
strategy of developing countries 34 , and very few countries 
have developed without industry.35 
'Apart from a handful of oil-rich countries, the 
most rapidly growing developing countries have 
been those that, without neglecting other sectors 
have achieved the most efficient and rapid growth 
in manufacturing industries. While some develop-
ing countries have benefited from the ownership 
of rich raw material resources, industrialisation 
has had a much greater impact on their style and 
standard of living'. 36. 
Industry has been perceived as a path to greater 
political and economic independence, providing employment, 
raising productivity and living standards as well as induc-
ing 'necessary and desirable changes in social and cultural 
attitudes and institutions through the "modernising" impact 
.. h d d hI' ,37. of imported organ~sat~onal met 0 s an tec no og~es . 
Industrial investments tend to have more potential for 
backward and forward linkages than other sectors of the 
economy, as well as providing inputs to and being a source 
. 1 1 38. d . 1 .of demand for the agr~cu tura sector. In ustr~a 
activity is particularly conducive to the creation of inter-
33. Sutcliffe (1971) p. 3 
34. Ghantus (1982) p. 24 
35. See Sutcliffe (1971) p. 67 
36. Hughes (1980) p.12 
37. Colman and Nixson (1978) p. 180. 
38. All of these points are discussed and challenged by 
Sutcliffe (1971) chapter 3. 
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industry and inter-sectoral linkages and hence provide 'grow-
lng points' in the economy. 
Although industry has been presented as a crucial 
component of development this does not imply that it can be 
considered as a development strategy on its own. If any-
thing, emphasis on industry should be interpreted as a 
priority rather than an alternative to agricultural de-
velopment. 39 . 
Conceptually, third world countries have at least 
two (not necessarily mutually exclusive) approaches to 
40 foster economic growth and development; the inward-look-
ing autarkic path and the outward-looking path of export 
expansion, thus presenting 'a choice between producing 
goods for overseas markets (export-led growth) or for the 
domestic market (import substitution)' .41 
The inward oriented approach is closely associated 
with import substituting industrialisation, involving 
policies designed to encourage indigenous development forces 
within the national framework. This is achieved primarily 
by policies encouraging the establishment of domestic in-
dustries behind protective barriers, thus allowing the 
economy to gain the benefits of employment, alleviation of 
balance of payments constraints and as a method of 
accelerating industrialisation. Emphasis on import sub-
stitution reflected the postwar view that the prospects 
for export-led growth were unfavourable, in the case of 
primary products because of slow growth in demand and 
historically deteriorating terms of trade, and in the case 
of manufactured goods because of the barriers to trade with 
the industrial countries, and the cost of subsidies nec-
essary to support infant industries. 
39. Sutcliffe (1971) p.72. And as shown by Sutcliffe, all 
of the advantages of industry can also be attained in 
agriculture. 
40. Neither of these on their own has proved a general 
method of successful industrialisation, and in prac-
tice neither approach would be considered in isolation. 
41. Colman and Nixson (1978) p. 187 
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Import substitution as a path to economic growth at 
the national level has faced several constraints. First, 
it has been constrained by the size of domestic markets that 
have limited the benefits from economies of scale and the 
extent of product specialisation that allows the manufacture 
of parts, components and accessories on an efficient scale. 
In most cases import substitution has not significantly 
alleviated foreign exchange constraints as the process has 
tended to replace one type of import for another. 42 . The 
ability to continue importing, especially capital goods, 
machinery and raw materials has emerged as a serious con-
straint. 
'At the beginning of the 1950's, the process of 
import substitution in the field of consumer 
manufactures in the larger countries of Latin 
America had just about reached its limit, and 
the import capacity of almost all the republics 
in the region ceased to grow at the rate needed 
to finance the expanding cost of industrialisation. 
This last phenomenon is owing, among other causes, 
to the exceedingly rapid technological progress made 
by the industrially advanced countries'. 43. 
The smaller an economy the more severe these con-
straints and the higher the costs of protecting 'infant 
industries', the more restricted the possibilities of est-
ablishing industries catering exclusively for domestic 
demand. 44 . Finally, industrialisation based on import 
substitution implicitly assumes that imports are the most 
suitable area for industrial specialisation without taking 
into account available resources and potential areas for 
45. 
creating a comparative advantage. 
42. For example, replacing consumer goods by capital goods. 
43. Wionczek (1966b) p.3. 
44. Domestic demand is likely to be reduced further as 
higher costs and prices caused by tariff protection 
will in turn lead to a reduction in market demand 
unless price elasticity of demand is zero. 
45. Suitability of products for import substituting 
industrialisation is largely based on the fact that 
demand already exists. But part of this demand may 
be specifically because the product is an import -
for example foreign luxury goods. 
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As an approach to development, import substituting 
industrialisation based on the national market alone is 
not a feasible option for the majority of third world 
countries given the high costs of protection, the market 
size requirements and the restrictions on choice likely to 
f 46. ace consumers. 
The outward oriented path is based on policies designed 
to encourage growth through export expansion, either by re-
lying on free market forces or by encouraging certain export 
industries with subsidies and other methods of support. 
First, the laissez fa ire approach would imply the pro-
duction and export of labour or resource intensive commodit-
ies. This would constrain the third world to concentrate 
on areas of production determined by historical comparative 
advantage. A country's comparative advantage could be 
changed by appropriate policies of export subsidies and 
grants, but based on the export market which may only allow 
the development of a limited range of products (or product 
groups) rather than a broad industrial base. This may 
restrict future options for the direction of development. 
Whichever approach to export expansion is chosen, the 
economy (or sector of the economy) is relying on the export 
market, in particular on the willingness of the industrial-
ised countries to allow third world access to their markets. 
In this context account has to be taken of the history of 
both non-tariff-barriers and the escalating tariffs that 
have faced third world exporters. Finally, account has to 
be taken of the finance required to subsidise industries 
until they are producing at minimum cost outputs, until 
the workers have been appropriately trained and until the 
new products have established themselves in world markets. 
It is in the context of the common economic objectives 
and constraints facing the third world that economic In-
tegration is important as an alternative development 
46. A further critique of import substituting industrial-
isation can be found in Sutcliffe (1971) p. 260 and 
Colman and Nixson (1978) p. 193 
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strategy lying between export expansion and national pro-
tectionism. Those nations attempting industrialisation 
at the national level face constraints of market size that 
limit both the scale of operations and thus the benefits of 
cost reduction, and the breadth of industry that could be 
supported by a larger market. On the other hand those 
nations-concentrating on export expansion face problems 
of market access as well as the costs of subsidising the 
export sector. 
Economic integration can provide an alternative path, 
incorporating aspects of both import substituting industr-
ialisation and export expansion ln terms of the protected 
regional market and the removal of restrictions within the 
region, as well as providing a framework for development 
and industrialisation pOlicies. 47 . As such, economic inte-
gration can no longer be viewed simply as an alternative to 
free trade; rather the choice is 'between the national 
protectionism of each country and integration - in other 
d - 1 -., 48. wor s, regl0na protectl0nlsm. 
Economic integration therefore provides through 
market extension and protection important preconditions 
that can aid development, in particular the opportunities 
to exploit economies of scale as well as those associated 
with time. 
Oreof the major obstacles facing third world industrial 
. . k' . 49 h h lsatlon has been mar et Slze constralnts t at ave re-
stricted the benefits from economies of scale. If certain 
areas of production are to be efficient some minimum economic 
size may have to be attained. In the manufacturing of inter-
mediate products and durable goods in particular, efficient 
operations require large-scale production. Economies of scale 
47. See Linzano (1976) p. 276. Industrialisation will not 
necessarily occur just because the conditions are 
favourable (e.g. market size) but will require planning 
and direc.tion. 
48. Linzano (1976) p. 277. 
49. The size of the market is determined by a variety of 
factors including the size of the country, per capita 
income, income distribution, population density, trans-
portation costs, leve~ of protection and the access-
ibility of export markets. 
Also see Sutcliffe (1971) Chapter 6. 
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refer to falling costs of production per unit of output 
as the level of output increases. In general, the larger 
the market (or demand available) the larger the 
scale of production the market can support and the lower 
the unit costs. 
Economies of scale can arise both internally and ex-
ternally to the firm or plant. Internally they are realised 
from the division of labour, the integration of production 
processes, increasing returns to scale and indivisibilities 
in the use of machinery. External economies of scale are 
associated with social overhead capital and perhaps more 
importantly for industrialisation, with the effects of one 
investment on the profitability of other investments; the 
larger anyone firm, the more likely it is to be able to 
t . 11 . d . 50. suppor anCl ary In ustrles. We also have to take into 
account the possible benefits of both the concentration and 
overall size of an industrial base. 
According to Sutcliffe (1971) engineering and cost 
studies have shown that the characteristic static average 
cost curve for modern industrial products is one which 
falls over a large range of output. Empirical evidence is 
lacking in this area, and although it is reasonable to 
accept that increasing returns to scale are important and 
obtainable this will depend on the production techniques 
h . f . . d d 51. used and on t e specl lC In ustry concerne . 
The removal of intra-union tariffs and the imposition 
of a common external tariff provide the member countries 
with a potentially larger market. But, for this potential 
to be realised needs more than the removal of restrictions 
and the automatic forces of the free market system. 
Economic integration 'cannot guarantee an enlargement of the 
market for industrial products; it is simply permissive 
and may have to be reinforced by numerous items of government 
50. For a more extensive discussion see Sutcliffe (1971) 
Chapter 6. 
51. For example economies of scale are important In the 
Petroleum and Steel industries. 
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policy' .52. In other words integration provides a framework 
that allows market extension, but any gains will depend on 
the existence of potential economies of scale and whether 
regional policy allows the freedom of movement of the 
factors of production as well as of final products. 
The protection provided by economic integration may 
also permit the attainment of dynamic economies associated 
with new industry which has no inherent disadvantage but 
only a present inferiority of acquired skills and experience. 
There is an expectation that over time the costs facing the 
industry will fall as the necessary skills and experience 
are acquired. 
In the words of J.S. Mill, 
'The superiority of one country over another in a 
branch of production often arises only from 
having begun it sooner. There may be no in-
herent advantage on one part, or disadvantage on 
the other, but only a present superiority of 
acquired skill and experience. A country which 
has this skill and experience yet to acquire, may 
in other respects be better adapted to the pro-
duction than those which were earlier in the 
field ... But it cannot be expected that individ-
uals should at their own risk, or rather to 
their certain loss, introduce a new manufacture, 
and bear the burden of carrying it on until the 
producers have been educated up to the level of 
those with whom the processes are traditional. 
A protecting duty, continued for a reasonable 
time, might sometimes be the least inconvenient 
mode in which the nation can tax itself for the 
support of such an experiment'. 53. 
There are those economies that are internal to the 
firm, where it is assumed that costs fall the longer a firm 
has been in production. There is a learning process over 
time such that, 
'when factors of production are engaged in producing 
output in a particular year two products really 
result, visible current output, saleable currently 
on the market, and the invisible accumulation of 
experience and knowledge, in fact th~ cr~ation of 
human capital. The process of learnlng 1S a form 
of investment which builds up a stock of productive 
capital'. 54. 
52. Sutcliffe (1971) p.230. 
53. Mill J.S. as quoted in Corden (19;8) p. 248. 
54. Corden (1978) p. 250. 
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Learning may be acquired at any stage of the product-
~on process and involves for example, market familiarisat-
ion, quality improvements in the product and gaining of 
experience by workers and management. Experience is 
accumulated over time and the firms efficiency improves, 
resulting in falling costs of production (or increasing 
quality). It is important to note here that this argument 
does not depend on the scale of operations but the length 
of time production has been in progress. 
We can also consider dynamic economies that are ex-
ternal to the individual firm. lIn the dynamic growth 
context lIexternal economies" are effects which one invest-
ment project has on the profitability of another' .55. 
Specifically, the production of one firm may create a 
capital asset the product of which is freely available to 
another firm. Under these conditions the first firm should 
be encouraged to produce an amount of the asset that'takes 
into account its marginal product to the second firm. 
External dynamic economies include labour training 
where once workers have been trained in the use of 
specific machines, as well as developing la willingness to 
submit to the disciplines and rigours of work in factories 
d l ' f' .. I 56 11 b d an ~ e ~n c~t~es, they are not usua y oun to any 
particular firm and so may change employment if they current-
ly receive less than their marginal product. Externalities 
will also exist when knowledge is made available to all 
firms , but at a cost to only one of them. This includes 
creation of new technology or the adapt ion of given tech-
niques to local conditions. 
Although the training of labour and the acquisition of 
knowledge is desirable from a social point of view, individ-
ual firms may be unwilling to make the necessary investments 
unless they were awarded protection or subsidies. 
We can also consider the interdependence of investment 
decisions. If current market prices do not accurately re-
flect future as well as present demand and supply conditions 
55. Grube1 (1966) p. 333 
56. Corden (1978) 
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investments made on the basis of these prices will not 
maximise the social return to resources. It may be the case 
with two industries that are complementary, that the more one 
of them expands the more the other will be able to expand. 
Although returns from an investment made in either of these 
industries may not be profitable, if the investment decis-
ions were coordinated, simultaneous investments in both in-
dustries could result in higher rates of profit. 
These dynamic effects are more closely associated with 
industry rather than integration, but these dynamic effects 
may be obtainable within the integration framework and will 
be determined by the extent to which new industry is en-
couraged and the degree of protection given the economy. 
These benefits are derived from the establishment and 
survival over time of industries, but for the small develop-
ing countries market size restrictions may in fact be a prob-
lem that could be solved within the regional framework. Al-
though these arguments are independentof scale, it is likely 
that the larger scale and breadth of industrial base that an 
integrated market can support, the greater the dynamic bene-
fits accruing to industry. 
The discussion has focused on necessary preconditions 
for regional industrialisation. Economies of scale and 
dynamic economies require market extension and protection 
over some period of time, both of which can be provided in the 
integration context; free movement of trade within the 
region creating a larger market and the common external 
tariff (common protection) the time required for dynamic 
economies to become effective. These preconditions are 
largely 'permissive' in providing the environment within 
which industrialisation can be pursued. Economic integrat-
ion also creates other conditions and effects that aid 
regional economic growth. 
Integration of production allows access to a larger 
natural resource base, providing a more diverse range of 
inputs, that in turn, through backward and forward linkages 
allows a broader range of outputs and value added. 
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At the regional level this enhances the breadth of potent-
ial comparative advantage. With market extension, there 
will be greater scope for other input supplying and output 
demanding industries to be economically feasible. It is 
important that industries that can create forward and back-
ward linkages be encouraged rather than basing industrial-
isation on 'enclave' or 'screwdriver' activities that may 
not be geared toward the needs of the region and contribute 
low value added without necessarily providing linkages with 
the rest of the economy. Economic integration can provide 
the framework for an integrated industrial base that may 
not be feasible at the national level. A broader industrial 
base also provides potential for the development of more 
skills, both managerial and technical. Although many skills 
can be acquired through the education processes, use of these 
skills and 'learning by doing' are also essential elements. 
Development of an adequate infrastructure at the re-
gional level may be more effective than at the national 
level. In particular transport and marketing facilities 
are notoriously underdeveloped in many third world regions. 
By nature of their development within the colonial frame-
work, transport systems have tended historically to be 
geared toward trade with the industrialised countries, 
local transport systems being inadequate to the extent 
that regional trade may be restricted. Development of this 
type of infrastructure should enhance the prospects for 
improved trade and development and competitiveness of 
local industries within the region. Pooling of resources 
in other areas including a regional university and research 
and development institutions geared toward the needs of the 
region are potentially important within integration. Al-
though this type of cooperation may not usually come under 
the effects of economic integration, the framework may aid 
those projects that have potential long term effects for 
regional development. 
Enlargement of the market within an integration frame-
work will tend to eliminate risks and uncertainty regarding 
foreign transactions. Greater knowledge of each others 
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markets and, for example, the bringing together of business-
men, will help in creating a more optimistic climate of 
expectations, especially if the integration framework is 
viewed as being long run. Better contacts and the security 
of the regional market will he7.p in encouraging higher levels 
of complimentary investment and act in creating or aiding 
the process of discovering new investment opportunities. As 
a result new and more efficient productive capacities and 
higher levels of income will be generated, and hence greater 
demand for a broader range of goods and services. An im-
proved investment climate will also help in encouraging 
foreign investment that may be more conducive to the de-
velopment of the region. 
Integration can act as a framework for the development 
of common policies (political and economic) toward the rest 
of the world. As such, the total may be greater than the 
sum of the parts in bargaining power vis-a-vis other 
economic groupings and international organisations. This 
is relevant to the political and economic independence of 
the region in having greater control over the direction and 
type of development. For many third world countries this 
aspect is particularly important. 
All of these effects are potential and the economic 
integration framework allows their exploitation. But some 
degree of intervention will also be required. In particular, 
development of an integrated industrial base will require 
regional planning that should be reflected in national 
plans. Some form of allocation of industrial plants may be 
necessary to overcome potential polarisation, and allow the 
smaller members of the grouping opportunities in industry. 
In some of the smallest third world economies, development 
of a broad industrial base may be almost impossible. This 
may result from lack of natural resources or very small 
populations so that apart from traditional cottage industr-
ies and small scale farming, any other form of industrialisat-
ion that is not capital intensive may be restricted by 
market size, available labour force and infrastructure. It 
is likely that plants or factories that are established will 
rely to a considerable degree on the export market. For 
these economies, the region can provide an important market 
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as well as allowing them to partake in industrial processeso 
In these cases linkages between the various parts of the 
production process will be of paramount importance. In all 
areas of development including the basic agricultural ex-
ports on which they rely for most of their export earnings 
(and which are subject to the movement of international 
prices) these countries will rely on the regional market 
as a source of demand and aid if they are to diversify 
their economic structures: 
Planning will also be required to establish the areas 
of potential comparative advantage within the region and 
take measures to ensure the development of these areas, 
providing the support necessary for establishment of industry. 
A similar process will be required in the agricultural sector, 
creating a balance between regional food supply and cash 
crops as well as integrating agriculture into the in-
dustrialisation process. 
Section 3.6: Conclusion 
In this chapter we were ultimately concerned with the 
role of economic integration ln the third world, and the 
extent to which the traditional theory of economic integrat-
ion could provide a useful basis for analysis of third 
world integration. Establishing a theory relevant to the 
particular cases and problems being considered is important, 
because the methods of evaluating the effects of integrat-
ion and the actual effects we look for will be derived from 
theory. 
The traditional theory of economic integration was con-
cerned with the attainment of static efficiency and welfare 
gains and losses arising from varying degrees of specialisat-
ion resulting from the reallocation of given inputs of re-
sources and shifts in the existing trade patterns under 
static assumptions. However, the preconditions existing in 
the third world do not generally correspond with those 
expected in the model and required for successful integrat-
lone Furthermore, the assumptions made effectively dis-
counted the basic problems that concern the third world, 
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and the theory did not address the question of how the 
process of integration would dynamically change the 
structural conditions of production and technology, the 
composition of investments and the capacity to absorb 
externalities. 
The role of economic integration in the third world 
has to be viewed in the broader context of economic de-
velopment. The complexity of the development process, 
and the associated political and other 'non-economic' 
aspects, means that the role of economic integration may 
not be easily separated from overall development. We 
suggest that economic integration should be viewed in terms 
of a framework for development policies at the regional 
level. It provides an alternative to nationally based 
import substitution or export-led strategies and helps to 
overcome some of the basic constraints facing development 
by providing the framework for the development of an inter-
connected regionwide industrial base. In the short run 
economic integration creates the preconditions that allow 
the exploitation of economies of scale and dynamic effects 
associated with industrialisation. It creates a potentia-
lly larger resource base that within the regional context 
can be the basis of a broader and more efficient industrial 
base. It also provides a framework for other forms of 
cooperation - in infrastructure, common services, education, 
research and development, etc. - as well as increasing 
bargaining power in international negotiations and providing 
a suitable framework for the receiving and using of aid. 
Economic integration in the third world should not be con-
strained to 'negative' integration nor should it be viewed 
as an alternative to other development policies, rather it 
should be approached as a catalyst that creates conditions 
conducive to regional development. 
Finally, by approaching integration from the economic 
point of view, we are only taking into account one part of 
the overall process of integration and development, where-
as many of the effects and the rationale for integration 
may be non-economic in nature and outside of the traditional 
framework. 
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Based on this approach to the role of economic in-
tegration in the third world we are able to examine the ex-
tent to which methods of evaluation are able to isolate the 
effects of integration. In chapter four we discuss the 
approaches to evaluatl0n used in other studies and suggest 
an alternative approach for .evaluating economic integrat-
ion in the third world. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Empirical Evaluation of Economic Integration 
Section 4.1: Introduction 
Although the bulk of the literature on economic 
integration has been devoted to providing a theoretical 
rationale for the establishment of integration groupings, 
~it seems to be generally agreed that an a priori 
~ judgement regarding the net effect of customs unions on 
trade flows cannot be made'. (1) As we are dealing with 
a theory of second best it may be impossible to provide 
an unambiguous rationale without invoking the conditions 
of a particular case. It would seem therefore that 
proving the relevance of economic integration will rely 
on empirical evaluation. 
In common with many other areas of economics, 
appropriate methods of evaluation have not always 
developed along with the theory. (2) In part this can be 
explained by the continued dominance of the main 
theoretical framework in determining what the most 
important effects of integration are and how they will 
manifest themselves. (3) 
Evaluation is not just an academic exercise to 
'prove' the validity of a theory but is of very real and 
immediate importance for those countries considering 
participation in a regional grouping as well as indicating 
1. Balassa (1967) 
2. For example Mayes (1982) p.28 .. 'It is a common finding 
in economics that the development of the theory on a 
particular topic and the development of empirical 
research have pursued rather different courses. It is, 
however, difficult to think of a better example of 
this divergence than the study of the effects of 
economic integration'. 
3. Principally, the effects of economic integr~tion on, 
trade patterns thus reflecting the comparatlve statlc 
reallocation of resources and production patterns 
resulting from relative tariff changes. 
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the progress of and acting as a guide for the future 
direction of groupings already in existence. At the most 
general level the purpose of evaluation is to judge whether 
or not the desired objectives of integration are being 
achieved and at what economic cost. 
The criteria by which integration is judged will 
depend on the factors considered important within the 
theory, and by the objectives and the definition of 
integration. (4)_ As such 'there is probably no single 
measure that is adequate to portray all the facets of a 
broad concept like economic integration. It is important 
to be explicit about what aspects of the concept one's 
measuresare designed to tap'. (5) 
:, 
In chapter 3 we outlined a possible role for 
economic integration in the third world that presented 
integration as a framework for development rather than as 
an objective in itself. The purpose of this chapter is 
to derive an approach to evaluation that would isolate 
those effects of integration that are important in the 
third world. 
We first discuss the different approaches to 
evaluation - the degree of economic integration; the 
effects of economic integration, and the distribution 
of the costs and benefits of economic integration. 
However, all of these approaches are partial in nature; 
and to an extent are restricted in being able to totally 
isolate the effects they are looking at. However, this 
limitation on evaluating integration has to be accepted 
as inevitable in any empirical work. 
Based on these methods we suggest a broader 
framework for evaluation based on the role of economic 
integration in the third world. This involves a range of 
80ssible effects including those on trade patterns, the 
4 . 
5. 
For example in Kunz (1976) p.l~5/. 'We ded~ced.th: 
meaning and progress of economlC lnteg~at~on In ~he 
CMEA primarily be reference to the baslc lnterests 
of socialism'. 
Nye (1971) p.31. 
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development of industry, the effects on employment and 
income, price and cost changes, and external economies. 
It is to be hOPed however that this framework will 
present a broader perspective on the progress of economic 
integration. 
It is admitted though, that to attempt the full cost 
benet it analysis would be a: ~very large task and we do not 
attempt it here. Rather we concentrate on one aspect of 
it, associated with trade patterns. We present a trade 
flow model to be used in isolating the effects of 
economic integration on trade flows, with the ultimate 
objective of assessing the extent to which the trade flow 
model can isolate these effects. We then discuss two 
other approaches - changes in income elasticities of 
import demand and the share of expenditure in apparent 
consumption - that will be used to crosscheck the results 
of the trade flow model and to supply additional 
information on the effects on trade flows. 
Finally, we should be aware that our judgements will 
not be based on a value free method of evaluation. An 
important consideration in any empirica.l work is the 
stress that is automatically placed on measureable 
factors. Obviously this will be a problem in any 
quantitative study, but we should also bear in mind as 
far as possible the importance of qualitative factors 
that cannot be easily measured. 
Section 4.2: The Degree of Economic Integration (6) 
The first general area of evaluation to be considered 
is the degree of economic integration. As will become 
increasingly evident, the interpretation given to any 
particular aspect of evaluation will be determined 
largely by the particular objectives and approaches of 
an integration project. We can define the degree or 
progress of integration as being measured with reference 
6 • This section and section 4.3 and 4.4 are based to a 
large extent on Robson (1980) chapter 11. 
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to the deviations from the a~s of the integration 
process. (7) In this way we run a smaller risk of using 
inappropriate indicators in judging the progress of 
integration. For example, if we define integration as 
the abolisruaent or suppression of discrimination between 
member states, (8) then the relevant indicators would 
include the mobility of factors of production and 
commodities and the equalisation of prices within the 
region. (9) On the other hand, in Third World groupings 
for example, abolition of discrimination may not be an 
objective, rather positive discrimination in the 
allocation and direction of investment into particular 
industries or geographical areas may be a major objective. 
In thiscase aggregated mobility of factors of production 
is unlikely to provide any indication of the degree or 
progress of integration. 
According to Robson, (1980) the majority of 
quantitative studies concerned with the degree of 
economic integration have not been concerned with the 
institutional conditions themselves but with the effects 
they have on the mobility of factors of production and 
commodities, that is with the effects of the degree of 
integration rather than the actual degree of integration. 
In particular this indicator has been based on trade 
flow statistics, and the relative shares of intra and 




Results have shown that for developed country 
See Lundberg (1976) p.llS 
See Balassa (1966) for a range of definitions of 
integration. 
However, Nye (1971) p.28 states that 'it is.interest-
ing, from this perspective, to note t~at prlces of 
many goods and factors continued to dlffer 
considerably among the EEC countries e~en after the 
abolition of tariffs and quotas. And It was long 
after the formation of the United States that there 
began to be an equalisation of factor prices among 
the different regions of the country.' 
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groupings, principally the EEC and CMEA, intra union 
trade has accounted for over fifty per cent of total 
trade, and in the case of the EEC intra trade has grown 
more rapidly than total trade. (10) On the other hand, 
third world groupings have not appeared as successful 
when judged by this indicator, with intra-bloc trade 
stagnating at low percentage shares of total trade. 
This type of measure does not indicate the extent to 
which any changes in intra trade are a reflection of 
integration rather than other factors. Furthermore, 'the 
degree of integration is a relative concept that refers 
implicitly to the extent to which the potential for 
profitable integration is actually exploited. Actual 
trade and capital flows throw little light on the 
opportunities that remain to be exploited'. (11) This 
measure also ignores the problem of relative economic 
development. In the case of the EEC the members started 
from a reasonably well developed economic structure and 
expansion in trade was rapid. On the other hand most 
Third World countries did not trade extensively with each 
other before integration and started from a less 
established industrial position. In general the members 
of the grouping are likely to be exporting the same types 
of con~odities, based on primary and primary-related 
activities. Expansion of regional trade will probably be 
based on new activities, in particular of manufactured 
goods, which will not be revealed in trade flows until 
these new industries have been established. Furthermore, 
regional trade in the third world tends to be limited by 
underdeveloped infrastructure and marketing facilities. 
Expansion of trade is not the only indicator of the 
degree of integration. Equalisation (or at least 
convergence) of factor prices and associated factor 
10 See Robson (1980) chapter 11. 
11. See Robson (1980) p.165 
movements will also indicate progress in the removal of 
obstacles between economies, although changes in factor 
movements may still take place even if barriers remain 
unchanged. 
Measurement of the degree of integration is not 
particularly useful in iso~ation and has to be related to 
both the objectives and methods used in an integration 
programme. 
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Section 4.3: The Effects of Economic Integration 
Most emphasis has been placed on evaluating the 
effects of integration on the net welfare position of the 
group. This has been principally, although not 
exclusively, in terms of the llnpa~t of integration on 
trade flows as revealed through the traditional concepts 
of trade creation and trade diversion. Following Viner 
(1950), trade creation has been equated with tbenefits' 
and trade diversion with 'costs'. (12) 
In general, the earlier studies tended to be ex ante 
estimates of the integration induced effects usually based 
on the example of the EEC. (13) Ideally, the estimation 
process should involve a forecast of trade in the post 
integration period assuming the union would not be 
established and a forecast assuming it would be 
established. The main problem however is estimating the 
hypothetical outcome of trade with integration without 
having had any prior experience of integration. 
However most ex ante studies have tended to base 
their estimates on actual trade information from a base 
year. For example the most often quoted ex ante-approach 
as followed by Verdoorn (14) was based on the actual trade 
matrix for 1951. Verdoorn was estimating the effects of 
the elimination of internal (union) tariffs on trade flows 
and on the terms of trade. By assuming a price elasticity 
of demand for imports from all sources and a share 
elasticity of imports from non-members the effects of the 




From Robson (1980) p.12, Trade creation refers to a 
union induced shift from the consumption of higher cost 
domestic products in favour of lower cost products 
of the partner country, and trade diversions refers 
to a union induced shift in the source of imports 
from lower cost external sources to higher cost 
partner sources. 
For example Verdoorn (1954), Janssen (1961) and 
Krause (1963a and 1963b) as quoted in Balassa (1967). 
As quoted in Robson (1980) p.168. 
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imports from different sources was estimated. 
Obviously the accuracy of these forecasts will 
depend on the reliability of the estimated elasticities. 
Verdoorn's elasticities were based on aggregate 
measurements, although it is more desirable that separate 
import demand functions should be estimated for individual 
commodity categories. In addition we have to question 
whether or not the effect of a tariff is the same as that 
of an equivalent price change. It has been argued (15) 
that tariff elasticities substantially exceed the usual 
import demand elasticities. The removal of tariffs may 
be perceived as irreversible and non-linearities due to 
threshold effects may cause the import response to a 
large price cut to be proportio.nally larger than the 
response to a small cut. 
Other approaches to ex ante estimates of integration 
effects have not been so widely used but include (i) the 
survey method which would involve for example asking 
industrialists how they expect changes in trade barriers 
to affect their sales in the domestic market and the 
markets of the partner countries, and (ii) the direct 
method that analyses domestic and foreign data relating 
to costs and prices in the countries concerned. (16) 
In general, ex ante studies have by and large been 
concerned with the effects on trade of changes in 
relative prices caused by the removal and realignment of 
tariff barriers, with little attention paid to other 
possible effects that could result from increased 
competition, economies of scale and so forth. 
The majority of empirical studies have been ex post 
in nature and as such have been able to use historical 
data relating to existing integration groupings. This 
reduces the element of speculation with the estimation 
of the hypothetical outcome assuming integration has not 
occured being the major problem. In cornmon with ex ante studjes 
15. Waelbroeck (1976) p.90 
16. See Robson (1980) p.167 for further discussion of 
these two methods. 
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though, the basic effects of integrat~on are analysed in 
terms of its total impact on trade flows. Most of the 
estimation is carried out by the residual imputation 
approach under which the effect of integration is 
computed by comparing actual tra.de to an 'anti-monde' 
constructed by projecting trade flows under the assumption 
that no integration had taken place. (17) 
The early ex post attempts (18) at estimating the 
!integration effect' were based almost exclusively on the 
available trade flow data. These studies either compared 
pre and post integration shares of trade with union and 
non-union partners, any changes being attributed to the 
effects of integration, or extbapolated pre-integration 
matrices to create hypothetical non-integration trade 
flows. 
The validity of this type of trade share approach 
depends on the assumption that market shares would have 
been stable in the absence of integration. This implies 
there were no 'significant changes in tastes, technology, 
costs and competitivenes.s, or in, commercial policy other 
than tariffs or exchange controls'. (19) To take account 
of these non-integration induced changes one approach 
suggested is the use of a 'control group' that is subject 
to the same growth effects but is not influenced by 
integration. It may then be assumed that in the absence 
of integration the members of the regional grouping 
would have experienced similar growth rates. (20) 
Although this modification may produce more dependable 
results it is still being assumed that the union members 
and the 'control group' would have grown at the same 





See Waelbroeck (1976) p.90 
Early ex post attempts include Waelbroeck. (1964) and 
Verdoorn and Meyer zu Schlochtern (1964) In Balassa 
(1967) . 
Robson (1980) p.170 
Waelbroeck (1976) p.91 
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A further problem has creen the separation of the 
'integration effect' into trade creation and trade 
diversion. In attempting to provide an indication of 
trade creation and trade diversion, Waelbroeck (21) 
suggested the use of regression analysis, explaining 
trade flows by gross national product and geographic 
distance. The equation was specified as;-
a. b ci 
X{j = c Ci c j (Yt Yj ) / rtj 
where: - Xtj is exports of i· to j, 
~~ is GNP of countries i and jl 
c~cjare their export and ~~port 
p,arameters indicating the 
t'openness· of their economies, 
~j is the geographic distance 
between i and j, 
c is a scale factor. 
Assuming that the coefficients c, Ct , cjwould 
remain unchanged over time, Waelbroeck estimated a and b 
from cross-section data of world trade in 1958 and from 
this extrapolated world trade from 1958 to 1962. He was 
then able to compare these hypothetical trade figures with 
actual trade and thus estimate the various components of 
the Jintegration effect'. 
This study is principally criticised (22) on the use 
of average income elasticities of export supply and 
import demand, calculated in a cross section analysis of 
all trading countries and then applied to the case of a 
small subgroup (the customs union). Furthermore changes 
in opposite directions at the individual commodity group 
level may be concealed within an aggregate measure. 
Truman (23} on the other hand approaches the problem 
of measurin9 the integration effect more directly, using 
changes in domestic production as well as in international 
trade flows, thereby: ,being able to establish the size and 
21. Waelbroeck (1964) in Balassa (1967) 
22. Balassa (1967) 
23. Truman as described by Robson (1980) pp.171 - 174. 
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direction of the domestic production effect, necessary 
for estbmating trade creation. The analysis is based on 
shares of expenditure in apparent consumption where, 
C -





y X + Mf + Mw 
expenditure on apparent conslli~ption, 
gross domestic product, 
exports, 
imports. from partners, 
imports from non-members. 
The. following trade shares can then be defined: 
1. Domestic share DS - (Y X )/C 
2. Partner share PS - Mp /C 
3. Non~member share WS - Mw IC. 
In any one year DS + PS + WS - 1, 
and b. DS -+ bPS + AWS = O. 
Chari(jes from one period to the next were then defined 
~PS )1 0 indicates gross trade creation, 
~DS ( 0 indicates net trade creation, 
DaWS ( 0 indicates trade diversion 
as: 
Gross trade creation is measured by the increase in 
trade among members of a grouping regardless of whether 
this trade is replacing domestic production (trade 
creation) or non-member trade (trade diversion). Trade 
creation is measured by the fall in the domestic share and 
hence the replacement of domestic production by both 
partner and non-partner sources. Trade diversion is 
measured by the fall in non-partner trade and hence the 
replacement by domestic and partner sources. 
An alternative approach suggested by Balassa Q967) is 
based on the comparison of ex post income elasticities of 
import demand in intra-area and extra-area trade for 
periods preceding and following integration. These 
elasticities were defined as the ratio of the average 
annual rate of change of 
gross national product. 
import demand would have 
imports to that of 
Assuming income elasticities of 
remained unchanged in the 
absence of integration, the following are defined. 
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1. Gross trade creation as a rise in the income 
elasticity of demand for intra-area imports. 
2. Trade creation as an increase in the income 
elasticity of demand for imports from all 
sources of supply. 
3. Trade diversion as a fall in the income 
elasticity of d~aand for extra-area imports. 
By comparing the relationship of internal and 
external trade to GNP between the pre-integration and 
the post~integration periods, it is asserted that this 
method abstracts from changes in the growth rate of 
national income, and provides comparable estimates of 
trade creation and trade diversions. But, it is 
largely concerned with the static effects and as 
admitted by Balassa no account is taken of the effect 
of integration on economic growth. When applied to 
extra~area imports this method has the drawback of 
ignoring the growth of total imports, consumption or 
income within the grouping4 It is therefore not 
possible to say how far changes in the growth rates 
of extra~area imports is the result of integration or of 
these other factors. 
In general the methods used to determine the 
'integration effect' have been based on the residual or 
difference between actual and predicted trade flows. 






autonomous changes in prices in the supplying 
and importing countries, 
changes in income, consumption or some other 
variable representing macroeconomic activities, 
changes in variables other than income or 
consumption and autonomous price movements, 
revision of tariffs, ie. integration, 
residual errors due to the random error term in 
the estimating equation, misspecification of 
the form of the equation, errors in the data, 
omission or misrepresentation of certain 
variables etc. 
Most of the studies above have only taken into account 
number (ii), and have assumed the remaining difference is 
due to number (iv), ignori~g (i), (iii) I and (v). 
Finally, we can consider an approach that attempts to 
measure the effects of integration directly by using a 
trade flow model (24) in which dummy variables are 
incorporated to represent the effect of integration on 
intra-union trade. In this approach trade flows are 
determined by national income, population and geographic 
distance between the two trading partners. The equation 
also includes a dummy variable for trade flows between 
union members (intra-union trade). Using cross-section 
data over pre- and post-integration years, a series of 
parameter estImates are produced that can be considered in 
terms of whether their pattern indicates the expected 
cumulative growth in intra-union trade. By estimating the 
preference or integration effect as an independent 
variable in a multiple regression equation, one is able to 
hold constant other major variables which affect trade. 
The preference parameter can be used to estimate gross 
trade creation, and to provide information useful in 
determining when the first integration effects occured. (25), 
Unfortunately, in this form of equation, extra-union 
trade is used as the 'normaliser' (26) so that a further 
dummy variable for extra-union trade cannot be included. 
Therefore, to measure trade diversion, use of the residual 
method (27) was resorted to. But, this type of approach 
has perhaps come the closest in providing a more direct 
measurement based on trade flows as well as being able to 
24. This type of method was used by Aitken (1973) and 
~elzman (1977). 
25. Pelzman (1977) was able to determine the start of 
integration effects statistically. 
26. Basically, trade between the union and the rest of 
the world is used: to represent normal trade thus 
precluding the addition of a further dummy 
variable to measure the t~ade diversion effect. This 
is discussed in Chapter 5, when we attempt to 
overcome this problem. 
27. As only the gross trade creation effect could be 
estimated directly trade creation and trade 
diverslon had to be based on the difference 
between actual trade and hypothetical trade. 
97 
show when integration first had any effects. 
At this stage it is worthwhile discussing one of the 
attempted evaluations of economic integration in the Third 
World. This is interesting in that although the method of 
estimation may be similar, the interpretation (in welfare 
terms or in terms of desired objectives) does differ. 
Willmore (1975) I using methods similar to those of 
Balassa (19671 compared the pre- and post-integration 
elasticities of import demand for the CACM. It was 
assumed that in the case of integration among developing 
countries there would be an attempt to accelerate import 
substituting industries and this would be reflected in 
trade diversion. In effect this is a reversal of the 
traditional welfare roles played by trade creation and 
trade diversion. But( the expected trade diversion result 
may also be counterbalanced (at least in the short run) by 
increased imports from the rest of the world of necessary 
capital goods and raw materials required in the early 
stages of industrialisation. 
Willmore expands the categories defined by Balassa to 
include trade suppression (high cost domestic production 
replacing low cost non-member production) and external 
trade creation (low cost non-member production replacing 
high cost domestic production). He also defines: 
1. Gross trade creation as the sum of integration 
induced imports from partners that replace 
domestic production and the external trade 
creation that results in the replacement of 
domestic production by imports from non-member 
countries. 
2. Gross trade diversion as the sum of intra-
regional L~ports that replace extra-regional 
imports and the domestic production that 
replaces extra~regional imports. 
3, Trade creation refers to the replacement of 
domestic production by imports from partners. 
4. Trade diversion refers to the replacement of 
imports from non-members by imports from 
partner countries. 
This section has covered the main me~hods used in 
estimating tfue effects of economic integration. iThese 
have tended to be based on trade flow data although 
measurement of domestic effects has been incorporated 
directly by Truman. Trade flows are the principle form of 
transaction between separate economies (the basic unit in 
integration), and as such their measurement and changing 
patterns are important in the context of the evaluation of 
economic integration. However, it should also be 
remembered that trade patterns do not reveal all of the 
effects of integration on a region. 
Section 4.4: The Distribution of the Costs and Benefits 
of Integration 
The previous section was devoted to the impact of 
integration on the regional grouping as a whole, but from 
the point of view of the success of integration, members 
are likely to be more interested in the distribution of 
the gains and the costs of being a member. As discussed 
above there is a possibility that integration schemes 
will tend to favour the more advanced members who benefit 
from the liberalisation of trade and the expansion of 
markets. (28) 
Attempts at measuring the distribution of costs and 
benefits have been characterised not only by reference to 
trade flows, but to national income, distribution of 
industrial activities, operation of common services and 
the pattern of tax revenues. 
From the pOint of view of income or employment the 
benefits and costs have been calculated in terms of the 
increase in national income due to new firms being 
established behind tariff barriers, other members 
benefits being assessed by the increase in exports to the 
first country, Benefits have also been determined in 
terms of the increased aggregate value produced by the 
expansion of intra-area trade and the consequent 
increase in national income and the volume of employment. 
(29) 
28. This is associated with polarisation effects for 
example. See Unctad (1973) p.10. 
29. For example Brown(1961) and Segal (1970) discussed 
in Unctad (1973). 
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Another approach has been to estimate what the 
development of a countrJ's industrial sector would have 
been if there had been no integration and to compare this 
with the actual integration. 
Newlyn (1965) assesses hypothetical industrial 
development by analysing the country's imports and the 
minimmu size of plant required to produce the imported 
goods. Hazelwood (1965) attempted to measure the 
benefits and costs of common services as a method of 
distributing costs and benefits of an integration scheme 
among the member countries. 
Attempting to measure the distribution of the costs 
and beneiits means that in many cases the analysis is 
partial, only covering specific features of integration 
such as industrial development, intra-area trade, common 
services or fiscal revenues. 
In attempting to apply a single criterion for 
benefits and costs to all member countries alike, there 
is a danger of overlooking the fact that benefits and 
costs may not mean the same thing to all countries. 
Different levels of development, the special circumstances 
of each country and national objectives in an integration 
scheme are factors which entail a different assessment of 
benefits and costs for each country concerned. 
Section 4.5: An Alternative Framework for Evaluating 
Economic Integration 
Perhaps the main feature of the attempts to evaluate 
integration discussed above is their partial nature, first, 
by concentrating on one indicator and second, by the 
assumption that these indicators are capable of reflecting 
the full impact and effects of economic integration on a 
region. Ideally, evaluation of economic integration 
should take the form of a full cost benefit analysis, in 
which the partial analysis of trade flows, of the 
development of industry, of employment and income effects, 
etc. are only individual parts. It is also important 
that the stated objectives and the methods of attaining 
them shoula be taken into dccount. At the same time, 
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because of lack of measure~le data and an inadequate 
time frame, a full cost benefit analysis may not be 
possible, ana in most cases we do have to rely on 
partial methods. Finally, we should remember that 
welfare judgements will be subjective and all we can 
really report is to what extent the data indicates 
the progress of economic integration as reflected by a 
finite and often a restricted number of sometimes 
conflicting indicators. 
Ideally, a broader method of evaluation 
incorporating more than one measurement is required, 
although any particular method may not be directly 
relevant at anyone time. For example, the information 
derived from changing trade patterns may be limited in 
the short run for developing countries; (30) whereas in 
the longer run or among the industrialised countries 
trade may reflect the majority of the effects of economic 
integ-ration on a region, and it is also likely that 
negative trade creation and trade diversion effects in 
che short run will be outweighed by positive effects in 
later years. 
For these reasons we must not rely on one method of 
evaluation but must be able to transfer and aggregate 
various different forms. We should also not expect to 
obtain one overall figure for the degree of success of 
economic integration. What will result is a vector of 
attributes, both quantitative and qualitative that can be 
used as the basis for an overall assessment, but that will 
not provide an aggregated numerical evaluation of the net 
benefits of economic integration. 
In this section we attempt to outline some of the 
desirable features and methods of an evaluation framework 
based on the role of integration in the third world. In 
this study we are interested in particular in one aspect 
of the cost benefit analysis associated with trade flows, 
30. Ex~ansion of regional trade wil~ ~robabl~ be based on 
new activities, in particular at lndustrlal goods, 
which will not be revealed in trade flows until 
these new industries have been established. 
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so that the evaluation of Ca£iita/Caricom in chapters 5 
and 6 should be viewed as only one part of a full 
evaluation of the region. 
a Trade Patterns 
In any form of economic integration it is likely that 
there will be changes in patterns of trade among the 
integration partners (intra-trade) and between the members 
and the rest of the world (extra-trade). These changes 
are described in terms of trade diversion and trade 
creation. Within the traditional framework .. trade 
diversion is usually considered a cost of economic 
integration associated with the protection of the 
regional market, whereas trade creation, a benefit, is a 
result of the freeing of trade within the region. These 
associations (trade creation equals benefits and trade 
diversion equals cost) are usually only valid when the 
region is fully developed and does not have the problem 
of underutilisation of resources. When we consider the 
case of developing countries we have to take into account 
effects other than changes in relative prices that are 
associated with trade creation and trade diversion. 
Although trade diversion implies that the resource 
cost of a product faCing consumers within the region is 
now greater than in the rest of the world, we also have 
to take into account the employment effect of increased 
production as well as the positive effect on associated 
industries. 
Trade creation is usually associated with trade that 
did not exist before, being created within the region, 
although it may also imply one of the members expanding 
production at the expense of a partner country. 
Associated with this will be increased efficiency in the 
production of the good~ as well as a loss in employment 
in the other member country. 
Measurement of trade creation and trade diversion is 
necessary, but the results have to be interpreted in light 
of all the potential effects and not just in terms of 
lOL 
resource costs. 
Trade patterns should also be analysed by types of 
products. Trade diversion in certain goods that 
encourage growth and the development of an industrial base 
are more important that trade diversion in luxury goods 
that are generally considered a waste or misallocation of 
resources. Increased trade in capital, manufactured and 
semi-manufactured goods are especially relevent in 
reflecting progress in integration industries within the 
region, 
l~any of the effects that would be observed through 
trade patterns are not likely to appear in the short run, 
especially if there is little intra-union trade before 
economic integration. The more important patterns of 
trade may not emerge for many years, partly because the 
types of goods to be traded, especially manufactures, 
depend on the development of the infrastructure and 
building of plant. In trade terms therefore, economic 
integration may appear to produce negative or no effects, 
when in fact progress is being made. 
To interpret changing patterns of trade, information 
relating to the types and locations of industries is 
required. Given this information trade creation and 
trade diversion can be interpreted in t~rms of positive 
and negative effects. 
b Regional Industrial Base 
One important aspect of economic integration is the 
building of an integrated regional industrial base. This 
usually involves allocation of industries or processes 
among the member countries taking into account the trade-
off between factors and ensuring a fair distribution of 
benefits. The industries can be divided by the degree of 
dependence on the existence of a regional market. 
(i) There are those industries that because of their 
minimum economic size, require a guaranteed market 
greater than the national market. These can be further 
divided into those uhat require a market greater than 
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that of the largest member state, and so would not be 
economically feasible for any of the regional partners to 
support nationally and can therefore be called integration 
industries. There are also those industries that require 
a large market but could be supported by one of the 
larger members nationally, but may have been allocated to 
a smaller member that will have to rely on the regional 
market. Although this industry may not be considered an 
integration industry in general, to the member concerned 
it is. 
Cii) There are those upstream and downstream industries 
that support or provide inputs to or markets for the 
integration industries. Some of these may be considered 
as part of the integration industry. Of these there will 
be industries that depend on the integration industry for 
their market and would not be feasible without their 
existence. There will also be those that do not depend 
totally on the integration industry. 
(iii)The third category includes those industries that 
could develop without either the integration industries 
or the regional market, but they will benefit from the 
income effects of the other categories. 
(iv) Finally there may be industries that are totally 
unaffected by economic integration. 
The creation and growth of all of these industries 
will depend to some degree on the existence of the 
integration framework. Over time some of these effects 
may be reflected in changing trade patterns, but to judge 
the progres.s of the industrial base it will also be 
necessary to analyse key industries in terms of the role 
of economic integration in their development. 
If the industries are categorised by their dependence 
on the integration process as judged by their minimum 
economic size, actual and potential regional and market 
size, as well as potential costs, then it will be possible 
to estimate their impact on various aspects of the economy. 
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c Employment and Income Ef~ects 
For every industry created or expanded in size we 
will be able to estimate certain characteristics. 
(i) Direct employment and income effects. There will be 
an expansion or creation of employment which may b-e a 
mixture of nationals, regional nationals and foreigners. 
For the first two groups there will be a direct 
contribution of income, training and experience to the 
economy. The third group will contribute toward nhe 
running of a p.lant but the income effect will depend on 
the proportion of their income repatriated to their 
home countries. Furthermore for all groups the income 
effect will be reduced by their propensity to import 
from outside of the region. Strictly speaking we should 
also consider the costs of providing infrastructure and 
facilities that are necessary for the maintenance of 
foreign workers, but in many cases this may be impossible 
to calculate separately from the requirements of the 
rest of the population. 
It may also be the case that the expansion of an 
industry in one of the regional members may cause a 
contraction of a similar industry in another member. In 
this case we have to take into account the associated 
emp1dly-ment and income losses as well as the differences 
in costs of production between the two potential 
producers. 
With the expansion of one industry there may be an 
expansion in other input supplying industries that will 
give rise to employment and increased income. We would 
therefore have to estimate the contribution of the 
expansion of one industry on the growth of others. 
(ii) Indirect employment and income effects. Increased 
income generated in the major industries will have an 
impact on other unassociated industries, via the income 
multiplier, especially on the food, housing and general 
consumer goods industries. This effect will be reduced 
by the degree of consumers propensity to import, and 
whether the goods demandedrby new income earners are 
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produced within the region. With increasing income, new 
demands may be created and provide opportunities for the 
establishment of consumer industries within the region. 
d Price and Cost Changes 
Witil the creation of new industries wi thin the region 
especi~lly those that require protection under infant 
industry criteria, consumers are likely to face, 
especially in the earlier years, costs greater than those 
of a comparable good imported from outside of the region. 
These costs have to be taken into account as a 
contribution toward increased costs of innuts to other ... 
industries as well as creating a fall in real income for 
the region. 
e External Economies 
Creation of an industrial base gives rise to 
external economies that will be available to any other 
firm established in an industrial area. For example 
within an industrial area there are skilled and trained 
workers, banking facilities, roads, ports and 
availability of required inputs. On the one hand an 
industrial base is likely to create these externalities, 
but on the other it is also likely to concentrate 
industry in growth areas that will attract other firms. 
This concentration of industry can create tensions within 
a country between high and low growth areas, and within a 
region between those members that are successful in 
attracting industry and those that are not. These 
economies have to be considered and set against the fair 
distribution of industry within a region. 
Finally, an estimate of the overall effect of 
economic integration on a region can be obtained by 
comparing the actual situation to an hypothetical state 
of no economic integration. This can be done based 
solely on the trade flow model, assuming that changing 
trade patterns reflect all of the integration effects. 
It can also be estimated, given potential growth of 
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national demand and export epportunities, which industries 
would have been feasible without integration and the 
associated employment, income and growth effects, by 
estimating the state of the economy under the assumption 
of no integration and comparing this to the actual 
situation. 
All of the possible measures suggested above are 
partial, and have to be used together as the basis for the 
overall evaluation of the effects of economic integration 
on a region. At least they should serve as a reminder of 
other factors that should be taken into account. 
This provides us with a basic framework for 
evaluating economic integration in the third world. 
However it is only tentative and there are obviously 
other factors including aspects of social and political 
integration that should also be taken into account. In 
the next section we develop the trade flow aspect of the 
evaluation framework i in particular the .. isolat.ion of the 
effects of economic integration on trade flows. 
Section 4.6; Proposed Methods of Evaluation of Economic 
Integration 
Given both the limitations in available data and 
size of an overall cost benefit analysis project, 
evaluation of integration usually has to based on a 
limited number of partial analyses. In particular those 
based on trade flows tend to be the most feasible given 
the accessibility and development of the raw data. If 
greater reliance is to be placed on this approach the 
models have to be further developed and more open to 
alternative interpretations, especially as the objectives 
and methods of integration do not always correspond with 
the given theory. 
In this section we discuss in more detail the trade 
flow model approach to evaluating economic integration 
which would be one part of an overall cost benefit study. 
We attempt to develop and adapt the model that is to be 
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used to isolate the effects of economic integration on 
trade flows, particularly in the context of the third 
world. It is found that there are certain features of 
development that require a reinterpretation of the model; 
some of these are discussed below. 
To provide a means of cross checking the results of 
the trade flow model and to provide additional information 
for the evaluation of integration we also discuss two 
additional methods. The methods to be used in this study 
are therefore larg.ely based on trade flows although the 
domestic sector is also incorporated in one method, and 
other less quantitative data is used in the analysis. The 
three approaches discussed below are (i) the trade flow 
model; (iil changes in income elasticities of import 
demand; and (iii1 the share of expenditure in apparent 
consumption approach. 
a Trade Flow Model 
Many studies of the effects of economic integration 
are based on variations of trade models, either in the 
form of import demand equations or as trade flow models, 
therefore such approaches to estimating the effects of 
economic integration are implicity testing theories of 
trade. It is especially important to have a model 
capable of describing trade so that the hypobhetical 
lantimonde"s" of trade with or without integration can 
be accurately estimated. In other words uhe model used 
should be capable of interpreting the determinants of 
trade under different conditions. For the results to be 
comparable
i 
the same general form of model is desirable. 
The early forms of gravity model (31) were concerned 
with just such a general method that allowed for the 
'dissimilarities between different countries in the 
economi c precondi tions of ex ternal trade' (32), Al though 
31. For ex~~ple Poyhonen (1963a and 1963b) and Pulliainen 
(1963) . 
32. poyhonen (1963b) p.69. 
108 
the different conditions between countries was allowed 
for in these models .. by the use, for example, of 
national income of trading partners, the inability of 
such a general model to capture all of the differences 
between countries may be reflected in the estimated 
coefficients. Although these estimated coefficients may 
in some cases be "unexpected', of the wrong sign or not 
significant, rather than reject the results and model an 
attempt should be made to interpret them in the light of 
differences between economies, or of their stage of 
development. A more in depth study may reveal important 
points about third world trade, 
As we. are dealing with a broad range of countries, 
the trade flow model is by necessity very simplified. 
The trade flow model is primarily concerned with the 
size of trade flows between countries in a general 
equilibrium framework and not with the composition of 
trade as defined by comparative advantage. 
We assume that the size of a trade flow will be 
determined by: 
(i) the total potential supply of exports of a 
country, 
(it) the total potential demand for imports of a 
country, 
(iiilfactors that restrict trade between 
countries. (33) 
For an individual economy, the potential aggregate 
supply available for exports, and demand for imports is 
reflected in the relative magnitude of the foreign to 
domestic sector share in national income. In other words, 
consumption of domestic goods plus exports will equal 
total income, and the greater the share of exports in 
income the greater the relative size of potential export 
supply. Therefore to determine the size of trade flows 
we need to know what determines the size of the foreign 
sector share. 
Although the foreign sector share is determined by 
33. This approach to trade flows has been developed by 
Linneman (1966). 
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many factors, the size of the economy or market will be a 
major determinant. In general the larger the market size 
the broader the range of industry that can be supported 
domestically, the greater the opportunity to exploit 
economies of scale; and the more opportunity there is for 
product differentiation. A large 'continental' economy 
(like the USA, USSR or the EEC) tends to have a wider 
range of available resources, and a more balanced economic 
structure, so that to a greater extent demand can be 
satisfied from domestic production. The opposite is true 
for small countries where a narrower resource base and 
market size limits on the exploitation of economies of 
scale mean that a broad economic base cannot be supported 
by the domestic economy. As a result tmost small 
countries have both a high ratio of exports to GDP as well 
as a concentrated composition of exports and a diversified 
structure of imports. Such countries trade more and are 
also more specialised than larger ones'. (34) It follows 
that the larger the geographic size and population of a 
country, the closer it can approximate the continental 
pattern of growth. 
In this model we use population as an absolute 
measure of the size of the market and as a determinant of 
the foreign sector share. Furthermore, we can argue that 
with a given population a certain percentage of 
productive factors are diverted to production for the home 
market and thereby reduces the factors available for 
production of tradable goods. 
These 'horne' goods may be divided into those that 
are non-tradable, either because they cannot enter into 
trade (eg. services and infrastructure) as well as those 
goods that have to be produced close to the point of 
consumption (for reasons of after sales maintenance for 
34. Demas (1965) p.23. Demas discusses in de~ail the 
differences in types of development posslble between 
sma'.l:l and large countries. 
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example}. There may also be those goods that are 
tractable but tastes demand that they be produced 
domestically if possible. 
Therefore, for every trading country there will be 
some minimum share of resources devoted to production for 
the domestic market, and as population increases there 
will be a greater share of resources devoted to home 
~roduction. 
Second, the ability of a country to produce all its 
requirements will be limited by the size of the market and 
high costs involved in finding substitutes for certain 
production factors or conditions (eg. technical skills). 
To the extent that population determines market size, the 
greater the population the more lines of production in 
wnich the country will meet the minimum market size for 
efficient market production, and so the greater range of 
goods that can be produced domestically and for domestic 
consumption 
Taking into account those factors that are used in 
production for the domestic market exclusively, there will 
be a reduced quantity 0£ factors available for production 
of exportables. This can be represented diagramatically 
by an inward shift of the production function. 
Therefore with a given level of income, production 
of tradable goods as a share of total production will tend 
to fall as population increases, thus implying a negative 
relationship between the share of the foreign sector and 
population size as shown in diagram 4.1 with x/gdp 
representing the relative size of the foreign sector. (35) 
Similarly, on the demand side the share of the 
foreign sector (imports/GDP) is hypothesised to vary 
inversely with population. In part this is due to the 
suggestion that as population increases, and economies of 
scale can be reaped in more lines of production, more of 
local demand can be supplied domestically. Of course this 
35. This hypothesis is suggested by Linneman (1966), 
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may be modified by the utility structure, for example if 
nationals prefer imports over domestically produced goods 
then the relationship may be reversed. 
Linneman (1966), tends to play down the importance of 
per capita income, arguing that an increase in per capita 
income with constant population will increase market size, 
increasing demand for goods already produced domestically, 
but also increasing demand for goods that cannot be 
economically produced domestically. In this case the net 
effect may well be zero - a priori we do not know which 
way it would go and so assume an average effect of zero. 
As we are concerned with the size of trade flows we 
include national income as a scale factor representing 
total factor endowments or economic capacity, so that for 
a given population the larger is GDP the larger are total 
imports and exports. 
Finally, we can consider the third factor, trade 
resistance. Por a country engaged in trade, various 
factors will reduce trade from its full potential. These 
can be divided into natural and artificial trade 
impediments. 
(i) Natural Trade Impediments 
These include the costs involved in transporting and 
marketing a product in another country. Transport costs 
depend on weight, bulk, value, physical characteristics, 
distance, mode and speed of transport, the character of 
the route etc. We also have to consider dynamic factors 
based on the time element involved in transportation. 
This is relevant not only for perishable goods but because 
it also implies losing the possibility of immediate 
adaption to changing conditions and because it will 
increase iEregularities in supply. The longer the time 
of transportation, the greater the necessary stocks of 
the products in the importing country and the greater the 
risk of losing profitable opportunities. Finally we have 
to consider the ~economic horizon' or 'psychic distance'. 
Perfect knowledge of the market does not exist, either 
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for producers or for consumerse Trade is likely to be 
restricted between those countries that are not familiar 
with each others business information; laws, habits, 
language etc. In general these factors are associated 
with and can be proxied by the geographic distance 
between trading partners. 
(ii) Artificial Impediments 
These 'are largely the result of government action and 
include tariff barriers, quantitative restrictions, 
preferential treatment and custmms unions. These can be 
approached on the basis of an assumed regularity of their 
trade~reducing effects for the world at large. Thus the 
trade flow between any pair of countries is subject to 1. 
an average trade reducing effect which is the same for 
all trade flows, and 2. a random deviation from the 
average trade reducing effect, that reduces the trade flow 
either more or less than usual. In general these factors 
will be included in the form of for example dummy 
variables representing above average trade flows between 
members of a customs union. 
Thus the trade flow can be derived. (36) 
where: 
Fi =, f(Yi,Ei,Ui,Ri) 
Vi - g (Fi)1 Vi - h(Fi) 
and Vij - h(FiIFj) 
- h f(Yi,Ei,Ui,Ri) ,f(Yj,Ej,Uj,Rj) 
F - general equilibrium value of the foreign sector. 
Y - gross national product. 
E - resource endowment. 
U - utility or demand structure. 
R - general resistance to trade. 
v.,~ 
Vij -
= value of exports and imports. 
trade flows between countries i and J. 
i = subscript indicating country i. 
36. This derivation is based on Leamer and Stern (1976) 
p.152. 
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or in terms or the suggested variables of the analysis: 
where: 
Xij = f(Yi,Ni,Yj,Nj,Dij) 
Xij = actual trade flow. 
Y - GNP_ 
N - population. 
D - distance between the trading partners. 
and where the coefficients of Yi and Yj are expected to be 
positive j and Ni,Nj,Dij are expected to be negative. 
Linneman (1966) admits that this type analysis is 
based on the assumption that every country has reached 
the optimum or equilibrium situation corresponding to its 
production conditions and population size, or that it will 
adapt itself to changing conditions without any time-lag. 
In the short run though, the ratio of domestic to foreign 
market production may deviate from its long run equilibri-
um value, for example if there is a period of export 
induced growth. Furthermore, technical progress, 
transfer of knowledge and new discoveries allow a 
continuous process of change and adaption in production 
and trade. But although the static equilibrium pattern 
of the analysis will never be realised, the approach is 
useful as a simplified model that is general enough to 
cope with all the countries. 
Although this model has been used in various studies, 
(37) these have generally been in the context of (or the 
analysis has been dominated by) the industrial countr±es. 
These economies are at similar levels of development and 
are likely to exhibit similar utility structures and face 
the same general levels of tariff and other barriers to 
trade. In this study we are interested in trade within 
the Third world, and between the Third World and the 
industrial countries. In particular we are concerned 
with the smaller developing countries that tend to have 
relatively large foreign sectors and may exhibit certain 
37. Aitken (1973) and Pelzman (1977). 
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characteristics that require a modification of the 
underlying economic model. The individual production 
functions in this case will have a bias toward ex~ortable 
goods for a variety of reasons. 
Potential export supply may be dominated by the 
exploitation of specific resources and commodities, for 
example sugar, bauxite and petroleum. The development of 
these resources has in some cases been the result of 
colonial history and links within the :Commonwealth. 
This particular skewness in their production structure 
is also a reflection of their underdeveloped status. 
Small population sizes may act as a constraint on 
their producing a broader range of products (especially 
in manufacturing} for domestic consumption, based on 
economies of scale arguments. There may be some 
threshold below which increases in population do not 
improve their ability to benefit from economies of 
scale. Increases in population will increase the level 
of demand, and as this demand cannot be satisfied 
domestically by reducing trade (due to the narrow 
resource base) exports may have to be increased to 
satisfy demand through increased imports On the other 
hand economies of scale may be reaped if the market size 
can be extended through exports, though bhis may still 
restrict production to a narrow range of products. It 
may also be necessary to import semi-processed materials 
(as the economic base may not be large enough to support 
the necessary input industries), so this process will also 
be associated with a larger foreign sector. Finally these 
products may not be generally competitive (or may face 
fuigh trade restrictions} within the international market, 
and this trade may be more closely associated with the 
region. This is especially true within the integration 
framework where different parts of an industry are 
established in different member countries. 
Trade with the industrial countries will therefore 
reflect the traditional pattern, but intra-regional trade 
will be modified as above. But within the region greater 
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populations may mean a greater ability to trade in more 
products rather than less, and as a limited range of 
products is produced trade will still be important. 
Thus so far the determinants of the foreign sector 
and of trade flows are not as clear cut as in the 
traditional model and the determinants may have to be 
categorised according to intra and extra union trade. 
Trade resistance will also reflect the same 
L~pediments to trade flows as in the traditional model 
although these effects may be more pronounced. In 
particular historical trading ties with the U.K. and the 
U.S.A. have established well defined and developed lines 
of communication, whereas trade within the region has 
been restricted by inadequate transport systems and 
infrastructure (ports and shipping routes), and so this 
can at the aggregate level produce the paradox of the 
greater the distance the greater the trade. 
On the other hand trade flows may be augmented by 
traditional ties such as membership of the Commonwealth, 
which according to Linnemanns study was particularly 
important for certain Caribbean countries. For developing 
countries then, although the model is similar to the 
traditional approach, disaggregation by country groups 
may reveal different forces at work. 
b Methods of Evaluation 
The three methods of evaluation are outlined below, 
and will be discussed more extensively in the context of 
the results in chapter five. It should be stressed here 
that their purpose is not to quantify the net welfare 
effects of integration, but rather to provide an 
indication of the path or progress of integration in the 
West Indies, and to see to what extent these approaches 
can adequately evaluate the experience. It would be 
hoped on the basis of these results that these partial 
measures could be incorporated into a full cost benefit 
analysis of integration. 
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(i) Trade Flow Model 
The model to be used is based on the discussion 
above, with income and population representing country 
parameters, and geographic distance accounting for 
restrictions on the full potential of trade flows. The 
role of these variables has been discussed above. 
It is "normally assumed that the trade flow model ~ill 
capture the majority of changes in trade, and that over 
time these coefficients will be stable. Under these 
assumptions, the inclusion of a dummy variable for 
preference (intra-uniantrade) effects should capture the 
growth in intra-union trade associated with a regional 
grouping. In the case of the EEC for example the 
preference variable coefficient was close to zero prior 
to integration and thereafter was positive. (38) 
Unfortunately, due to. the nature of the dummy varible, 
(39) other effects (extra-union trade) could not be 
estimated directly and were produced by the residual 
method. A similar approach is used here, although one 
set of equations includes dummy variables for both intra 
and extra union trade. In this study as the economies 
under consideration are undergoing structural changes 
associated with development, the estimated coefficients 
are unlikely to remain stable. This reflects both the 
growth process and the possible threshold effects 
associated with market size discussed above. As these 
threshold effects are overcome at the regional level, we 
may expect to see changes in the estimated coefficients 
that will reflect the importance of integration on trade 
flows and how they are determined. This will involve use 
of information other than the parameter values of the 
preference variables. The coefficients and their changes 
over time of the other variables will be important in 
understanding the integration process. 
38. See Aitken (1973) 
39. See fo~tnote 26 and chapter 5. 
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The trade flow equations will also be estimated at 
the country level, to establish whether the determinants 
of trade are different for subgroups of the sample. 
(ii) Elasticities of Import Demand (40) 
This method is based on a comparison of ex post 
income elasticities of import demand in intra and extra 
area trade, preceding and following integration. The 
elasticities are defined as the ratio of average annual 
rate of change of imports to that of GNP for ~ntra and 
extra area trade. This approach abstracts from changes in 
growth rates of national income and provides comparable 
estimates of trade creation and diversion. It will 
provide a comparison with the trade flow model as well 




in interpreting the progress 
Furthermore by using this 
both by country and by 
of integration. 
can disaggregate 
thereby observing the effects of integration 
on the SITe categories. 
It should be noted that this method is concerned with 
static effects and does not take into account directly the 
effects of integration on economic growth. 
(iii) Expenditure Shares Approach (41) 
This approach involves estimating the share of 
domestic, partner and non-partner production in a members 
consumption, changes in these indicating the effects of 
economic integration. As it is a direct measure involving 
domestic production it allows the establishement of size 
and direction of the domestic production effect and so 
further extends the information available on the 
integration effects. Its importance lies in including 
changes in domestic production that may not be adequately 
reflected in the trade flow models. 
40 Based on Balds~a (1967) 
41. Based on Truman as described by Robson (1980). 
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c Measurement of Integration Effects 
Traditionally the concepts of trade creation and 
trade diversion are employed when estimating the wel=are 
effects of integration, with trade creation being equated 
to benefits and trade diversion to costs. These 
definitions can be extended to include production and 
consumption effects as suggested by Meade (1956). In 
orthodox theoretical terms, trade creation refers to the 
replacement of high cost domestic production by lower cost 
production in a partner country and trade diversion as the 
replacement of a lower cost producer outside the union by 
a higher cost source within. Economic integration is 
evaluated in terms of the relative magnitudes of the costs 
and benefits associated with trade creation and diversion. 
Orthodox theory is based on the reallocation of resqurces 
resulting from changes in relative prices as is made clear 
in the standard definitions above. The essential feature 
of trade creation and diversion is the relation of pre to 
post integration costs. Thus referring to trade creation 
implies a change in trade flows to a lower cost source, 
and trade diversion as a change to a higher cost source. 
This depends though on the definition of costs. If we 
refer to costs as being all those factors which determine 
whether or not one good will be preferred over another 
(eg. quality, delivery date, servicing facilities etc) 
then by definition demand will be from the least 'cost' 
source. If we consider cost as basically the delivery 
price then it is no longer clear that this will be the 
case. Using delivery cost, all we can really say about 
trade diversion is that it is a move from a non-union to 
a union producer, and trade creation is a move from 
domestic production to a partner. Finally, even if it 
could be shown that the move was from a low to a high 
cost, or high to low cost producers (however defined), it 
may be incorrect to automatically assume that the move was 
caused by the changes in relative prices. In the third 
world countries it may also be the case that knowledge of 
prices (or lack of it) will render the market less than 
perfect and trade flows will not be based on full 
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~nformation, and be further biased by political factors 
determining trading partners. 
Apart from the problemsdiscusssd above we also have 
to take into consideration the partial nature of trade 
creation and trade diversion, measured by changing trade 
patterns as a reflection of net welfare effects. As way 
of example the trade creation effect of a partner 
replacing domestic production does not neeessarily take 
into account the loss in income and employment in the 
home country, nor of the effects of this loss in income 
on the other domestic industries. 
From the pOint of view of this study it does not 
seem reasonable to attempt to measure welfare effects or 
to attach benefits to trade creation and costs to trade 
diversion. This is based on the partial nature of these 
welfare measurements and on the assumption that trade 
will reflect the most efficient pattern given trade 
~arriers etc. It seems more sensible in this framework 
to describe trade in terms of movements between sources 
rather than between more of less efficient producers. In 
that case we will also have to redefine our concepts of 
trade creation and diversion in terms of changes in source 
or supply rather than in terms of more or less efficient 
2roducers. This does not exclude discussion of the 
probable welfare effects, which now have to be determined 
using more information, especially on relauive prices 
over time. But as mentioned before the purpose of this 
study is not to generate welfare statements (which would 
require a full cost benefit analysis) but to indicate 
from avialable infonnation the path that integration has 
followed as reflected by a limited number of indicators. 
We can therefore define the following effects. 
(1) 
( 2) 
Trade creation as the source of production 
shifting from domestic production to an 
integration partner. 
External trade creation as the source of 
production shifting from domestic production 
to non-union producers. 
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(3) Traae diversion as the source of production 
shifting from a non-union producer to a partner. 
(4) External trade diversion as the source of 
production shifting from a partner producer to 
non-union producer. 
(5) Internal and External trade suppression as the 
source of production shifting from union or 
non-union producers to domestic producers. 
Although these definitions do differ in some respects 
from those used by Balassa and Truman they may give a 
better indication of the direction and type of net change 
occuring. In this context, creation refers to a new trade 
being created and diversion being a change in source, 
without any welfare assumptions being implied, and to an 
extent incorporating Meade's production and consumption 
effects. 
Section 4.7~ Conclusions 
In this chapter we have developed the basis for an 
approach to evaluating integration. Evaluation of 
integration using partial measures - such as the effects 
on traae, the degree of integration or the distribution 
of costs and benefits - do not provide full coverage of 
the effects of integration in the third world. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to make a welfare judgement 
based on these partial measures. We have therefore 
outlined a tentative framework for evaluation based on the 
role of integration in the third world. Basically, this 
approach involves an extended list of partial methods in 
an attempt to cover the main effects of integration. In 
particular we suggest analysis of trade patterns, of the 
growth of industry associated with integration, of 
employment and income, and of price and cost changes. 
The outcome of this approach would be in the form of a 
vector of attributes that could be used as the basis of a 
full evaluation of integration. The contents of this 
framework are not exhaustive and did not include for 
example aspects of social and political integration. 
In this study we concentrate on the trade pattern 
aspect of the framework based primarily on the trade flow 
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model. The trade flow model allows a direct estimate of 
integration effects on regional trade while taking into 
account the other determinants of trade flows. We also 
suggested that there are certain features of growth in the 
developing countries that may require a reinterpretation 
of the estimated parameters of the trade flow model, this 
was discussed in section 4.6. 
One of the objectives of the thesis is to examine 
the extent to which the trade flow model can 1solate the 
effects of integration on trade flows. As a basis for 
this we attempt to evaluate the effects of economic 
integration on the Commonwealth Caribbean. In chapteT; 5 
we estimate the trade flow model for Carifta/Caricom to 
obtain an estimate of integration effects on regional 
trade patterns and on the trade of individual members. 
The trade flow model is supplemented by two other 
methods - changes in income elasticities of import demand 
and the share of expenditure in apparent consumption -
which allow us to crosscheck the results of the trade flow 
model and also to provide additional information on the 
effects of economic integration on trade. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
Section 5.1: Introduction 
In chapter five the empirical results that are the 
basis for evaluating the effects of economic integration In 
the West Indies are presented. The objective of the eval-
uation is not to produce an estimate of the net gains or 
losses attributable to integration, but rather to indicate 
the areas in which economic integration has affected trade 
flows in the region, and the extent to which the objectives 
of integration have been achieved. We are also concerned 
with the degree to which the estimation methods capture 
integration effects in the third world, and to suggest 
possible areas of extension and modification that may pro-
vide a clearer interpretation of the role of integration 
In the third world. 
Before we can consider estimating the net costs or 
benefits of economic integration we have to first establish 
whether the methods used are capable of isolating the 
effects of integration, and whether these effects can be 
attributed to integration rather than to other unrelated 
factors. Although the theories of integration have been 
extended and adapted for developing countries
l
, the 
empirical measurement has tended to lag behind, perhaps 
partly because more sophisticated models have generally not 
produced results that are easily interpreted.
2
. 
The relationship between trade flows and the independ-
ent variables (income, population and distance) may differ 
from the expected results for a variety of reasons. A de-
veloping country's trade and economy may be based on one 
major commodity (for example in the West Indies these may be 
1. See chapters three and four. 
2. See Chernick (1978) p. 29, note 6. A trade flow model 
was applied to the case of Caricom but 'the results, 
however were statistically insignificant so that a , - . 
quantitative balance sheet of the benetlts and costs 
of integration could not be drawn up' . 
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sugar, bauxite or petroleum), and trading patterns may be 
determined by historical links and agreements rather than 
by relative income and population sizes. Furthermore 
developing countries by their very nature are involved in 
changing their economic structure, so that their imports 
need not be directly related to current income and populat-
ion but to future requirements for development. These con-
ditions could cause unexpected and unstable estimates of the 
trade flow elasticities. 
Data quality also presents a problem in estimation. 
Although in general trade data is regarded as the best 
available, quality does in fact vary considerably, and in-
come and population statistics especially over a long period 
are not always reliable. Errors may occur in the trans-
formation of the data, the use of different accounting 
methods and whether appropriate exchange rates have been 
d 3. use 0 
To isolate the effects of integration i-t is assumed 
that the major 'event' is the creation of the integration 
scheme, and it is therefore integration that is the source 
of changes that do occur. However, for developing countr-
ies other factors including recent independence, changes in 
economic structure, price fluctuations in main commodity 
exports, world depression, restrictions on third world 
exports to certain industrial country markets, and changing 
patterns of tariff and non-tariff-barriers will also con-
tribute to changes in trade patterns. To isolate the 
effects of integration would therefore involve accounting 
for all these possible influences, some of which may be in-
directly associated with integration. It would be a very 
large task to perform if it were possible, but by not tak-
ing account of all possible influences we can never be 
fully confident in the results of anyone approach. 
Three separate measures of the effects of integrat-
lon are used. This will provide a cross-check of the 
effects and will increase the information available for 
evaluating economic integration. Based on these results 
3. See Appendix B for further discussion of the data 
used. 
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it may be possible to suggest method that could be used in 
future research to evaluate economic integration in the 
third world. 
4 The three methods used are: 
1. Trade Flow Model. This is a cross section equation 
estimated annually and takes the form, 
w~l a2 bl b2 cl dl logT = logx + logY - logP - logP - logO + logDV + CONST. 
where:- T is the trade flow, 
Y lS the national income, 
P lS population, 
D is geographic distance between trading 
partners, 
OV is a dummy variable value 2 for intra union trade 
I for extra union trade 
CONST is the constant, 
aI, a2 - elasticity with respect to exporters and 
importers income, 
bl, b2 - elasticity with respect to exporters and 
importers population, 
cl - elasticity with respect to distance, 
dl - elasticity with respect to the dummy 
variable 
2. Income Elasticity. This approach is based on the changes 
in the lncome elasticity of intra, extra and total im-
ports between pre and post integration periods. The 
elasticity is calculated as -
average annual rate of change of imports 
average annual rate of change of income 
3. Expenditure Share Approach. This involves estimating 
the changes in the share of domestic, partner and non-
partner (world) production in a members expenditure. 
First we define expenditure on apparent consumption as -
C = Y x + M + M P w 
4. See chapter four for a more detailed description of 
these methods. 
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where:- C - expenditure on apparent consumption, 
y - gross domestic product, 
X - exports, 
M -p imports from partners, 
M - imports from non-membe::-s. w 
The following trade shares can then be defined: 
1 . Domestic share DS = (y - x)/c. 
2. Partner share PS = M Ic. p 
3 . Non-member or world share WS = M Ic. w 
In anyone year DS + PS + WS = 1 
and ~DS + t:::.PS + ~WS = 0 
Changes from pre to post integration periods are de-
fined as: 
6. PS > 0 
D. DS < 0 
~WS < 0 
indicates gross trade creation, 
indicates net trade creation, 
indicates tradediversion. 
Section 5.2: Results of the Trade Flow Model 
This section presents the results of variations in the 
trade flow model as described in chapter four. Because of 
data limitations 5 , the country coverage within the West 
Indies has been limited to the four more developed countr-
ies (MDC's) - Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad-
TObago. 6 . The following equations were estimated; 
1. Aggregate trade flow model; 
2. Intra-union trade only, no dummy variable; 
for intra union trade; 
3. Extra-union trade only, no dummy variable; 
for intra union trade; 
4. TOTAL Exports of the MDC's; 
5. TOTAL Imports of the MDC'c ; 
6. Trade flow model with separate variables for 
intra and extra distance; 
7. Adjacent year regressions; 
5. See Appendix B. 
6. The countries included for Caricom's trad~ with the 
rest of the world are the USA, the UK, Canada, 
Venezuela, France, West Germany, the Netherlands 
and Japan. 
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8. Trade flow model with extra dummy variable for 
trade with the UK; 
9. Barbados' trade with dummy variable for the 
UK; 
10. Guyana's trade with dummy variable for the 
UK; 
11. Jamaica's trade with dummy variable for the 
UK; 
12. Trinidad-Tobago's trade with dummy variable 
for the UK; 
The individual equations are now reported and discussed In 
order. 
a Equation One (Table 5.2) 
The standard trade flow model was estimated for all 
trade of the MDe's with selected partners over the period 
-2 1967 to 1976. As shown by the R the equation was able 
to explain between 37% and 46% of the variation in trade 
flows. This is lower than similar estimates for the EEC. 7 . 
The elasticities of both the exporters and importers 
income, al and a2, were positive as predicted by theory, 
but whereas al was not significantly different from zero, 
a2 was significant over the period 1967 to 1972. The 
elasticity a2 is relatively high in the earlier years 
(especially when compared to the elasticities in the EEC 8 ) 
but it does decline over time and from 1973 is no longer 
significant. Taken together, al and a2 suggest that the 
importers income is a more important determinant of trade 
flows than the exporters income or that demand is more im-
portant than supply. The high values of a2 could be caused 
for example, by the UK, USA and Canada being traditional 
markets for West Indian exports, and that the MDC's do have 
a high average propensity to import as indicated by their 
shares of imports in GDP. 
For their given resource endowment as reflected by 
GDP the MDC's have an export or trade bias
9 
determined 
by their small size and the limited range of products they 
produce and export. Therefore for a given income their 
7. See for example Aitken (1973) 
8. Aitken (1973) reports values for al lying between 
1.05 and 1.2~values of a2 lying between 0.74 and 1.0 
9. See fOI example Demas (1965) 
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KEY TO ELASTICITIES REPORTED IN TRADE FLOW MODEL RESULTS 
INCOME 
al Exporters income elasticity of trade 
a2 Importers income elasticity of trade 
POPULATION 
bl Exporters population elasticity of trade 
b2 Importers population elasticity of trade 
DISTANCE 
cl . Distance elasticity of trade (except In Table 5.7) . 
Table 5.7 
cl Intra-regional distance elasticity of trade 











Dummy Variable for intra-regional trade 
Dummy Variable for intra-regional trade in 
Dummy Variable for extra-regional trade 
Constant term 
Adjusted coefficient of determination (R2) 
Indicates coefficient is significant at the 
95% confidence level 
Values in parentheses are t-statistics 
Table 5.1 




YEAR al a2 bl b2 cl dl CONST R 
1967 1.14 2.13* -0.08 -1.70* -0.44 4.94* -1.17 0.37 
(1.60) (3.07) (-0.08) (-1.88) (-1.39) (3.30) (-0.30) 
1968 0.98 2.39* 0.11 -2.03* -0.51* 4.59* -0.14 0.39 
(1.56) (3.80) ( 0.13) (-2.47) (-1.70) (3.20) (-0.04) 
1969 0.85 2.60* 0.30 -2.33* -0.38 5.51* -1.25 0.37 
(1.27) (3.90) ( 0.34) (-2.70) (-1.20) (3.70) (-0.33) 
1970 0.49 1.79) 0.75 -1.28* -0.69* 4.67* -1.48 0.42 
(0.93) (3.36) ( 1.10) (-1.87) (-2.66) (3.70) (-0.48) 
I--' 
l\.) 
1971 0.19 1.41* 1.11* -0.85 -0.67* 4.61* -2.64 0.43 \0 
(0.39) (2.90) ( 1.70) (-1.30) (-2.60) (3.80) (-0.90) 
1972 0.02 1.07* 1.41* -0.38 -0.64* 5.62* -5.04* 0.44 
(0.05) (2.28) ( 2.34) (-0.64) (-2.46) (4.50) (-1.69) 
1973 0.32 0.65 0.85 0.08 -0.59* 4.93 -3.43 0.38 
(0.80) (1.61) ( 1.64) ( 0.16 (-2.37) (4.10) (-1.24) 
1974 0.26 0.46 0.94* 0.42 -0.86* 4.43* -2.45 0.42 
(0.65) (1.14 ) ( 1.87) ( 0.84) (-3.73) (3.85) (-0.96) 
1975 0.24 0.36 0.97* 0.53 -0.71* 4.96 -3.79 0.39 
(0.60) (0.91) ( 1.97) ( 1.07) (-2.9) (4.17) (-1.39) 
1976 0.11 0.39 1.15* 0.52 -0.8* 4.89* -3.59 0.46 




levels of exports are relatively high, whereas for the in-
dustrialised countries whose economic structure tends to be 
biased toward the domestic market, the levels of exports 
are relatively smaller. It is also a possibility among the 
MDe's that as GDP increases, so does their ability to pro-
duce a broader range of products and the smaller is the 
relative size of their export sector, although this may be 
counterbalanced by imports of raw materials and capital goods 
associated with new industries. Together these factors 
may produce a small elasticity of exporters income that in 
somecases may even be negative. Therefore, although ex-
ports do increase as income increases, there is a much 
stronger relationship between imports and income. 
According to the traditional theory (see chapter four) 
the population variables are expected to have negative 
elasticities. However, bl, the elasticity of the exporters 
population is positive apart from in 1967, lies between 
0.1 and 1.4, and is significant over the period 1971 to 
1976. This may be accounted for by the nature of the sample 
chosen, as well as by special factors operating both within 
the West Indies and between the West Indies and the non-
regional trading partners It does suggest that the larger 
the population the larger 1S the foreign sector and hence 
exports. As this pattern of result is recurring, bl will be 
discussed in greater detail below. The elasticity of the 
importers population, b2, conforms to theoretical expectat-
ions and is generally negative, but significant only over 
the period 1967 to 1970. 
Together these two elasticities suggest that the 
greater the population the more the economy has available 
for export and the smaller the population the more it needs 
to import. If this is the case then the relationship be-
tween population and the import and export sides of the 
foreign sector is assymetric. 
Distance is included as a proxy for all the factors 
that may contribute to restrict maximum potential trade 
flows, and includes transport costs, market knowledge, 
tastes etc. The elasticity cl is negative, significant 
131 
in 1968 and 1970 to 1976, and has values lying between 
-0.86 and -0.3. 
Over the period the negative effect of distance has 
tended to increase, possibly because as the MDC's develop 
and have a broader range of goods to trade, the effects of 
higher transport costs will become more evident as re-
flected by the increasing negative value of cl. 
The dummy variable is included as a proxy for the trade 
enhancing effects of integration on the regions trade. 
Effectively it measures the extent to which the regression 
for extra trade underestimates intra-regional trade flows. 
It is therefore assumed that the elasticities of income and 
population to trade are similar for both intra and extra 
trade, and will be unaffected by integration (or at least 
they are affected to the same degree) although other factors 
cannot be discounted. 
The elasticity is expected to be non-significant prior 
to integration and positive and significant thereafter~O. 
In equation one the dummy variable is positive and signifi-
cant both before and after integration. This poses a diffic-
ulty in using this information to determine the effects of 
integration. The possibilities are that (i) effects simil-
ar to thoseof integration were evident prior to integrat-
ion, and are perhaps associated with the region's history 
of cooperation as well as being a member of the Common-
wealth, (ii) that other factorsare the source and in-
tegration has had no effect, (iii) that other factors have 
declined in importance as integration effects became evi-
dent, the two creating a balance and (iv) there are other 
peculiarities in this sample that have created this effect. 
As this variable is of central importance in the evaluat-
ion of economic integration in the traditional sense ,it 
will be fully discussed below. 
It has to be established whether or not the determin-
ants of intra and extra trade are similar in all other 
elasticities apart from the dummy variable and to what 
10. This was true for the case of the EEC in Aitken (1973) 
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extent disaggregation would provide more information. It 
also has to be established why al is not significant, why 
bl is positive, whether distance is a greater restriction 
to intra rather than extra trade, and what the dummy 
variable is measuring, in particular whet~er or not it lS 
measuring the effects of integration. 
Equations two and three take the same form as equation 
one but without the dummy variable for intra-regional trade; 
equation two estimated using only intra-union trade data 
and equation three using only extra-union trade data. 
b Equation Two (Table 5.3) 
Equation two is estimated using only intra-union trade 
data and should indicate the determinants of regional trade 
flows. By using only intra-union data the overall fit 
(Rt improves dramatically from between 0.37 and 0.41 in 
equation one to between 0.49 and 0.88 in equation two, and 
provides evidence for possibly two separate trade regimes, 
that may have contributed to the high values for the dummy 
variable in equation one. II. It is also interesting to note 
that within the region neither the income nor the populat-
ion elasticities have the expected signs, and suggests that 
trade between the union members is determined not only by 
different factors, but that the factors may act in a diff-
erent way possibly reflecting both the level of develop-
ment and the reliance of the members on a limited range of 
exports. 
Contrary to expectations, the income elasticities al 
and a2 are generally negative, but significant in only two 
years - 1967 and 1968. In both cases they increase from 
-2 to around zero. This result may be associated with 
peculiarities of the sample on the distribution of trade. 
The two richer members - Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago -
depend to a high degree on exports of bauxite-alumina and 
petroleum. In both cases this trade is directed to 
markets outside of the region, so that intra-regional 
11. This can be tested for by using the Chow test. See for 
example Maddala (1977) p. 198. 
EQUATION TWO 
ESTIMATED ELASTICITIES 
YEAR al a2 bl b2 cl CONST 
-2 
R 
1967 -2.06* -2.20* 4.4S* 3.8S* -2.S0* -S.90 0.78 
(-2.S9) (-2.S9) (4.00) (3.46) (-S.93) (-1.S1) 
1968 -1.69* -1.94* 4.4S* 3.31* -2.70* -S.10 0.82 
(-2.06) (-2.37) (3.9S) (2.94) (-S.74) (-1.27) 
1969 -0.79 -1.02 2.9S* 2.09* -2.00* -2.07 0.88 
(-1.47) (-1.88) (4.08) (2.91) (-6.77) (-0.82) 
1970 -0.41 -1.32 2 .19~ 1.20 -1.60* 0.14 0.78 
(-0.71) (-0.S6) (3.00) (1.64) (-4.78) (0.05) 
~ 
w 
1971 -0.20 -0.14 1.83* 1.01 -1.40* 0.41 0.72 w 
(-0.36) (-0.24) (2.61) (1.4S) (-4.06) (O.lS) 
1972 0.04 0.23 1.4S* 0.76 -1.20* -0.13 0.65 
(0.08) (0.4S) (2.27) (1.19) (-3.29) (-O.OS) 
1973 0.34 -0.05 0.99 0.96 -1.04
k 
0.S4 0.60 
(0.81) (-0.12) (1.76) (1.71) (-2.83) (0.20) 
1974 0.43 -0.11 0.96 1.17 -1.16* 0.14 0.S2 
(0.78) (-0.20) (1.26) (1.5S) (-2.41) (0.04) 
1975 0.15 -0.06 1.28 1.25 -1.14* -0.97 0.49 
(0.28) (-0.11) (1.69) (1.65) (-2.21) (-0.28) 
1976 0.23 -0.05 1.1[)* 1.10* -1.23* 1.06 0.69 




trade accounts for a much smaller proportion of their total 
trade and the same is true for their import requirements _ 
for example capital goods that are not available regionally. 
On the other hand, Barbados, with a smaller income has to 
some extent expanded into simple manufactures that depend on 
the regional market. Taken together this could produce the 
result that the greater is income the less important relat-
ively is regional trade. 
Finally, it is important to note that al and a2 are 
not significant for the majority of the years and it may be 
the case that income is not a useful indicator of trade 
within the region. 
The elasticities of population, bl and b2, are more 
important as not only do they have the wrong sign, but bl 
is significant over the period 1967 to 1972 and in 1976 
and b2 is significant in 1967 to 1969 and 1976. Of the two, 
bl is perhaps the more interesting as it is significant for 
a greater proportion of the years and is associated with the 
regions export side. In part these results may be caused 
by the income elasticity being negative and generally not 
significant. This would mean that per capita income would 
still have the correct sign with population acting as a 
proxy for income. However, it does throw doubts on the 
expected inverse relationship between the size of the 
foreign sector and population that is the basis of the trade 
flow model. 
As expected the elasticity of distance, cl,has a 
greater negative effect within the region than on total 
trade. This reflects the underdeveloped system of trans-
port and infrastructure within the region as well as a 
lack of knowledge of each others markets and possibly the 
limited range of products available or suitable for intra-
regional trade. Over time however, the negative effect of 
distance does diminish suggesting improvements in the 
regional transport system, knowledge of markets as well as 
a broader range of products available for trade. In this 
case changes in the elasticity of distance is reflecting 
some of the positive effects of integration. 
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c Equation Three (Table 5.4) 
Equation three, estimated using extra-union trade data, 
is similar to equation one, with comparable R2 (0.38 to 0.46), 
as well as a similar pattern of elasticity signs and of co-
efficient values. Only the distance elasticity is lower, as 
expected reflecting the superior transport and marketing 
facilities of the industrialised countries and that the 
majority of the West Indian trade flows are of an extra-union 
nature. 
As in equation one, al and a2 are generally positive, 
although al is not significant. Over the period 1967 to 
1972 a2 is significant and follows the same pattern as 
equation one, increasing to a maximum (2.82) in 1969 and 
then declining. 
Similarly bl is positive when significant and b2 
negative. It is worth noting that bl is positive when al 
and a2 are not significant. 
The elasticity of distance is significant from 1970, 
and was on average greater than -1. This is evidence of 
lower resistance to trade for extra-regional trade flows 
when compared to intra- regional trade. 
Overall, the estimated elasticities in equations two 
and three suggest that intra and extra union trade could be 
determined in different ways so that equation one may be re-
stricted in the extent to which it can determine intra-
union trade. The fact that differences exist in the es-
timated elasticities between equation two and three casts 
doubts on the validity of the dummy variable in equation one 
as a measure of the effects of economic integration. 
As there does appear to be evidence that trade is de-
termined more by the import side than the export side, equat-
ions four and five are estimated using the import and ex-
port trade data of the MDC's separately, thus enabling us 
to look directly at the import and export sides of trade. 
By including a dummy variable for intra-union trade it will 
be possible to separate the extent to which imports and 
exports have been affected by economic integration. 
EQUATION THREE 
ESTIMATED ELASTICITIES 
YEAR -2 al a2 bl b2 cl CONST R 
1967 1.23 2.36* -0.16 -1.96* -0.34 -1.82 0.38 
(1.59) (3.05) (-0.16) (-1.95) (-0.98) (-0.43) 
1968 1.07 2.59* 0.004 -2.27* -0.42 -0.54 0.39 
(1.54) (3.73) (0.004) (-2.49) (-1.28) (-0.13) 
1969 0.86 2.82* 0.31 -2.59* -0.29 -1.70 0.38 
(1.15) (3.78) (0.31) (-2.66) (-0.86) (-0.40) 
1970 0.51 1.93* 0.74 -1.46* -0.65* -1.65 0042 
(0.84) (3.16) (0.94) (-1.85) (-2.21) (-0.47) 
......, 
~ 
"" 1971 0.16 1.55* 1.18 -1.02 -0.62* -2.91 0.42 
(0.27) ( 2 . 7 5) (1.62) (-1.41) (-2.21) (-0.87) 
1972 -0.08 1.20* 1.55* -0.56 -0.60* -5.39 0.44 
(-0.14) (2.16) (2.16) (-0.78) (-2.00) (-1.57) 
1973 -0.26 0.75 0.94 -0.06 -0.56* -3.62 0.38 
(-0. 54) (1.56) (1.52) (-0.09) (-1.96) (-1.13) 
1974 0.18 0.56 1.04* 0.28 -0.84* -2.46 0.41 
(0.38) (1.17) (1.73) (0.47) (-3.24) (-0.85) 
1975 0.20 0.43 1.02* 0.43 -0.69* -3.79 0.39 
(0.42) (0.89) (1.72) (0.73) (-2.47) (-1.22) 
1976 0.03 0.48 1.27* 0.41 -0.77* -3.91 0.46 
(0.08) (1.26) (2.63) (0.85) (-3.12) (-1.41) 
Table 5.4 
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d Equation Four (Table 5.5) 
Equation four is based on the exports of the MOC's, so 
that the export elasticities (al and bl) are related only to 
the MDC's whereas the majority of import elasticities are 
non-West Indian. Overall this equc~.tion is very similar to 
equation one although the elasticities in equation four are 
slightly larger. 
The elasticity of exporters income, aI, although it 
does tend to be negative is not significant. For the MDC's 
one would perhaps expect income to be a function of exports, 
given the importance of exports as a source of income. As 
in equation one, a2 is positive and significant over the 
period 1967 to 1972. The majority of the importers are 
non-regional, and the results indicate the expected positive 
correlation between imports and income. 
For population bl is positive and significant for 1970 
to 1976, excluding 1975, and b2 is negative and significant 
over 1968 to 1970 and 1973. The values of bl tend to be 
smaller than in equation two, and the positive sign could 
be associated with the non-significance of ale 
The elasticity of distance, cl, is negative but is 
significant only over 1970 to 1972 and 1974 to 1976. The 
trade reducing effect for MDC exports is greater than for 
MDC imports (see equation five below). This may be the 
result of poor market access and knowledge on the part of 
the MDC's, as well as the types of products the MDC's may be 
trying to export. This contrasts with the better transport 
and marketing facilities available to the industrial 
countries. 
The dummy variable for intra-union trade is consist-
ently significant and is particularly high, both prior to 
and after integration. 
e Equation Five (Table 5.6) 
Equation five is based on MDC import data so that a2 
and b2 are specifically related to the MDC's. Overall, 
where significant, the elasticities have the correct signs. 
EQUATION FCU R 
ESTIMATED ELASTICITIES 
YEAR al a2 bl b2 CONST 
-2 
cl dl R 
1967 0.19 2.40* 1.26 -1.73 -0.53 7.00* -6 80 . . 0.34 
(0.16) (2.76) (0.86) (-1.51) (-1.15) (3.10) (-1.25) 
1968 0.34 2.90* 1.01 -2.33* -0.59 6.60* -4.20 0.42 
(0.34) (3.68) (0.84) (-2.29) (-1.42) (3.21) (-0.85) 
1969 -0.22 3.10* 1.59 -2.59* -0.47 7.84* -5.7 0.39 
(-0.20) (3.70) (1.22) (-2.40) (-1.09) (3.58) (-1.11) 
1970 -0.46 2.40* 1.80* -1.58* -0.89* 7.50* -5.20 0.43 t--J 
(-0.53) (3.27) (1.78) (-1.69) (-2.34) (3.87) (-1.19) \...v 
(» 
1971 -0.66 2.15* 2.05* -1.25 -0.85* 7.90* -6.54 0.41 
(-0.82) (2.96) (2_1~) (-1.38) (- 2.19) (3.98) (-1.52) 
1972 -0.78 1.36* 2.40* -0.18 -0.92* 8.60* -10.00* 0.43 
(-1.11) (1.82) (2.86) (-0.19) (-2.28) (4.20) (-2.27) 
i 
1973 -0.005 0.22 1.20* 1.03* -0.54 7.20* -9.20 0.31 
(-0.009) (0.94) (1.71) (2.55) (-1.41) (3.73) (-2.19) 
~ 
~ 
1974 -0.009 0.58 1.40* 0.73 -1.03 6.90* -7.36* 0.41 
(-0.02) (0.79) (2.09) (0.86) (-2.82) (3.38) (-1.88) 
1975 0.03 0.92 1.12 0.47 -0.90* 8.60* -8.09* 0.36 
(0.05) (1.27) (1.67) (0.55) (-2.28) (4.13) (-1.94) 
1976 -0.06 0.30 1.48* 1.00 -1.04* 6.49* -6.77 0.46 




YEAR a1 a2 d1 CONST -2 b1 b2 c1 R 
1968 1.07 1.43 -0.30 -1.03 -0.67 2.40 3.62 0.29 
(1.40) (1.50) (-0.30) (-0.87) (-1.65) (1.19) (0.76) 
1969 1.17 1.74* -0.43 -1.34 -0.53 3.25* 2.89 0.29 
(1.57) (1.84) (-0.45) (-1.16) (-1.37) (1.68) (0.64) 
1970 0.70 1.19* 0.08 -0.62 -0.69* 2.22 2.68 0.43 
(1.33) (1.88) ( 0.11) (-0.84) (-2.48) (1.59) (0.86) 
1971 0.87* 1.35* -0.35 -1.76* -0.56* 1.49 10.78* 0.46 
(1.92) (2.69) (-0.62) (-3.00) (-2.32) (1.20) (3.98) 
....... 
~ ~ 
1972 0.55 1.12* 0.21 -0.49 -0.56* 2.94 1.24 0.47 \0 
(1.27) (2.73) ( 0.39) (-0.99) (-2.37) (2 .46) (0.48) 
1973 0.45 0.77* 0.29 -0.09 -0.61 2.50* 1.58 0.44 
(1.08) (2.22) ( 0.57) (-0.21) (-2.57) (2.05) (0.63) 
1974 0"36 0.57* 0.37 0.15 -0.73* 2.10* 2.46 0.45 
(0.83) (1.72) ( 0.74) ( 0.38) (-3.34) (1.74) (1.06) 
]975 0.06 0.29 0.82* 0.52 -0.68* 2.54* 0.56 0.47 
(0.14) (0.94) ( 1.75) ( 1.38) (-3.07) (2.19) (0.24) 
1976 0.30 0.51* 0.62 0.18 -0.65* 3.57* 0.06 0.43 
(0.78) (1.75) (1.34) ( 0.49) (-2.75) (2.86) (0.02) 
Table 5.6 
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Although al is positive it is insignificant apart from in 
1971. A2 is positive and significant over 1969 to 1974 
and in 1976. The value of a2 ranges between 0.51 and 1.74, 
with the general trend being one of decline over time. It 
is otvious .that income is important in determ:_ning imports 
for the MOe's, although it is not as elastic as in equation 
four. In part this may be due to the smaller number of 
importing countries in the sample that in terms of income 
will be grouped together. (In equation four, a2 covers 
both MDe's and industrialised countries thereby providing 
a greater range). 
For the elasticities of population, bl is significant 
only in 1975 and b2 is significant only in 1971. In general 
we therefore have to assume based on the estimates so far 
that for MDe imports, population is not an important de-
terminant of trade levels. 
Distance is significant from 1970 onwards and has a 
smaller negative effect on Moe imports than on MDe exports. 
As stated above, this will reflect the greater range of 
goods, market knowledge and better transport systems 
available to industrial countries. 
The dummy variable is significant ln 1969 and in 1972 
to 1976, but its value is lower than in equation four and 
indicates that there may be very little difference between 
the determinants of Moe intra and extra imports. 
f Equation Six (Table 5.7) 
So far we have examined the intra and extra distance 
elasticities by comparing different equations. To allow 
for consistency in all other variables we have re-estimated 
equation one with two distance variables, one for trade 
within the region (cl), and one for extra trade (c2). 
Both income elasticities were positive, and although 
a2 was significant from 1967 to 1972, al was not signific-
ant. Of the population elasticities bl was positive and 
significant between 1971 and 1976, and b2 was negative and 
significant between 1967 and 1970, generally following a 
similar pattern to equation one. 
EQUATION SIX 
ESTIMATED ELASTICITIES 
YEAR al a2 bl b2 cl c2 dl CONST 
-2 
R 
1967 1.09 2.08* 0.002 -1.63* -1.33 -0.35 14.31 -2.36 0.37 
(1.56) (2.99) (0.002) (-1.79) (-1.50) (-1.05) (1.62) (-0.59) 
1968 0.91 2.32* 0.20 -1.94* -1.37 -0.42 13.60 -1.35 0.40 
(1.45) (3.68) (0.25) (-2.35) (-1.61) (-1.34) (1.61) (-0.35) 
1969 0.78 2.54* 0.39 -2.24* -1.16 -0.29 13.70 -2.36 0.37 
(1.18) (3.83) (0.45) (-2.59) (-1.33) (-0.91) (1.58) (-0.60) 
1970 0.45 1.75* 0.81 -1.23* -1.13 -0.64* 9.30 -2.12 0.42 
(0.84) (3.25) (1.17) (-1.78) (-1.53) (-2.35) (1.26) (-0.66) 
1971 0.15 1.37 1.17* -0.79 -1.10 -0.62* 9.30 -3.28 0.43 ~ 
(0.31) (2.79) (1.86) (-1.26) (-1.57) (-2.34) (1.31) (-1.07) + t-' 
1972 -0.01 1.04* 1.45* -0.34 -1.05 -0.59* 9.96 -5.61* 0.43 
(-0.02) (2.19) (2.38) (-0.56) (-1.43) (-2.15) (1.35) (-1.79) 
1973 0.29 0.62 0.87* 0.11 -0.87 -0.56* 7.86 -3.8 0.38 
(0.73) (1.53) (1.68) (0.22) (-1.24) (-2.10) (1.12) (-1.30) 
1974 0.25 0.45 0.95* 0.43 -0.97 -0.84* 5.6 -2059 0.41 
(0.62) (1.11) (1.86) (0.85) (-1.47) (-3.49) (0.85) (-0.96) 
1975 0.23 0.35 0.99* 0.54 -0.85 -0.69* 6.42 -3.97 0.39 
(0.56) (0.87) (1.96) (1.08) (-1.21) (-2.68) (0.91) (-1.39) 
1976 0.09 0.37 1.18* 0.55 -1.10* -0.76* 8.09 -3.98 0.46 
(0.39) (1.18) (2.89) (1.34) (-1.78) (-3.36) (1.30) (-1.56) 
Table 5.7 
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Of interest though are the two distance variables. As 
expected the elasticity of intra distance, cl, ranging be-
tween -0.85 and -1.37, was larger than the elasticity of 
external distance, c2, which lay between -0.29 and -0.84. 
Also of interest is that whereas cl becomes less restrict-
ive over time, c2 becomes more restrictive. But although 
c2 is significant between 1970 and 1976, cl is significant 
only in 1976. 
The dummy variable also reacts in an unexpected way, 
increasing quite dramatically, now lying between 5.6 and 
14.31, but is not significant and seems to fall in value 
over time as the two distances begin to converge. 
g Equation Seven (Table 5-8) 
The single year cross section equations are restricted 
in the amount of direct information that they can provide 
about the effects of economic integration. As we only have 
two choices of possible dummy variable - intra and extra 
trade in anyone year - we are restricted to one dummy 
variable. 12 . Therefore to estimate the effects of integrat-
ion on the option not chosen requires further calculations 
based on the estimated equation, and involves using the 
residual method. 13 . 
In an attempt to overcome this problem we have used the 
technique of adjacent year regressions which basically in-
. f d . 14. volves the poollng of the data or two a Jacent years. 
There are now a total of four possible choices of dummy 
variable intra and extra trade in each of the two years -
of which a maximum of three may be used one having to be 
excluded to represent normal trade. Equation seven is 
based on this method and incorporates dummy variables for 
intra trade in the first and second years and extra trade 
in the first year, all of these being relative to extra 
trade in the second year. This should therefore glve 
12. This is because one of the alternatives has to be 
used to represent normal trade. 
13. That is measuring the difference between actual and 
hypothetical trade flows. 
14. Basically this technique should keep the other 
estimated elasticities more stable. 
EQUATION SEVEN 
ESTIMATED ELASTICITIES 
a2 CONST -2 YEAR al bl b2 cl dl d2 d3 R 
1967/68 1.05* 2.27* 0.03 -1.88* -0.48* 4.72* 4.69* -0.12 -0.62 0.40 
(2.29) (4.97) (0.05) (3.15) (-2.22) (4.02) (3.97) (-0.25) (-0.24) 
1968/69 0.92* 2.49* 0.19 -2.18* -0.45* 5.12* 5.35* 0.36 -0.81 0.40 
(2.05) (5.58) (0.34) (-3.73) (-2.10) (4.29) (4.57) (0.75) (-0.32) 
1969/70 0.66 2.17* 0.55 -1.77* -0.54* 5.12* 5.15* 0.09 -1.53 0.41 
(1.58) (5.20) (1.01) (-3.28) (-2.73) (4.52) (4.65) (0.22) (-0.60) 
1970/71 0.34 1.59* 0.94* -1.04* -0.68* 4.69* 4.77* 0.18 -2.16 0.45 
(0.97) (4.50) (2.07) (-2.30) (-3.80) (4.66) (4.80) (0.44) (-1.04) 
t-' 
1971/72 0.10 1.23* 1.27* -0.59 -0.66* 5.07* 5.49* 0.35 -3.99* 0.45 +-'v..J 
(0.32) (3.70) (2.98) (-1.40) (-3.70) (4.97) (5.55) (0.86) (-1.96) 
1972/73 0.19 0.84* 1.10* -0.13 -0.62* 5.26* 5.26* -0.04 -4.23* 0.43 
(0.64) (2.80) (2.80) (-0.33) (-3.50) (5.15) (5.30) (-0.10) (-2.10) 
1973/74 0.32 0.56* 0.86* 0.25 -0.72* 4.39* 4.65* -0.39 -2.84 0.43 
(1.10) (2.01) (2.43) (0.69) (-4.30) (4.30) (4.96) (-0.97) (-1.50) 
1974/75 0.25 0.41 0.96* 0.47 -0.78* 4.73* 4.81* 0.15 -3.17 0.43 
(0.89) (1.49) (2.76) (1.36) (-4.75) (4.84) (5.16) (0.40) (-1.73) 
1975/76 0.17 0.38 1.07* 0.52* -0.75* 4.88* 4.93* -0.03 -3.68* 0.45 
(0.69) (1.56) (3.46) (1.67) (-4.70) (5.42) (5.46) (-0.07) (-2.05) 
Table 5.8 
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directly comparable estimates of intra and extra trade in 
the first year. For extra trade this really only shows the 
relationship between extra trade from one year to the next, 
but with the change in sign we may get some indication of 
whether extra trade is improving or not. 
Unfortunately the extra regional trade dummy variable 
was not significantly different from zero and may indicate 
that extra trade from one year to the next was similar -
i.e. that there were no additional changes in extra trade 
from one year to the next. If for example there had been 
significant trade diversion we would expect this dummy 
variable to be positive - i.e. extra trade in year one lS 
greater than in year two - but we do not have evidence for 
this. Overall, the performance of this equation was simil-
ar to equation one, although now more of the estimated 
elasticities are significant, and the variation in the 
extent to which the model explains trade flows is reduced, 
R2 lying between 0.40 and 0.45 compared to 0.37 and 0.46 in 
equation one. 
h Equation Eight (Table 5.9) 
Given the special links, colonial and Commonwealth, that 
exist between the UK and the West Indies, it was felt that 
trade with the UK may be biased upwards and that this should 
be taken into account in the equation by including a dummy 
variable for trade with the UK, similar in function to the 
intra-union trade dummy variable. 
In this equation both al and a2 were positive with a1 
significant over 1967 - 1970 and in 1973 and, with all of 
the a2 apart from 1972 being significant though they were 
declining over time. Bl was significant in only one year 
(1972) and b2 was negative and significant for 1967 to 1971. 
The elasticity of distance, cl, was negative as expected. 
Of particular interest in this equation is the dummy 
variable for trade with the UK (d2). This lay in the 
range 3.02 to 4.13 and was significant in every year, In-
dicating that trade with the UK is greater than the other 
variables allow. At the same time the overall fit of the 
EQUATION EIGHT 
ESTIMATED ELASTICITIES 
YEAR a1 a2 bl b2 cl dl d2 CONST 
-2 R 
1967 1.22* 2.22* -0.22 -1.85* -0.52* 5.08* 3.82* 0.06 0.48 
(1.94) (3.52) (-0.26) (-2.24) (-1.78) (3.76) (3.94) (0.02) 
1968 1.25* 2.66* -0.25 --2.39* -0.59* 4.90* 4.02* 1.74* 0.52 
(2.28) (5.51) (-0.34) (-4.05) (-3.03) (4.08) (4.24) (1.80) 
1969 1.17* 2.92* -0.12 -2.75* -0.47* 5.89* 4.13* 0.77 0.51 
(1.97) (4.94) (-0.16) (-3.56) (-1.72) (4.47) (4.38) (0.23) 
1970 0.78* 2.07* 0.39 -1.64* -0.79* 5.04* 3.77* 0.19 0.57 
I--' 
+ 
(1.68) (4.46) ( 0.66) (-2.76) (-3.51) (4.64) (4.87) (0.07) \.J\ 
1971 0.44 1.65* 0.81 -1.15* -0.78* 4.97* 3.68* -1.19 0.58 
(1.04) (3.93) (1.51) (-2.14) (-3.59) (4.77) (5.00) (-0.47 
1972 -0.22 0.78 1.15* -0.56 -0.93 0.04 3.58 5.74* 0.45 
(-0.43) (1.62) (1.71) (-0.88) (-3.20) (0.39) (3.81) (2.22) 
1973 0.59* 0.92* 0.53 -0.23 -0.72* 5.40* 3.58* -2.20 0.54 
(1.68) (2.59) (1.17) (-0.52) (-3.31) (5.16) (4.84) (-0.91 
1974 0.55 0.75* 0.61 0.09 -0.94* 4.96* 3.02* -1.75 0.53 
(1.49) (2.03) (1.32) (0.19) (-4.55) (4.75) (4.16) (-0.76) 
Table 5.9 
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-2 regression improved, (R in the range 0.45 to 0.58). 
Part of the problem in estimating this type of model 
for the West Indies is the diversity of the MDC economies, 
anyone of which can bias the results. To make a comparis-
on with later results, and to try and isolate the effects of 
economic integration on each of the MDC's, trade flow 
equations were estimated for each of the four members. The 
form of the equation was that of number eight - i.e. in-
cluding a dummy variable for trade with the UK. 
l Equation Nine - Barbados (Table 5-10) 
Equation nine is an estimate of the trade flow model 
for Barbados' imports and exports, and includes a dummy 
variable to account for the special relationship between 
the UK and members of the Commonwealth. In general, the 
elasticities had the correct signs and this form of the 
equation accounted for between 37% and 57% of the variat-
ion in trade flows. 
Although they have the correct sign, neither of the 
elasticities relating to the exporter, al and bl, were 
significant. The elasticity of importers income, a2, was 
significant for 1968 to 1973 and over this period the 
elasticity varied between 1.9 and 6. B2 is also sig-
nificant over 1968 to 1971 and has a correspondingly high 
negative elasticity of population. Once again the emphasis 
seems to be on the importance of import elasticities in 
determining trade, the export elasticities being relative-
ly unimportant or incapable of describing changes in trade 
flows. This is partly a reflection of the relatively low 
share of exports in GDP over the period - less than 40% in 
1967 and 20% in 1977 - and the relatively high share of 
imports in GDP - 71% in 1967 and 54% in 1976. Furthermore 
as the elasticities a2 and b2 declined over time so did the 
share of imports in GDP. 
The elasticity of distance, cl, was of the correct 
sign, and significant in 1968, 1970, and over the period 
1973 to 1976. I~s value lay between -0.79 and -1.33 and 




YEAR al a2 bl b2 cl 
-2 
dl d2 CONST R 
1967 1.11 2.15 -0.37 -2.28 -0.81 2.90 5.32* 7.96 0.42 
(0.71) (1.38) (-0.18) (-1.11) (-1.37) (1.00) (2.57) (0.92) 
1968 1.34 4.64* -0.75 -5.46* -0.91* 2.41 5.52* 15.88* 0.57 
(1.02) (3.54) (-0.43) (-3.14) (-1.80) (0.96) (3.04) (2.07) 
1969 2.06 6.04* -1.62 -7.20* -0.26 5.85* 5.81* 13.83 0.57 
(1.44) (4.22) (-0.86) (-3.82) (-0.48) (2.15) (2.97) (1.67) 
1970 1.63 4.12* -0.81 -4.41* -0.93* 5.17* 5.35* 8.82 0.52 
(1.21) (3.08) (-0.46) (-2.52) (-1.81) (1.99) (2.86) (1.12) ~ 
+-
1971 1.79 4.04* -1.08 -4.39* -0.70 6.03* 5.36* 7.69 0.53 
""'-l 
(1.42) (3.21) (-0.66) (-2.68) (-1.41) (2.36) (2.96) (1.02) 
1972 1.68 2.51 -0.96 -2.61 -0.80 5.79* 5.62* 5.99 0.53 
(1.32) (1.96) (-0.58) (-1.57) (-1.53) (2.18) (2.98) (0.77) 
1973 1.43 1.90* -0.89 -1.95 -0.79* 4.22* 5.07* 7.37 0.51 
(1.45) (1.94) (-0.70) (-1.54) (-1.83) (1.91) (3.25) (1.19) 
1974 1.55 1.39 -0.66 -0.93 -1.33* 4.43* 4.90* 4.69 0.49 
(1.29) (1.16) (-0.45) (-0.63) (-2.85) (1.76) (2.77) (0.73) 
1975 0.65 0.22 0.57 0.72 -1.06* 4.70* 4.12* -2.17 0.37 
(0.58) (0.39) (0.40) (0.85) (-2.12) (1.86) (2.29) (-0.32) 
1976 0.87) 0.97 0.41 -0.17 . -1.08* 5.94* 2.72* -2.41 0.56 
(1 .07) (1.20) (0.39) (-0.17) (-2.83) (2.93) (1.90) (-0.46) 
Table 5.10 
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the end of the period. This may be associated with a 
change in the pattern of goods imported and exported with 
more manufactured goods as well as the possible effects of 
increased tariff barriers reducing the value of trade: 
The dummy variable for trade with the UK was signific-
ant over the whole period, generally greater than 5 
confirming the strong post colonial ties within the Common-
wealth, as well as reflecting the decline in sugar prices. 
The dummy variable for intra-regional trade (dl) was 
not significant until 1969 when it doubled in value from 
2.41 (1968) to 5.85 (1969). This higher value, indicating 
evidence for gross trade creation, was maintained through 
to 1976. Strictly the dummy variable should be close to 
zero prior to integration and positive thereafter and al-
though the estimated pattern indicates an integration effect, 
the values In 1967 and 1968 suggest that other factors are 
present prior to integration. After 1974 the increasing 
value of the dummy variable may be partly attributable to 
oil imports, especially from Trinidad-Tobago. It may also 
be that the dummy variable will change as the price of sugar 
changes as changes in extra-trade will also reflect changes 
in sugar prices that are not determined by GDP or populat-
ion, whereas intra trade may be more stable, therefore as the 
value of extra-trade falls with sugar prices intra-trade 
appears to improve. 
j Equation Ten - Guyana (Table 5-11) 
Of the four trade flow equations for the individual 
MDC's, that of Guyana provides the best overall fit with an 
R2 lying between 0.53 and 0.72. Apart from the distance 
variable all of the elasticities have the correct sign. 
Both al and a2 are positive and significant over the 
whole period, this being the first time that both al and 
a2 have been consistently significant. 
For the population variables both bl and b2 have the 
correct sign and are significant for the period 1967 to 
1970 and in 1971 (bl) and between 1967 and 1971 (b2), al-




YEAR al a2 bl b2 cl d2 CONST 
-2 
dl R 
1967 3.6S* 3.84* -3.S0* -3.76* 0.92 9.32* 3.S3* -O.SO 0.S3 
(2.90) (3.0S) (-2.08) (-2.24) (1.66) (3.88) (2.04) (-0.07) 
1968 4.09* 4.1S* -4.07* -4.11* 0.9S* 10.16* 4.47* 0.69 0.69 
(4.00) (4.06) (-2.96) (-2.99) (2.07) (S.OS) (3.06) (0.11) 
1969 3.87* 3.71* -3.77* -3.46* 0.78 10.03* 4.S1* -0.91 0.62 
(3.40) (3.26) (-2.49) (-2.29) (1.S8) (4.S6) (2.83) (-0.14) 
1970 2.89* 3.08* -2.48* -2.7S 0.08 7.S4* 3.97* 1.lS 0.72 
(4.06) (4.32) (-2.6S) (-2.94) (0.2S) (S.39) (3.91) (0.27) t--J += 
\() 
1971 1.81* 2.10* -1.21 -1.64* -0.39 S.33* 3.SS* 2.21 0.64 
(2.82) (3.27) (-1.45) (-1.97) (-1.32) (4.09) (3.82) (O.S7) 
1972 2.10* 2.08* -1.4S -1.38 -0.17 7.69* 3.9S* -2.64 0.71 
(3.22) (3.19) (-1.74) (-1.67) (-0.59) (5.94) (4.26) (-0.69) 
1973 2.30* 1.67* -1.58 -0.64 -0.32 8.56* 4.12* -5.17 0.63 
(4.90) (2.11) (-1.62) (-0.66) (-0.88) (5.29) (3.56) (-1.13) 
1974 2.27* 1.90* -1.56* -0.96 -0.41* 7.59* 3.87* -4.06 0.75 
(3.74) (3.13) (-2.17) (-1.34) (-1.79) (6.51) (4.87) (-1.49) 
1975 1.57* 1.42* -0.71 -0.40 -0.34 7.73* 3.75* -7.25* 0.65 
(2.38) (2.02) (-0.8S) (-0.48) (-1.11) (5.39) (3.73) (;':2.02) 
1976 1.35* 1.02 -0.50 0.01 . -0.50 6.61* 3.76* -4.64 0.62 
(2.15) (1.63) (-0.66) (0.01) (-1.69) (4.85) (3.81) (-1.34) 
Table 5.11 
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(values over -3) does increase towards zero by 1975/76. 
The elasticity of distance, cl, is significant in only 
two years, 1968, when it also had the wrong sign (0.95) and 
1974 when it was negative. In fact distance is not negative 
until 1971. This result is similar in pattern to those for 
Barbados. 
The dummy variable for trade with the UK is not as 
large as that for Barbados, although it is consistently 
significant lying between 3.5 and 4.5. 
The dummy variable for intra-union trade, although it 
is significant does not seem to indicate the expected 
pattern for economic integration, in the late 1960's having 
very high values of close to and over 10, and during the 
1970's it falls in value and tends to lie between 7 and 8. 
However this does indicate a strong emphasis on intra-
regional trade in comparison to the other MDC's and this is 
supported by the generally higher shares of Guyana's regional 
trade in total trade: 5 
k Equation Eleven - Jamaica (Table 5-12) 
On average this equation accounts for over 50% of the 
variation in trade flows with an R2 lying between 0.43 and 
0.60. All of the elacticities generally have the correct 
sign, but once again al is not significant, and a2 sig-
nificant for only three years - 1968 to 1970. From 1969 
a2 declines and is negative in 1974 to 1976 although it is 
not significantly different from zero. 
Although bl and b2 have the correct sign (negative) 
neither of them are significant. 
The elasticity of distance, cl, is negative and sig-
nificant from 1970, and is always less than -1.3 indicat-
ing quite a strong resistance to trade, although this may 
be associated with factors other than resistance to trade 
including the concentration of sugar and bauxite exports in 
total exports that in general are to non-regional markets. 
The dummy variable for trade with the UK (d2) is 
significant and lies between 3 and 4 in general. This 




YEAR al a2 bl b2 cl dl d2 CONST 
-2 
R 
1967 1.66 2.05 -0.59 -1.58 -0.58 4.86 3.71* -1.08 0.47 
(1.24) (1.54) (-0.33) (-0.88) (-0.82) (1.72) (2.01) (-0.13) 
1968 1.09 2.38* 0.24 -2.04 -0.71 4.39* 3.60* -0.89 0.60 
(0.97) (2.11) (0.16) (-1.34) (-1.17) (1.78) (2.21) (-0.12) 
1969 1.48 2.57* -0.36 -2.33 -0.95 4.66* 3.98* 3.40 0.57 
(1.35) (2.33) (-0.25) (-1.58) (-1.64) (1.95) (2.55) (0.47) 
1970 1.56 1.92* -0.47 -1.43 -1.31* 4.77* 3.77* 4.23 0.59 
(1.62) (1.99) (-0.36) (-1.12) (-2.53) (2.23) (2.69) (0.66) 
~ 
\.J\ 
1971 1.28 1.33 -0.19 -0.73 -1.44* 4.10* 3.79* 4.35 0.59 ~ 
(1.42) (1.48) (-0.16) (-0.61) (-2.87) (1.96) (2.83) (0.71) 
1972 1.18 0.87 -0.02 -0.04 -1.50* 5.25* 3.85 2.13 0.54 
(1.28) (0.94) (-0.01) (-0.04) (-2.88) (2.41) (2.78) (0.34) 
1973 1.17 0.18 -0.04 0.88 -1.53* 5.30* 3.77* 0.70 0.50 
(1.26) (0.19) (-0.03) ( 0.72) (-2.64) (2.20) (4.47) (0.10) 
1974 1.16 -0.003 -0.16 1.04 -1.44* 4.51 3.08* 1.75 0.47 
(1.23) (-0.003) (-0.14) (0.88) (-2.78) (1.92) (2.14) ~(0.29) 
1 (~j 7 5 0.82 -0.05 0.40 1.12 -1.41* 5.46* 3.62* -0.69 0.43 
(0.83) (-0.05) (0.32) (0.89) (-2.36) (2.13) (2.25) (-0.10) 
1976 0.54 -0.08 0.58 1.10 -1.80* 3.85* 2.98* 4.11 0.50 
(0.73) (-0.11) (0.60) ( 1 .14 ) . (-3.60) ( 1 . 79 ) (2.18) ( 0.72) 
Table 5.12 
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variable follows a pattern similar to Guyana and may be partly 
explained by the possible similarity of exports to the UK -
bauxite and sugar - although given the relative size of the 
elasticities, Jamaica would seem to depend less on the UK 
market. 
The dummy variable for intra-regional trade is signif-
icant from 1968, and in general the values are greater than 
those of 1967. Although this pattern may reflect the effects 
of integration it may also, as for distance, reflect the 
changing price of sugar and bauxite. 
1 Equation Twelve - Trinidad-Tobago (Table 5-13) 
Of the four MDe's, Trinidad-Tobago has the poorest 
results in terms of the R2 which lies between 0.23 and 
0.47. Although both al and a2 have the correct positive 
signs neither of them are significant. Until 1971 al is 
less than 1 thereafter increasing though still less than 2. 
The income elasticity of the importer - a2 - although not 
significant has a higher value, though once again less than 
2 • 
Neither bl nor b2 are significant, b2 has the correct 
negative sign whereas bl is positive up to 1972. 
Although aI, a2, bl and b2 are all non-significant, 
a2 and b2 tend to begreater than al and bl, suggesting the 
relative importance of the import side. 
Distance is significant from 1968, with negative values 
close to 1. The dummy variable for trade with the UK, al-
though generally significant and greater than 3, had a value 
in 1974 of only 1.98. In comparison to the other MDC's, 
Trinidad-Tobago's links with the UK are not as strong, re-
flecting Trinidad's more developed economy and trade links 
with the rest of the world. 
The dummy variable for regional trade is not signific-
ant until 1970/71 by which time it has risen to 5.26 from 
1.75 in 1967, and provides the strongest indication so far 
of evidence of integration effects. Trinidad-Tobago is the 
most developed of the region's members and as well as 




YEAR al a2 bl b2 c] dl d2 CONST 
-2 
R 
1967 0.71 1.69 0.03 -1.36 -0~87 1.75 3.05 5.96 0.23 
(0.44) (1.18) (0.12) (-0.71) (-1.67) (0.60) (1.21) (0.67) 
1968 0.62 1.54 0.27 -1.04 -1.05* 2.21 3.31 4.58 0.26 
(0.19) (0.90) (0.43) (-0.36) (-1.97) (0.66) (1.35) (0.37) 
1969 0.54 1.69 0.54 -1.19 -1.14* 3.23 3.41* 3.38 0.31 
(0.10) (0.97) (0.64) (-0.40) (-2.17) (1.03) (1.98) (0.19) 
1970 0.52 1.45 0.66 -0.82 -1.08* 3.97 3.19* 1.00 0.39 
(0.09) (0.89) (0.78) (-0.23) (-2.23) (1.45) (1.83) (0.12) ~ 
V\ 
\..U 
1971 0.58 1.36 0.72 -0.64 -0.94* 5.26* 3.25* -2.22 0.45 
(0.18) (0.88) (0.84) (-0.14) (-1.89) (1.98) (2.14) (-0.63) 
1972 1017 1.28 0.10 -0.38 -1.07* 6. 61 lLt" 3.33* -3.21 0.47 
(0.66) (0.76) (0.44) (-0.08) (-2.06) (2.47) (2.31) (-0.79) 
1973 1.17 1.10 -0.18 -0.34 -0.86* 5.56* 2.81 -1.14 0.28 
(0.67) (0.59) (-0.15) (-0.25) (-1.80) (1.92) (1.58) (-0.39) 
1974 1.53 0.84 -0.57 0.21 -0.88* 6.00* 1.98 -3.31 0.30 
(1.07) (0.35) (-0.51) ( 0.19) (-2.11) (2.11) (1.06) (-0.70) 
1975 1.80 1.46 -0.63 -0.42 -1.09* 7.55* 3.26* -5.23 0.31 
(0.99) (0.69) (-0.58) (-0.39) (-1.83) (2.43) (2.56) (-0.83) 
1976 1.34 1.11 -0.21 -0.06 -0.90* 6.87* 2.88* -5.19 0.34 
(0.83) (0.57) (-0.15) (-0.06) (-1.78) (2.32) (2.01) (-0.94) 
Table 5.13 
154 
regional trade, it is the member most able to benefit from 
the regional grouping. However, many of the apparent In-
tegration effects are likely to be related to the oil 
price increases in the early 1970's. 
Section 5.3: Overview of Trade Flow Equation Elasticities 
This section discusses the elasticities estimated in 
the trade flow equations as a whole in an attempt to present 
an overall picture of the working of the model, what the 
model appears to be describing and to suggest explanations 
for some of the 'unexpected' results. 
Section 503.1: Income and Population Elasticities 
Income and population are included in the trade flow 
model as joint determinants of the size of the foreign 
sector and strictly the estimated elasticities al and bl, 
a2 and b2, should be discussed together. 
If equations two, eight and ten are excluded, the el-
asticity al (exporters income) did not perform particularly 
well. Although the sign was generally correct (positive), 
al was only significant five times, twice in equation 2 and 
equation 7, and once in equation 5. This is in contrast 
to a2 (importer's income) which was generally positive and 
significant. 
The population elasticities should have been negative, 
and apart from equation two this is true for b2 (importers 
population). However, bl (exporters population) tends to 
be positive rather than negative and only in equation ten 
is it both negative and significant; in three equations 
the results are generally non-significant. 
In most of the equations where bl is significant but 
predominantly positive, aI, the corresponding income el-
asticity is non-significant (except in equation 10) and in 
all the other equations there are only two years in which 
both al and bl are significant; this is equation two where 
they both had the wrong sign. 
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These results are open to several possible inter-
related interpretations. 
(i) The non-significance of al contributes to a 
breakdown in the relationship between the 
size of the foreign sector and trade flows 
so that trade as a function of population 
(which is positive) is in fact being 
estimated. 
(ii) Population may be acting as a proxy for 
income. 
(iii) The interaction between the foreign sector 
(estimated by income and population) and trade 
flows is different from that normally expected. 
This may affect the all-trade equations in such 
a way as to cancel out the income elasticities. 
Under this assumption the true relationship 
would be obvious in the intra and extra regional 
equations. (i.e. the explanation may lie in 
the special conditions of regional trade). 
Possibilities one and two would tend to reinforce the 
view of the relative unimportance of the export side in de-
termining trade flows. The third alternative basically 
suggests, for reasons discussed below, that the determinants 
of exports for the MDC's is different in some way from the 
expected result, although this does not exclude the poss-
ibility of one and two also occurring. Some of the trade 
flow results above do support the view that trade among the 
four MOC's is affected by income and population to a diff-
erent degree and possibly in different ways. 
First, in equation four (exports of the MOC's) those 
elasticities that are exclusively concerned with the MOC's 
(al and bl) do not conform to expectations; al is non-
significant and negative and bl is positive and significant. 
In equation five (imports of MOC's) where al and bl are 
associated with both the MOC's and non-regional trading 
partners, although al and bl are generally non-significant, 
al is positive and bl although not always negative is not 
significant. In both of these equations a2 and b2 
(elasticities associated with the importing countries) 
conform to expectations at least in terms of the signs. 
So far this suggests that at least for trade involving 
non-MOC's the import related elasticities are as expected, 
although not always significant, whereas the export side 
does not seem to respond in the same way. 
We now consider equations two and three. In equation 
three (extra trade) the import side acts as expected where-
as on the export side al is non-significant and bl is pos-
itive when significant. In every equation so far there is 
the possibility that bl is positive because al is not sig-
nificant. 
In equation two (intra trade) not only do al and bl 
have the wrong signs but a2 and b2 also have the wrong 
signs. In the first two years all of these elasticities 
are significant and have the wrong sign. We can at least 
assume then for these two years that either trade is de-
termined in a different way or special factors have created 
these unusual results. Alternatively, we can assume that 
for intra trade, income is relatively unimportant and that 
population works in a different way. 
If we ignore equation two, then In general the import 
elasticities, a2 and b2, behave as expected, a2 being 
positive and b2 being negative. Therefore the import side 
of the foreign sector diminishes as population increases. 
For MDC imports in general and in particular those imports 
from the rest of the world the signs tend to be correct al~ 
though income tends to be significant in more cases, (in 
equation five b2 is significant only once). To the extent 
that income and population describe trade the import deter-
minants of the foreign sector have a stronger relationship. 
It lS possible because of peculiarities of the MDC 
sample that the export elasticities can have the wrong 
sign especially for intra trade and be insignificant for 
extra and total trade. 
Two of the MDC's may be the cause of the unexpected 
results; Trinidad-Tobago and Barbados, in particular the 
latter. Concentrating on the MOC's alone, if the hypothesis 
behind the trade flow model. is correct (i.e. the relative 
size of the foreign sector) then within the West Indies 
as population increases the share of exports in total in-
come should decline - and this is true for the import side 
- and it is also assumed that trade is balanced which 
loosely interpreted would mean that merchandise imports 
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and exports as a share of income were roughly equal -
though not necessarily identical. As long as they are 
reasonably close then the model functions as predicted, 
because it is mainly designed to look at merchandise trade. 
At the same time small deficits will be balanced on t.he 
invisibles account and in the case of the West Indies we 
would expect net tourist receipts to play this balancing 
role. We are therefore assuming that there are no large 
and persistent deficits on the merchandise trade account. 
For Trinidad-Tobago, Guyana and Jamaica, imports and ex-
por~are roughly balanced in this sense to within a certain 
percentage. Barbados on the other hand has tended to run 
a persistent and large visible trade deficit (as much as 50% 
between the share of imports and exports in income). This 
has been financed by tourist receipts, foreign investment, 
aid, loans etc., but this gap may be large enough to violate 
the assumption of equilibrium to such an extent as to vis-
ibly effect the results. Effectively it gives Barbados 
the appearance of having an uncharacteristically small 
export foreign sector with respect to population, and this 
could certainly bias the elasticities for intra regional 
trade and result in a positive relationship between the 
foreign sector on the export side (exports share of GDP) and 
population. This may account in part for the results in 
equation two and in general for the insignificant and/or 
incorrect signs of the export elasticities. 
The results on the export side are not rejected and 
we have to consider the violation of the equilibrium 
assumption as a possible alternative explanation. Further-
more this upward bias in the export side of the foreign 
sector will also bias the dummy variable estimates up-
wards to an extent. By using individual MDe equations 
(equations 9 - 12) we can reduce this effect to a consider-
able extent and as we can see from the results of equations 
9 - 12 the dummy variable does reflect a more acceptable 
integration effect. 
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In general it would appear that if in the sample used 
there are countries that do not conform to the equilibrium 
assumption then either we have to re-estimate the equations 
country by country" o.r else we have to incorporate equil-
ibrating variables (based on the capital account) to accounc 
for the visible trade deficit. 
Section 5.3.2: Resistance to Trade 
The role of cl, the elasticity of distance, lS much 
broader than the geographic distance it is measured by. 
Basically it is included as a proxy for those factors that 
may act to restrict trade between a pair of countries as 
has been discussed in chapter four. But changes in this 
elasticity over time may be the result of other factors not 
directly associated with 'resistance'. For example, if the 
trade resistance effect appears to fall over time, as has 
been evident in some of the trade flow equations above, 










Lower transport and insurance costs (perhaps 
a result of) 
More extensive transport systems and regional 
infrastructure. 
Improved contacts and communications between 
trading partners enhancing trade flows which 
effectively reduce the negative effect of 
distance. 
Reduced tariffs generally. 
Tariff reduction within the customs union. 
Other integration associated effects that 
have enhanced regional trade. 
A broader range of regionally produced 
goods available, that result in a broader 
scope for trading opportunities. 
Lower transport costs associated with more 
value-added especially of primary goods. 
Greater access to industrial markets for 
third world exports. 
Of course a stronger resistance effect can be 
associated with all these factors working in the opposite 
direction. It is therefore possible that at least some of 
the integration effects may be captured by changes in the 
elasticity of distance, although to quantify this effect 
would require for example an estimate of what extent 
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factor 2 affected cl, and to what extent factor 2 was 
caused by integration. Although this type of calculation 
is outside the scope of this thesis we should note that all 
of the above factors could be directly and indirectly 
affected by integration. Greater emphasis should be placed 
on cl as an indicator of possible integration effects and 
this proxy should be researched in more detail and the 
measurement refined. 
In most of the equations the elasticity, cl, was 
negative and significant as expected. What is important 
is the direction in which cl moves over time, and the re-
lative magnitude of the elasticity between comparable equat-
ions. 
The following points may be noted. First, the effect 
of distance tended to increase in all the equations that In-
cluded trade external to the region. Second, for intra-
union trade the effect tended to decrease and third, the 
effect of distance was greater for intra-regional trade than 
for extra regional. 
The estimates of cl in equations 2, 3 and 6, suggest 
that trade reducing effects are greater for trade between 
the MOe's. This reflects both their initially underdevel-
oped regional infrastructure and transport systems as well 
as a lack of regionally tradable goods, especially of manu-
factures. Efforts have been made to improve the regional 
infrastructure which will certainly have helped in reducing 
16. 
costs and making regional transport more predictable. 
So the general decline in the effect of cl may be attribut-
able to various factors that are likely to be associated 
with regional integration. 
Second, as is evident from a comparison of equations 
two and three, trade between the region and the rest of the 
world - extra trade - is less restricted by the resistance 
proxy. This can be accounted for by various factors in-
cluding better transport connections that are owned by the 
industrial countries, traditional links that imply a better 
market knowledge by the industrialised countries, the 
16. For example the establishment of WIseo to improve the 
regional shipping service. 
role of multinational corporations in the MDC's, and that 
many of the goods that are traded between the MDC's and 
the industrial countries are generally not available in 
the importing country. The tendency for cl to have an 
increasing effect over time on extra trade may be in part 
due to increased tariffs imposed by the industrial countries, 
the common external tariff of Carita/Caricom, competition 
from other third world countries etc. and is an indication 
of a possibly import substituting regional grouping. 
There is also a slightly stronger distance effect for 
MDC exports when compared with MDC imports which may be 
associated with the greater dominance of industrial country 
exports and the need of the MDC's for these imports as 
well as a broader range of goods available for MDC imports 
as opposed to MDC exports. 
Section 5.3.3: Integration Effects - Dummy Variable for 
Intra-Union Trade 
In the trade flow model the dummy variable for intra-
union trade i~ expected to indicate the effects of economic 
integration as reflected through changing trade flow 
patterns. Effectively it measures the extent to which the 
regression for extra-trade underestimates intra-regional 
trade flows. It is therefore assumed that the elasticities 
of income and population to trade are similar for both intra 
and extra trade -or at least have the same overall effect -
and will be unaffected by integration. 
The dummy variable elasticity is expected to be non-
significant prior to economic integration and positive and 
significant thereafter. First, excluding the individual MDC 
equations (numbers 9 - 12), the dummy variable was positive 
and significant both before and after integration except in 
equation 6. This suggests the following possibilities. 
(i) Effects similar to those of economic integrat-
ion were evident prior to integration and are 
perhaps associated with th~ regio~'~ his~or~ 
of cooperation as well as ltS posltlon wlthln 
the Commonwealth. 
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(ii) That other factors are the source and integrat-
ion has had no effect. 
(iii) That other factors have declined in importance 
as integration effects became evident, the two 
creating a balance. 
(iv) That there were other peculiarities in the 
sample that have affected the dummy variable. 
It is possible that there is an underlying integrat-
ion effect that was zero prior to and positive after 
economic integration, and any integration effects may have 
to be observed or make themselves evident by changes in the 
dummy variable rather than by its absolute value. It is 
certainly not the aim of this thesis to isolate all of the 
possible effects described above, but it is possible to 
suggest certain factors within the sample that could have 
contributed to this effect. 
As suggested above, in general the import side of the 
trade flow model appears to approximate the expected results, 
and that many of the problems in the model are associated 
with the export side, particularly of the MDe's, specifica-
lly as a result of Barbados' large and persistent visible 
trade deficit. It is possible that this once again may be 
showing its effects. 
If the dummy variable provides an estimate of the 
difference between intra and extra trade, then a bias in 
intra trade may be reflected in the size of the dummy 
variable. It has been suggested above that the relation-
ship between the size of the export side of the foreign 
sector and population is positive instead of negative because 
of the unusually low share of exports in income (and the 
associated trade deficit) for Barbados. If this is the 
case then the difference between the (negatively related) 
foreign sector (export side) for extra trade and the 
positively related foreign sector (export side) for intra 
trade will be much greater than if the foreign sector for 
intra trade had a negative relationship with population as 
expected. This means that the dummy variable is appearing 
positive and large because of Barbados' trade deficit. If 
we could assume that this deficit affected the model in a 
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'constant' fashion then it could be possible to use the 
change in dummy variable as a measure of integration effects. 
This is supported by equation 4 (MDC exports) in which 
the dummy variable is particularly large especially when 
compared to equation 5 (MDC imports) which is assumed to 
perform normally. The difference between intra exports and 
extra exports is very much greater than the difference be-
tween intra imports and extra imports and is associated with 
the bias in the intra exports caused by Barbados. 
Given the restrictions we have to place on the inter-
pretation of the dummy variable in the general equations, 
we will have to place greater emphasis on the individual 
MDC trade flow equations (Numbers 9 - 12). At least it may 
be possible to isolate special characteristics of the in-
dividual MDC's that could distort the results, and so come 
to a more acceptable estimate of integration effects. The 
results of these equations have already been discussed 
above and we are interested here principally in the 
characteristics of the dummy variables alone. 
For the four MDC's, the value of the dummy variable is 
variable, both in the size of the elasticity and the individ-
ual patterns of change. The overall dummy variable elasticit-
ies in the previous equations would therefore not be suit-
able in estimating the effects of integration in individ-
ual members. 
On the other hand, if we exclude Guyana which will be 
discussed below, the MDC's show a similarity over time. In 
1967, 1968 and in some cases 1969, the dummy variable al-
though positive is not significant, and generally prior to 
integration has much lower values than in any other equat-
lons. For Barbados and Trinidad-Tobago when the dummy 
variable does become significant there is a large increase 
in value. As a rough guide to the size of the changes the 
table below shows for the three MDC's in column A the 
percentage change ln the dummy variable from the last in-
significant value to the first significant value, and in 
column B the percentage change from the last insignificant 














As can be seen, the size of changes in the value of 
the dummy variable for Jamaica are much smaller (in fact 
initially negative), the dummy variable changing gradually 
and starting from a larger non-significant value. 
It may be suggested that Trinidad-Tobago and Barbados 
experienced a more obvious 'integration effect' than did 
Jamaica. In the standard literature this change would be 
categorised as gross trade creation and is associated with 
greater regional trade. It also seems that taken on its 
own, Barbados does not seem to exhibit any of the features 
expected from t~e large trade deficit. If Barbados had 
been the cause of previous upward biases we would have 
expected this to be reflected In a larger dummy variable 
in equation 9. This does not rule out the effect of 
Barbados on the earlier equations and suggests that on its 
own the foreign sector on the export side performs satis-
factorily. For Barbados the effects of the dummy variable 
seem to peak around 1971, thereafter declining. Jamaica's 
dummy variable on the other hand was more erratic and 
peaked in 1975. The dummy variable for Trinidad-Tobago 
grew up to 1972, declined in the following year and peaked 
in 1975. The st~onger effects on Trinidad-Tobago reflects 
the more developed nature of the economy that could take 
advantage of trade liberalisation, though in later years 
the high dummy variable is probably associated with the 
growing oil trade (although this may also have been In-
directly facilitated by economic integration). Trinidad-
Tobago dominates regional trade by virtue of its role as 
a major regional petroleum supplier. 
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The results for Guyana are particularly interesting 
as practically all of the income elasticities, al and a2 
are positive and significant and the population elasticit-
ies; bl and b2 are negative and significant for 1967 to 
1970. In both cases the elasticities declined in effect 
over time (i.e. both moved closer to zero from different 
directions). On the other hand distance is only signif-
icant in 1968 when it has the value of 0.95. Cl 1S 
positive until 1971. 
The dummy variable is always significant and has very 
high values, peaking in 1968 and generally declining there-
after. This may be related to the fact that before integrat-
ion the region was particularly important as a market and 
supplier for Guyana. As its economy is largely based on 
foodstuffs and bauxite it could not benefit much from trade 
liberalisation as it did not produce a broad enough range 
of goods. Furthermore as bauxite and alumina became more 
important, emphasis on trade would have shifted outside 
the region. 
Section 5.4: Import Elasticity and Expenditure Share 17. 
Models 
In this section we present the results of the changes 
in 1ncome elasticity to import and the expenditure share 
methods. Before discussing the results in detail it is 
necessary to outline some of the restrictions imposed on 
the interpretation of the results by the methods used. 
These qualifications will reduce the confidence we can have 
in the results but reinforces the view that a proper dis-
cussion of the effects of integration requires more informat-
ion, and should be incorporated as part of a much broader 
approach within which different methods contribute differ-
ent parts to the overall picture, but in themselves cannot 
provide the full picture. 
In deriving the elasticities for 1960/68, 1968/73 and 
1968/74, the growth rates of imports and GDP on which the 
estimates are based will depend crucially on the time 
17. Described in chapter four and section 5.1. 
I 
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period chosen, specifically on the end years. By basing the 
growth rate of a period on the two end years we are assum-
ing that the estimate derived accurately describes the over-
all performance during the chosen period. It is possible 
that one of the years chosen may be particularly good or 
bad and will tend to bias the estimated average growth rate. 
It may be that more representative estimates could be de-
rived from the regression analysis of trade flows. 
As expected the year-on-year growth rates that were 
also calculated show a marked degree of instability. 
Cyclical variation in the estimated elasticities may re-
flect the inability of many categories of imports to change 
in the short term and may therefore reflect changes In 
prices. In the short run for categories of imports that 
are essential or required for development volume may not 
be responsive to price and income changes, such that changes 
in the value of imports may be a reflection of an inelastic 
short run price demand function and not related to GOP 
growth as such. Also, if there are expectations that a 
prlce movement is not permanent, then consumption may con-
tinue at the same level and not respond in the short run 
to price signals. This may be observed around 1973/74 when 
oil prices increased substantially. It is therefore open to 
question whether we are in fact estimating the income elas-
ticity of imports using the year-on-year growth rates. It 
lS to be hoped that the longer run estimates are closer 
to the elasticity we want to measure, and we will concentrate 
on these measures~ However the results still have to be 
interpreted with care. 
The results of the expenditure share and import elast-
icity methods are now reported for the four MOC's. It must 
be remembered that both of these methods only give a partial 
result. An overview of the results of the expenditure 
share approach and the changes in income elasticity to im-
port are found in tables 5.19 and 5.20. 
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Section 5.4.1: Barbados 
The direction of change of elasticities for total, intra 
and extra imports between pre and post integration periods 
is reported in table 5.15, for all commodities as well as by 
one digit SITC headings. 
The aggregate results for Barbados indicate evidence 
of gross trade creation (an increase in the elasticity of 
intra-regional imports), trade diversion (a fall in the 
elasticity of extra- regional imports) and no evidence of 
net trade creation (a fall in the elasticity of total 
imports), the last result possibly indicating a decline 
in total trade in response to changes in income, 
. A d' . 18 suppresslon. ccor lng to my own categorles 
i.e. trade 
the results 
can be interpreted as trade suppression, and trade divers-
ion from extra to intra regional sources. The results of 
the expenditure share approach (change in domestic share 
= +1.7, change in partner share = +0.8, and change in world 
share = -2.5) indicate similar results (i.e. no net trade 
creation, gross trade creation and trade diversion) although 
the changes in elasticity indicate the replacement of extra 
imports by intra imports, the expendiure share approach 
also suggests a large trade suppression element or that 
trade is being diverted from extra imports to domestic pro-
duction. Between the two periods the domestic share of ex-
penditure increased from 53.5% to 55.2% accounting for 68% 
of the fall in extra imports (world share) share of total 
expenditure. This result is supported by the negative 
change in elasticity of total imports. Overall the net 
position seems to be at the expense of extra imports, with 
a greater domest.ic share of consumption. 
The results for the individual SITC headings are re-
classified below by direction of change. 
At this level of disaggregation there is general 
evidence of trade suppression as evidenced by the negative 
changes in total elasticity for all groups apart from 
beverages and tobacco, crude raw materials, and manufactures. 
This trade suppression may be associated with greater 
18. See section 4.6 
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CHANGES IN THE INCOME ELASTICITY TO IMPORT 
(1960/68 and 1968/73) 
SITC Category 
A 
0 - Food 
3 - Fuels 
5 - Chemicals 
8 - Misc. Manufactures 
B 
1 - Beverages and 
Tobacco 
2 - Crude Raw Materials 
C 
4 - Animal/Vegetable 
Oil and Fat 










Transport Equipment -0.60 
9 - Others -0.50 
0 

























domestic production, declining demand in general and de-
clining demand for a particular category. 
Category C shows the strongest evidence of trade 
suppression with both intra and extra import elasticities 
declining. This is not surprising for SITC-4 (animal/ 
vegetable oil fats) given the region's commitment to 
greater production of agricultural products. However 
the general decline in imports of SITC-7 (machinery and 
transport equipment) is perhaps associated less with 
greater domestic production and more with the high rates of 
growth of this category of imports prior to integration. 
Overall category A also suggests import suppression, 
although it is most evident for fuel imports - SITC-3. 
Category A suggests trade suppression though largely at 
the cost of extra imports, some of this trade being di-
verted to regional producers and the rest either to domes-
ic producers or to different product groups. In particular 
there appears to be clear evidence of trade diversion of 
fuels from extra-regional suppliers to regional suppliers 
(as well as to domestic sources). This is associated 
with the increasing role of Trinidad-Tobago as a major 
regional supplier of petroleum and petroleum products. 
In category B, beverages and tobacco -SITC-l - indicate 
both trade creation within the region as well as a small 
degree of trade diversion from extra to intra sources, 
whereas crude raw materials - SITC-2 - shows a stronger 
element of trade diversion from extra to intra and very -
little trade creation (i.e. small change in total import 
elasticity). Changes in SITC-l would indicate greater 
regional self-sufficiency in producing and processing 
this category. 
Finally, category D which consists of manufactures 
suggests a fall in regional sources being replaced by extra-
regional sources although there is little evidence of a 
greater share of total imports. However, Barbados has 
increased its share in manufactured goods production and 
other evidence (i.e. share of regional imports in total 
imports) suggests more manufactured goods from the region. 
Although the expenditure share approach suggests a 
stronger movement from extra sources to domestic sources 
than to regional sources we do not know precisely in which 
categories these changes were the strongest. It may be ex-
pected that the types of goods that Barbados can produce 
for themselves (or at least assemble) will be those already 
produced by other more developed MDe's, so any switch to 
domestic production may be indicated by falls in the elas-
ticity of intra imports than by extra imports which would 
suggest manufactures and machinery and transport equipment. 
Section 5.4.2: 'Guyana 
The aggregate changes in total, intra and extra import 
elasticities for Guyana were all positive, the largest 
change occurring in intra imports. This indicates trade 
creation both regionally and extra regionally. The expend-
iture share aproach also indicates net trade creation 
(negative change in domestic share) as well as a strong 
gross trade creation effect; however, there is also an 
indication of trade diversion away from extra-regional 
sources. Rather than general trade creation the expendit-
ure share results indicate that over 88% of the increase in 
intra trade had been diverted from extra sources. 
In general the domestic share of expenditure was re-
latively stable, while partner share increased from 6% to 
8.32% and non-partner share fell from 43.1% to 41%. Both 
methods suggest an increase in partner share of imports, 
though it is not agreed whether this was trade creation or 
trade diversion. 
Only two product groups, (see table 5-16) crude raw 
materials - SITC-2 - and others - SITC~- show a fall in the 
elasticity of total imports, and both cases are accompanied 
by falls in both intra and extra import elacticities. As In 
the case of Barbados this could be attributed to falling 
demand or greater domestic production. In both cases intra 
trade appears to be hit harder. These two cases seem to be 
the exception and both of these import categories generally 
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(1960/68 and 1968/73) 
GUYANA 
SITC Category TOTAL 
A 
0 - Food 0.30 
1 - Beverages and 
Tobacco 1.69 
3 - Fuels 0.98 
8 - Misc. Manufactures 0.15 
B 
2 - Crude Raw Materials -1.24 
9 - Others -2.76 
C 
4 - Animal/Vegetable 
Oil and Fat 1.04 
5 - Chemicals 0.44 
6 - Manufactures 0.58 
7 - Machinery and 

























account for less than 1% of both total and regional imports. 
Those imports listed under A indicate trade creation, 
gross trade creation and trade diversion, the main element 
here being the expansion of the region as a source of im-
ports. In particular the regional share of food imports in 
total imports increased from 2.6% in 1965 to 18.7% in 1972, 
the share of beverages and tobacco increased from 0.2% in 
1965 to 50% in 1973 and miscellaneous manufactures from 
2.9% ~n 1965 to 22.5% in 1973, whereas the share of these 
categories in total imports remained relatively stable. 19 . 
Certainly for those three import categories there appears 
to have been substantial diversion from extra to intra 
regional sources. On the other hand a large percentage of 
total fuel imports has more traditionally corne from the 
regional market in particular from Trinidad-Tobago, so al-
though there was some trade diversion to regional sources 
this was not evident. 
Finally category C covers those imports that experienced 
an increase in elasticity of total, intra and extra imports 
implying trade creation, gross trade creation and no evid-
ence of trade diversion - i.e. external trade creation. 
For SITC-4 and SITC-5 and to a lesser extent in SITC-6, the 
share of intra imports in total imports increased appreciably, 
whereas the total share was relatively unchanged. These are 
all sectors in which the region could have the capacity to 
increase supply. However, SITC-7 - machinery and transport 
equipment - improved only marginally in terms of the regions 
share of total imports, and any change seems more likely to 
be associated with a decline in total imports. This result 
~s not surprising given the generally limited capacity of 
the region to supply this type of import. 
Section 5.4.3: Jamaica 
In the case of Jamaica the import elasticity and ex-
penditure share approach only agree on one of the results-
in both cases there was evidence of gross trade creation as 
shown by the increased importance of intra sources of imports. 
19. See Appendix A 
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6 - Manufactures 
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On the one hand, the changes in import elasticity indicate 
gross trade creation)trade diversion and no evidence of net 
trade creation. Overall this may be associated with trade 
suppression as well as diversion of imports from non-
regional to regional sources~ On the other hand, the ex-
penditure share approach indicates a declining domestic 
share that is diverted to an increasing partner and world 
share in expenditure, indicating overall, trade creation, 
gross trade creation and external trade creation so that all 
sources of imports are improving. 
Overall (see table 5.17) there lS evidence of trade 
suppression In five of the product groupings - those listed 
under A and D. Those under category D - chemicals and 
machinery and transport equipment - have been characterised 
by a fall in import elasticities for all sources of imports, 
although intra imports do not seem to be as strongly affected 
as extra imports. In fact in SITC-7 regional sources are 
positive for the first time - i.e. prior to 1972 the share 
was zero. These changes are likely in part to be due to 
domestic production. 
In the other category - A - where there was evidence of 
trade suppression there was also evidence of trade diversion 
from extra to regional sources In all three of these 
categories - SITC-O, SITC-6 and SITC-8 - their share in total 
imports was generally the same in 1973 as it was in 1965 
(although manufactures share had fallen), whereas intra lm-
ports in total imports increased substantially for food and 
miscellaneous manufactures. 
Category C - Fuels and animal-vegetable-oil and fat -
shows evidence of trade creation and trade diversion In 
favour of imports from regional sources. SITC-4 generally 
plays a small role in total and intra imports so that small 
changes may be reflected by large percentage shares and this 
explains the large increase in the intra import elasticity 
for this product group as prior to integration intra imports 
share in total imports of SITC-4 fell rom 8% in 1960 to 0% 
in 1965 and 1970 and increased to 14% in 1972, and the 
share of SITC-4 in intra trade followed the pattern -
1.2%, 0, 0, 1.9%. 
Prior to the 1970's, fuel from the region accounted for 
0.6% in 1965 and 1.2% in 1970 of total fuel imports (in 1960 
though this share had stood at 23.9%). By 1972 this share 
had risen to 19.9% and accounted for 33% of Jamaican imports 
from the region. The share of oil in total imports increased 
much more slowly. As in previous cases this process is 
associated with the increasing role of Trinidad-Tobago as a 
regional oil supplier, replacing sources outside of the 
region. 
Section 5.4.4: Trinidad-Tobago 
For Trinidad-Tobago both the import elasticity and 
expenditure share results are in agreement as follows. 
1. Net trade creation as evidenced by a positive change 
in total import elasticity and a fall in the domestic share 
of expenditure. 
2. Gross trade creation as shown by an increase in the 
intra import elasticity and in the partner share of expendit-
ure. 
3. External trade creation (no evidence of trade diversion) 
as shown by an increase in the extra import elasticity and 
in the world share of expenditure. 
In particular the expenditure share approach suggests 
that 85% of the decline in the domestic share has been 
diverted to extra area imports, intra area imports only 
improving marginally. 
These results are associated with the fact that the 
Trinidad-Tobago economy is based on the petroleum industry. 
This has contributed to a domestic share of expenditure of 
only 40%, whereas the world share is closer to 57%. As a 
result trade is very important both as a market for oil and 
as a source for other imports, and many of the imports re-
quired come from outside of the region. 
In every category of imports (see table 5-18) there is 
evidence of trade expansion (positive change in total import 
elasticity) apart from fuels - SITC-3 - which is expected 
given Trinidad-Tobago's role as a major regional oil 
producer. The expansion in practically all categories of 
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(1960/68 and 1968/73) 
TRINIDAD-TOBAGO 
SITC Category TOTAL 
A 
0 - Food 0.84 
1 - Beverages and 
Tobacco 2.28 
5 - Chemicals 0.72 
6 - Manufactures 1.37 
7 - Machinery and 
Transport Equipment 1.06 
8 - Misc. Manufactures 
9 - Others 
B 
2 - Crude Raw Materials 
4 - Animal/Vegetable 
Oil and Fat 
C 






























imports lS largely a consequence of the oil industry.' The 
economy has concentrated on this area and the increased 
incomes that have resulted as well as the relative neglect 
of the other sectors of the economy has effectively in-
creased Trinidad-Tobago's dependence on imports for a 
broader range of products. 
Those imports listed under category A experienced a 
general expansion in demand from all sources~ In particular 
regional imports of SITC-l, SITC-5, SITC-7 and SITC-8 have 
increased their share of total imports of each category. 
Category B includes crude raw materials - SITC-2 - and 
animal vegetable oils and fats - SITC-4 - both of which 
suggest some transfer of source from the region to the rest 
of the world. In both cases intra-regional imports share in 
total imports declined in 1972/3 before which time they had 
risen rapidl~ The share of these categories in total trade 
has not changed much so it appears that the source has been 
changing from intra to extra regional. 
Finally, there lS category C which only consists of 
SITC-3 (fuels). As Trinidad-Tobago is the region's maln oil 
producer it is not surprising that oil imports have de-
clined. At one point falling oil reserves lead to greater 
imports of oil and though new reserves are now in use the 
large refineries still require some imported oil in addition. 
In general then the rise and dependence on oil has 
allowed Trinidad-Tobago to expand imports from intra as 
well as from extra regional sources. 
Section 5.5: Conclusions 
a Trade Flow Equations 
In general, the equations accounted for one third to 
two thirds of the variation in trade flows. However, there 
were variations in the way the individual elasticities re-
acted across equations and different sub-samples of the data. 
In particular we can make the following points. 
(i) The elasticity of the exporters income (al) did not 
perform particularly well, generally being non-
significant; 
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(ii) The elasticity of the exporters population (bl) tend-
ed to have the wrong sign - positive instead of 
negative; 
(iii) In equation four (exports of the MDC's), al had the 
wrong sign (negative instead of positive) and was 
non-significant, and bl also had the wrong sign 
(positive) but significant; 
(iv) Where bl was significant but positive, al tended to 
be non-significant, possibly suggesting that bl 
was positive because al was non-significant; 
(v) On the import side a2 was generally positive and 
significant as expected, and if we exclude equation 
two, a2 and b2 behave as predicted by theory so that 
trade flows vary positively with income and inverse-
ly with population; 
(vi) Overall, to the extent that income and population 
determine trade flows, there seems to be a stronger 
relationship on the import side, whereas the export 
side appears to be relatively unimportant in deter-
mining trade flows; 
(vii) It is also suggested that as it is assumed that merch-
andise trade is balanced, if this assumption is 
violated then either the export share or import share 
in income may be uncharacteristically low for a given 
population. This is in fact the case for Babados' 
exports, with a difference of as much as 50% between 
the share of exports and imports in income. There-
fore, on the export side Barbados may be biasing the 
results downwards, and may account for the unexpected 
results in equation two (i.e. al and a2 being negat-
ive and bl and b2 being positive). 
The elasticity of distance (cl) reflecting the resist-
ance to trade, performed as expected being negative and 
generally significant. In particular we can make the follow-
ing points. 
(i) The effect of distance tended to increase over time 
in all equations that included trade external to the 
region; 
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(ii) For intra-union trade the effect tended to decrease 
over time; 
(iii) The effect of distance was greater for intra-region-
al trade than for extra-regional trade. This re-
flects both the initially underdeveloped regional 
infrastructure and transport systems as well as 
the lack of regionally tradeable goods, as well 
as the generally superior transport systems avail-
able for trade with the rest of the world. 
The dummy variable elasticity for intra-union trade is 
expected to be non-significant prior to integration and 
positive and significant thereafter. However, excluding the 
individual MDe equations the dummy variable was positive and 
significant both before and after economic integration. This 
suggests that: 
(i) Effects similar to those of economic integration were 
evident prior to integration and are perhaps assoc-
iated with the region's history of cooperation as 
well as its position within the Commonwealth; 
(ii) That other factors are the source and integration 
has had no effect; 
(iii) That other factors have declined in importance as 
integration effects became evident, the two creat-
ing a balance; 
(iv) That there were other peculiarities in the sample 
that have affected the dummy variable, in particular 
the bias introduced by the imbalance in Barbados' 
trade. 
For the four MDC's, the value of the dummy variable is 
variable both in the size of the elasticity and the individ-
ual patterns of change. The overall dummy variable elastic-
ities in the aggregate equations would therefore not be 
suitable in estimating the effects of integration on individ-
ual members. On the other hand if we exclude Guyana, the 
MDC's do show a similarity over time. In 1967, 1968 and in 
some cases 1969, the dummy variable although positive is not 
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significant, and generally prior to integration has much 
lower values than in the aggregate equations. For Trinidad-
Tobago and Barbados when the dummy variable does become 
significant there is a large increase in value; for Jamaica 
this change is initi~lly negative. In the individual ~IDC 
equations therefore the dummy variable for intra-regional 
trade does give a clearer indication of integration effects. 
b The Expenditure Share and Import Elasticity Results 
An overview of the results of these methods can be 
seen in tables 5.19 and 5.20. At the aggregate level the 
results of the import elasticity and expenditure share 
methods show a reasonable degree of agreement. Out of the 
twelve results, three for each of the MDC's, nine were in 
agreement which gives us a degree of confidence in uS1ng 
them as part of the evaluation of Carifta/Caricom. Some 
of the differences arise because of the inclusion of changes 
in the domestic sector in the expenditure share approach, 
which in itself gives additional information that is not 
available from the trade flows alone. However, the expend-
iture share approach could only be used at the aggregate 
level and we have to rely on the import elasticities to in-
dicate the changes at the commodity level for each of the 
MDC's. The disaggregated elasticity approach indicated the 
changes by SITC category and can be seen in table 5.20. 
Whereas these two methods provide an estimate of the 
total change over a period of time, the dummy variable 
elasticities of the trade flow model show the pattern of 
change over time. 
In this chapter we have presented the results of the 
trade flow model, the changes in the income elasticities 
of import demand and the expenditure share method, based on 
Carifta/Caricom over the years 1967 to 1976. In particular 
we were interested in the extent to which: 
(i) the trade flow model could determine trade flows in 
the third world; 
EXPENDITURE SHARE 
(%Share in Apparent Consumption) 
BARBADOS GUYANA 
a a 
1966-68 1969-73 Chan e Effect 1966-68 1969-73 Chanoe Effect 
Domestic Share 
DS 53.50 55.20 1.70 No TC 50.90 50.64 -0.26 TC 
Partner Share 
PS 4.70 5.50 0.80 GTC 6.00 8.32 2.32 GTC 
World Share 
WS 41.80 39.30 -2.50 TD 43.10 41.04 -2.06 TD t-' 
()) 
0 
a) TC = Trade Creation 
GTC = Gross Trade Creation 
TD = Trade Diversion 
No TC = No evidence of trade creation (possible trade suppression) 
No TD = No evidence of trade diversion (possible external trade creation) 
Table 5.19 
EXPENDITURE SHARE 





1966-68 1969-73 Change Effect 1969-73 Chanqe Effect 
Domestic Share 
DS 70.50 68.32 -2.18 TC I 43.60 41.24 -2.36 TC 
Partner Share 
PS 0.37 1.10 0.73 GTC 1.14 1.49 0.35 GTC 
World Share I-' 00 
WS 29.13 30.58 1.45 No TD 55.26 57.27 2.01 No TD I-' 
a) TC = Trade Creation 
GTC = Gross Trade Creation 
TD = Trade Diversion 
No TC = No evidence of trade creation (possible trade suppression) 
No TD = No evidence of trade diversion (possible external trade creation) 
Table 5.19 
Overview of Integration Effect~ associated with change of Income Elasticity of Imports 
(1960-68 to 1968-73) 
a BARBADOS GUYANA 
SITC Cate Total Intra Extra Total Intra Extra 
0 No TC GTC TD TC CTC TO 
1 TC GTC TO TC GTC TO 
2 TC GTC TO No TC No GTC TD 
3 No TC GTC TD TC GTC TD 
4 No TC No GTC TO TC GTC No TD 
5 No TC GTC TO TC GTC No TO I--' CD 
N 
6 TC No GTC No TO TC GTC No TD 
7 No TC No GTC TO TC GTC No TD 
8 No TC GTC TO TC GTC TD 
9 No TC No GTC TO No TC No GTC TO 
TOTAL No TC GTC TO TC GTC No TD 
a) For ceontents of SITC Categories See Appendix B 
b) See note a) in table 5.19 
Table 5.20 
Overview of Intregration Effect~ associated with change of Income Elasticity of Imports 
(1960-68 to 1968-73) 
JAMAICA TRINIDAD-TOBAGO a 
SITC Cate Total Intra Extra Total Intra Extra 
0 No TC GTC TD TC GTC No TD 
1 TC GTC No TD TC GTC No TD 
2 TC GTC No TD TC No GTC No TD 
3 TC GTC TD No TC No GTC TD 
4 TC GTC TD TC No GTC No TD 
t-' 
5 No TC No GTC TD TC GTC No TD 00 v.... 
6 No TC GTC TD TC GTC No TD 
7 No TC No GTC TD TC GTC No TD 
8 No TC GTC TD TC GTC No TD 
9 TC GTC No TD TC GTC No TD 
TOTAL No TC GTC TD TC GTC No TD 
a) For contents of SITC Categories see Appendix B 
b) See note a) in table 5.19 
Table 5.20 
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(ii) the trade flow model could isolate the effects of 
economic integration on trade flows; 
(iii) other methods could support the trade flow model In 
a full evaluation of economic integration. 
The results of this chapter provide the basic input to 
the evaluation of Carifta/Caricom in chapter six, and to the 
eventual evaluation of the extent to which these methods can 
be used to isolate the effects of economic integration on 
trade flows in particular. 
185 
CHAPTER SIX 
EVALUATION OF CARIFTA/CARICOM AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Section 6.1: Introduction 
Chapter six is an attempt to evaluate regional 
integration in the Caribbean on the basis of and to extent 
allowed by the results in chapter five, and should be 
viewed as one part of an overall evaluation. It is not an 
attempt to measure the net welfare position of regional 
integration, but rather an evaluation of the success or 
iailure of a limited nuiilier of areas of economic integrat-
ion with reference to the main objectives of Carifta/ 
Caricom and the instruments used in achieving these aims. 
Not every aspect of the integration process in the 
Caribbean will be covered, and some, notably those related 
to trade flows, will be analysed in more detail than 
others. 
Based on these conclusions and the areas of success 
and failure in other third world regional groupings it 
will then be possible to suggest policy implications of 
West Indian economic integration, and recommendations at 
a general level for changes in the integration process 
that may contribute to the development of the region and 
the attainment of the desired objectives. 
By evaluating Carifta/Caricom using the results of 
chapter five we w±ll be able to judge the extent to which 
the trade flow approach, and the trade flow model in 
particular, isolates the effects of economic integration 
on trade flows in the context of the broader framework of 
evaluation outlined in chapter four. 
Whereas Cariita was principally a vehicle to promote 
free trade among the member countries, Caricom was a more 
complex organisation and represents a more comprehensive 
scheme of economic integration to achieve the purposes of 
economic development Eor the region. However, the purely 
economic objectives do not make it easy to classifj 
Caricom as a free trade area, a customs union, an economic 
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co~~unity or an economic union. In effect it is a hybrid 
to the extent that elements of all these standard stages 
are included. 
The three main objectives of CARICOM are (i) economic 
integration through the creation of a common market, (ii) 
functional cooperation in areas such as transport, health, 
etc; and (iii) coordination of foreign policy. In 
particular we are interested in the first. To achieve the 
objective of economic integration, four instruments were 
used; (i) the Common Market; (ii) coordination of common 
economic programmes; (iii1 common action on extra -
subregional trade and related activities and; (iv) the 
special regime for the ldc's. Diagram 6.1 shows the 
relationship between the objectives of economic integration 
and the instruments used. 
Given the data used, the analysis is principally 
restricted to the common market, although the common 
economic policies and the regime for the ldc's will have 
implications for and effects on the common market. 
This chapter is in five sections. Section 6.2 is an 
evaluation of CariftajCaricom based on general trade flow 
data (percentage shares etc.) and the results of the trade 
flow model, expenditure shares and income elasticity of 
import demand reported in chapter five. As economic 
integration can be described as a· process or structure 
of objectives and instruments to achieve these objectives, 
in section 6_3 we evaluate Carifta/Caricom in terms of the 
success of objectives and the application of instruments, 
in particular those instruments associated with the common 
market and the common policies. In section 6.4 based on 
the problems observed in other~third world integration 
groupings and what appear to be the basic problems in 
Caricom, we suggest some general policy recommendations 
that should be viewed as the posstble direction or main 
areas of emphasiS that may help in the future development 
of the Caribbean region. Section 6.5 presents the main 
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Section 6.2: The Cornmon Market and Trade Flows 
The principal components of the common market consist 
of the liberalisation regime or free trade area, the 
common external tariff as well as those additional 
instruments (ll required for the functioning of the 
common market. 
In the CARIFTA Treaty, trade liberalisation was the 
most specif~c provtsion. In 1968 trade was immediately 
freed between member countries from import and export 
duties and non-tariff barriers. As tariffs to third 
countries initially remained unchanged, rules of origin 
were required to determine whether any particular item 
qualified for duty free treatment within the region. (2) 
However because many raw materials and intermediate 
imports were not produced within the region, some two 
hundred imported items were incorporated in a Basic 
Materials List and treated as though they were of 
regional origin when used in the manufacture of products 
exported to other countries within the region. 
By 1973 (when Caricom was established), 90% of 
intra imports between the MDC's and over 80% by the idc's 
had been freed of all trade barriers. However by 1978, 
in an effort to deal with acute foreign exchange 
shortages and balance of payments difficulties, Jamaica 
and Guyana adopted protectionist trade ?olicies 
including quanitiative restrictions and licensing of 
intra-regional goods thereby limiting the freedom of trade. 
In Jamaica these restrictions were removed in 1979. 
Unlike the free trade area which has for the most part 
been implemented, the cornmon protective policy consisting 
of the common external tariff (CET) and a regime for 
regional quantitive restrictions has not been effectively 
1. These include a system of product origin and monetary 
cooperation. 
2. To qualify for duty free treatment, 50% of value-added 
had to originate within Carifta; for Idc's this was 
later reduced to 40%. 
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implemented. (3} Basically there are four seperate 
tariffs - the CET for the MDC's, tariffs for the ECCM, 
the Belize Tariff and the Montserrat Tariff. The 
schedule of the CET was expected to be adopted by all the 
member states by 1985, and as of October 1977 almost all 
the CET rates had been implemented among the MDC's, but 
the 13th Common Market Council Meeting (December 1978) 
after examining the progress member countries had made 
since the 12th Heeting, decided that the process of 
integration could be better served by advancing the date 
for the adoption of a CET. As a result the MDC's agreed 
to introduce the restructured CET by January 1979, and 
the Idcts later in 1979. 
The widespread, but differing national practices of 
exempting certain, industrial products from import duties 
represents a special problem for the operation of the CET. 
To overcome this difficulty the CET Agreement established 
an Exemptions list of those industries where member 
countries would continue to allow on a discretionary basis, 
duty exemptions for imported inputs. However, this list 
is in fact a consolidated list of all nationally exempted 
industries and covers almost every existing industrial 
activity in the Commonwealth Caribbean. 
The basic principle underlying the structure of the 
CET has been to charge very low rates of duty (6-8%) on 
capital goods and raw materials required for regional 
industries, slightly higher rates on semi-manufactured 
articles, and the highest rates on final products. This 
structure of effective protection provides excessive 
protection to final products while discouraging backward 
linkages which could encourage additional production and 
trade within the area. High protection rates are 
generated mainly by tariff exemptions on raw materials 
and other inputs, combined with a low percentage value-
added in many firms. 
With this background we can now analyse the results 
3. See EI-Agraa (1982) p.196. 
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and effects of the Common Market in terms of trade flows. 
This analysis is based on the shares of regional in total 
trade, the geographic distribution of trade, the 
measurement of the importance of the regional market for 
individual MDC's, as well as on the trade flow model, 
income elasticity of import demand and the expenditure 
share results of chapter five. 
Section 6.2~1: Share of Regional Trade in Total Trade 
a Regional Aggregates 
As can be seen in table 6.1 the share of regional 
trade in total trade has grown, increasing its share 
from 4.5% in 1960 and 5% in 1967 - just prior to the 
formation of CARIFTA - to over 11% by 1972 - just prior 
to the for.mation of CARICOM. This evidence certainly 
pOints to the trade expanding effects of the free trade 
area. However since 1973/74 the regional share declined 
to 6.2% in 1~78, and although it subsequently rose to 
7.4% in 1981, it has not reattained the levels of 1972. 
However not all of these changes can be attributed to 
economic integration, as some part of the decline can be 
attributed to the energy crisis of 1973/74 and the 
subsequent world recession, the results of which 
continued through to 1978, regional trade L~proving 
thereafter. 
It is likely that the decline in regional trade was 
also associated with the types of activities that were 
encouraged and maintained by the structure of effective 
protection, in particular the production of final 
products, with backward linkages being discouraged. The 
restriction of trade may also be associated with the small 
size even of the total regional market, the restricted 
supply of resources and the competitive rather than 
complementary nature of the member economies. 
It is expected that most of the expansion of trade 
directly associated with the free trade area would take 








PERCENTAGE SHARE OF REGIONAL TRADE IN TOTAL TRADE 
FOR SELECTED THIRD WORLD REGIONAL GROUPINGS 
1960 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 
4.5 7.3 11.1 7.9 6.7 6.2 
7.7 10.2 11.6 11.9 12.8 16.9 
0.7 2.3 2.5 3.1 4.2 4.2 
7.5 26.8 22.7 24.8 21.6 19.2 
21.7 14.7 14.5 12.8 13.9 13.2 



















By the time CARICOM was established in 1973, 90% of intra 
imports between the MDCts and over 80% by the ldc's had 
been freed of all trade barriers. Therefore as expected 
the major expansion in regional trade occured over the 
period 1967 - 1973, as indicated by the share of regional 
in total trade. However the extent of the expansion in 
regional trade is restricted as can be observed in most 
other third world regional groupings whe~e the initial 
expansion in regional trade eventually declined and 
stagnated, only the CACM and to a lesser degree Asean 
achieving reasonably higher shares of intra regional trade 
(table 6.1). One of the suggested reasons for this is 
that the llinit of the teasyt stage of import substituting 
industrialisation has been reached 
b Regional Share by SITC Category 
On its Ovffi the share of regional trade in total trade 
is of limited usefulness and is complemented here by the 
share of individual SITC categories in regional trade. 
Through this we can isolate those sectors that were the 
most important and dynamic in the growth of intra regional 
trade. 
The main features over the period 1960 to 1974 are 
sumnlarised in table 6.2. Between 1960 and 1974 the share 
of food products in regional traue declined from 33% to 
22.7%, and the share of raw materials fell from 42% in 1960 
to 25.7% in 1973. However in 1974 the share of raw 
materials rose to 42.4%, largely accounted for by an 
increase from 24.7% in 1973 to 39.2% of fuel trade within 
the region, this being associated principally with the oil 
price increases over 1973/74. However the main feature 
has been the growth of trade in manufactured goods from 
23.5% in 1960 to 47.9% in 1973, and between 1972 and 1976 
Caricom markets absorbed more than 50% of the regions 
exports of manufactures, in 1975 alone 82% of the total 
manufacturing export went to Caricom markets. However the 
role of economic integration in this growth has to be 






DISTRIBUTION OF INTRA-CARICOM TRADE BY SECTOR 
(percentage) 
SECTOR 1960 1965 1967 1970 
Foodstuffs 33.6 33.9 33.6 27.3 
Raw Materials 42.0 37.0 30.3 28.4 
Manufactures 23.5 28.3 36.0 43.8 
















of CARIFTA, Among manufactured products, the most dynamic 
categor1es have been clothing and footwear, and, to a 
lesser extent, chemicals, pharmaceutical products and 
cosmetics. Furthermore, only a few types of products are 
traded within the region. Trinidad-Tobago has exported 
petroleum derivatives, cement, fertilizers and certain 
durables for domestic use, Jamaica has exported mainly 
food, electrical equipment and chemical products; Guyana 
has exported maiJ.nly agricultural products, and Barbados 
mainly manufactures and textiles. The ldc's export 
mainly agricultural products to the IvlDC' s . 
So although integnation may have been important in 
the growth of manufactured trade, it was of a limited range 
of products, and the seeming concentration of manufacturers 
on the region could possibly be an indication of lack of 
competitiveness in world markets Under these circumstan~ 
ces~ based on the small size of the regional market, 
industrialisation based largely on the thome' market will 
rapidly be constrained especially after local demand is 
satisfied by the easier stage of import substituting 
industrialisation. 
c Geographic Distribution, ,and Shares of Regional Trade in 
Individual MDC Trade 
One of the problems of a regional grouping based on 
free trade is that if industry is concentrated in a limited 
number of the more developed members this polarisation of 
activity will reinforce itself creating a greater division 
between the more and less developed members. Removal of 
intra-union tariffs compounds this problem and will be 
revealed in the concentration of trade flows in the region. 
This process can be observed in the Caribbean where 
although between 1967 and 1973/74 individual country shares 
of total intra Carifta/Caricom trade has varied, certain 
features do stand out( in particular the fall in the Idc's 
share of imports from 33.1% to 10.1% (See table 6.3). 
The 1arg-est share on the import side in 197 ~: was that for 


































the largest import share. On the export side Trinidad-
Tobago has dominated regional trade helped to a large 
extent by the petroleum industry. In particular by 1973/ 
74 this share had increased to 61.9%, The largest single 
trade flow has been between Trinidad-Tobago and Guyana, 
mainly oil and oil related products. These results 
indicate a large and growing concentration of trade among 
the MDC ,. s who have a broader range of resources and a more 
developed industrial base. As such trade flovlS do suggest 
bhat polarisation is a problem within the region. 
As a result of the differences in shares in trade 
between the export and import sides an analysis of the 
intra regional trade balance in 1967 and 1974 revealed a) 
that while in 1967 Trinidad-Tobago and to a much lesser 
extent Jamaica recorded an intra regional trade surplus, 
only Trinidad-Tobago was a net exporter by 1974: b) 
between 1967 and 1~74, all the Carifta countries except 
Trinidad-Tobago experienced a deterioration in their trade 
ba1ance l and the largest absolute decline was experienced 
by Jamaica. (41 
We can also examine the importance of intra regional 
trade for the individual MDC's by the share of intra trade 
in their total exports and imports (Table 6.4). On the 
import side Guyana has the largest share of intra in total 
imports, rising from 12% in 1965 to over 26% by 1974, a 
large increase between 1973 and 1974 being associated with 
the oil price rises at that time. At the other extreme 
Trinidad-Tobago relies the least on the region for its 
imports. 
On the export side Barbados is the most dependent of 
the HDC's on the regional market, with the export share 
rising from around 10% to over 24% in 1974. Trinidad-
Tobago.s share is also higher and as mentioned above this 
is associated vlith the oil industry-
e Sununary 
Since at least 1965/67 various changes have occured 
4. See Chernick (1978) p.3l 




















1965 1970 1972 
10.3 11.3 13.5 
12.1 14.1 17.3 
2.0 1.8 5.4 
1.9 2.5 2.8 
9.9 18.0 28.1 
10.8 9.1 12.6 
2.0 3.7 5.9 
5.7 8.9 10.9 























in the regional market in the share, composition and 
distribution of regional trade. In particular the share 
of intra trade in total trade increased and then stagnated, 
this being a common feature in other third world groupings 
and perhaps associatea with the limitation of trade 
liberalisation in encouraging new activities as well as 
the limits of the regional market in supporting industry. 
Both food and raw materials trade have declined in 
importance, although in 1974 the oil price increases 
boosted this sector. The main feature however, has been 
the growth of manufactured goods in regional trade, from 
23.5% in 1960 to 47.9% in 1973. 
Geographical distribution has also changed with the 
emphasis still on the !vIDC "s On the import side there was 
a large fall in the Idcts share of regional imports, and 
an increase in Jamaican imports. Trinidad is the dominant 
regional exporter and although this is largely associated 
with the oil industry, manufacturing is also important. As 
measured by the individual MDC's share of intra trade in 
total trade ( Guyana relies most on the region for imports 
(26% in 1974} which is partly explained by oil imports 
from Trinidad,: Tobago I while on the export side Barbados 
depends most on the regional market. 
This provides a basic background to the evaluation of 
Carifta/Caricom using the results of chapter five. 
Section 6.2r2. Measured Effects of Carifta/Caricom 
In this section we use the results of chapter five as 
the basis for evaluating Carifta/Caricom. When discussing 
the results of the trade flow model~ import elasticities 
and expenditure shares, it was accepted that any results 
would have to be interpreted with care, in particular we 
could not use the results as measures of the overall effe-
Cts of economic integration. While still recognising all 
the problems with the model we will present the effects 
of economic integration based on these results in the 
next section. 
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As opposed to the other two methods, the trade flow 
model and more specifically the dummy variable for intra 
regional trade really only indicates the changes in intra 
union trade, generally referred to as gross trade creation. 
However, it was also the case that some of the effects of 
integration manifested themselves in changes in the other 
variables over time. This can be observed for example by 
the way the elasticity of distance changes over time in 
particular. However, immediately below we are referring 
only to the dun~y variable and hence to gross trade 
creation. 
a Trade Flows and the Dummy Variable 
The results from the aggregated trade flow equations 
(nwnbers 1 - 8}, generally indicate that there was a 
trade expanding effect on intra regional trade flows, that 
may be interpreted as gross trade creation (GTC). However 
in every case this effect was evident prior to the 
ior.mation of Carifta, and the elasticities were similar 
throughout the pre and post integration periods. It may 
be the case as suggested above that there were trade 
enhancing effects prior to 1967 that were maintained by the 
formation of Carifta, this being a possibility given the 
previous attempts at regional cooperation. (5) However we 
cannot determine if this was the case from these results. 
The results therefore do not allow us to determine when the 
effects of CariftajCaricom were first in evidence. 
If we compare equations three and four (MDC exports 
and imports} there is a clear indication of a greater 
regional effect on intra-regional exports than on the 
import side. This does provide some indication of the 
importance of the region for exports of the HDC's, and as 
will be seen below for certain categories of goods, in , 
particular for manufactured goods, the regional market is 
very important. 
One other possible indicator of regional effects is 
5. For example the West Indies Federation 1958 - 62. 
" 
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the decline in the resistence effect within the region as 
represented by the distance variable. This may be associ-
ated with both improvements in the regional transport 
infrastructure and the supporting marketing facilities as 
well as the production of goods that are demanded within 
the region. 
Overall the aggregated equations suggest evidence for 
gross trade creation although this was evident prior to 
formal integration, with the effect being stronger on the 
export side. It appears however that although these 
aggregate results show very little net effect on the region 
as a whole, the results for the individual MDC's show 
much clearer integration effects, and it is likely that 
Guyana and Barbados have to some extent distorted the 
aggreqate results. Whereas the dummy variable for Guyana 
is large at the begining of the period it subsequently 
declines, whereas for the three other ~IDC~s the results 
are more in keeping with the expected integration effects 
(see table 6.S}. 
The individual country equations provide us with 
information on the distribution of the effects of 
integration, as well as when these first appeared and how 
they evolved over time. From these we can suggest the 
relative extent to which the regional effect was important 
for each of the members. However it is not possible to 
directly compare these elasticities across equations. 
Barbados, Trinidad-Tobago and to a much lesser extent 
Jamaica, show definite regional effects (GTC). In the case 
of Barbados the elasticity of the dummy variable increased 
by 145%, and gives a clear indication of some trade 
enhancing effect between 1968 and 1969. Trinidad-Tobago 
shows a more gradual increase over time, until in 1971 
there is a larger increase and the dummy variable becomes 
Significant. In Jamaica the result is not so obviOUS, 
although the effect seems to be slightly stronger from 1972. 
For these three countries there appears to have been an 
integration effect associated with gross trade creation. 
Trinidad~Tobago in particular benefitted from the oil 
ELASTICITY OF THE INTRA-UNION DUMMY VARIABLE 
BARBADOS GUYANA JAMAICA TRINIDAD-TOBAGO 
* 1967 2.9 9.3 4.9 1.8 
* 1968 2.4 10.2* 4.4 2.2 
* * * 1969 5.9 10.0 4.7 3.2 
* * * 1970 5.2 7.5 4.8 3.9 
* * * * 1971 6.0 5.3 4.1 5.3 
* * * * 1972 5.8 7.7 5.3 6.6 
* * * * 1973 4.2 8.6 5.3 5.6 
* * * * N 1974 4.4 7.6 4.5 6.0 0 
* * * * ~ 1975 4.7 7.7 5.5 7.6 
* * * * 1976 5.9 6.6 3.9 6.9 
* Indicates significance at the 95% Confidence level 




industry, becoming a major regional supplier of petroleum 
and petroleum products, this position being enhanced by the 
oil price rises in 1973/4. For Barbados the regional 
market has become important for manufactured exports. On 
the other hand Guyana seems to show a decline in the t~ade 
expanding effect, the dummy variable declining from a 
maximum in the late 1960·s, although the value was greater 
than for any of the other HDCt,s except in 1971 and 1976. 
b Income elasticities of Import Demand, Expenditure Shares 
and the Importance of the Regional Market 
Whereas the dummy variable in the trade flow model was 
really only able to indicate the presence of gross trade 
creation (as well as timing and the distribution of the 
effectsl the inlport elasticities and the e~penditure share 
approaches can give a more extensive picture of the effects. 
For the four MDC ,. s the results are presented in Table 6. 6. 
In every case there was evidence of gross trade 
creation as already established in the trade flow model, 
but we can also see from these results the type of changes 
that have occured more generally. Summarising the results 
from chapter five we have the following effects occuring 
for each of the MDC's. 
Barbados - Although regional trade has expanded there has 
also been an element of trade suppression I with a greater 
dO:Mestic share in expenditure, both of these effects being 
at the ex~ense of imports from outside of the region. This 
implies that not only is Barbados importing more from the 
region, it also is providing more of its own requirements. 
Guyana - Both results indicate an expansion in imports from 
the region as well as a net trade creation effect. Whereas 
the elasticity result indicates no trade diversion the 
expenditure share approach indicates trade diversion away 
from the extra regional sources Basically both methods 
suggest an increase in partner share of Guyana's imports, 
though it is not agreed whether this was trade creation or 
trade diversion. 
ELASTICITY OF IMPORT DEMAND AND EXPENDITURE SHARES 
(Changes between 1960/68 and 1968/73) 
ELASTICITIES EXPENDITURE SHARE 
BARBADOS No TC GTC TO No TC GTC TD 
GUYANA TC GTC No TO TC GTC TO 
JAMAICA No TC GTC TO TC GTC No TD f' a 








Jamaica - The results for Jamaica only agree on the 
existence of gross trade creation. The elasticity results 
suggest trade diversion and trade suppression I whereas the 
expendi~ure share approach indicates a declining domestic 
share that is diverted to an increasing partner and world 
share. 
Trinidaa-Tobago - As in the case of Barbados, both methods 
agree in their results. There appears to have been a 
general expansion in imports from every source, and a 
decline in the domestic share of expenditure. This is 
associated with the dominance of the oil industry, and 
perhaps as well increased imports of industrial inputs. 
For each of the MDC's, we can, by looking at the 
results disagg~egated by SITC categories (table 6.7) I 
determine how each of the sectors were affected. However 
these results are based only on the elasticity methoa and 
so there is no direct measure of domestic changes. 
The data for the four MDCts has been reclassified into 
the five changes that were observed (general trade 
suppression, trade suppression and GTC, GTC, external 
trade creation, and general trade expansion, see table 6.7. 
For each of the MDC's, the ten SITC categories are listed 
under the appropriate headings, so we can analyse the 
effects by the observed changes across countries. 
1. General Trade Suppression which is represented by a 
decline in all the elasticities. In general this can arise 
both from an overall decline in demand as well as from a 
greater share of expenditure on domestically produced goods. 
As such, it can represent both import substitution and a 
recession. However with the background information 
available in chapter tvlO we can make the following 
suggestions. First, in the case of Trinidad-Tobago, the 
decline in oil imforts is not sur?rising given Trinidad-
Tobago's oil ana gas reserves and their role as the main 
oil exporter in the region. In this case we can state that 
there was an increase in domestic production that is 
?robably unrelated to integration as such. For the other 







EFFECTS OF INTEGRATION BY SITC CATEGORY 
1 2 3 4 5 
4,7,9 0,3,5,8 1,2 6 
2,9 0,1,3,8 4,5,6,7 
5,7 0,6,8 3,4 1,2,9 
3 2,4 0,1,5,6,7,8,9 
1 General Trade Suppression 
2 Trade Suppression and Trade Diversion to Region 
3 Gross Trade Creation 
4 External Trade Creation 






Finally we can look at the importance of the regional 
market for various categories of exports and how these 
have changed over time 0 To do this we compared the 
percentage of regional exports in total exports for the 
ten SITe 9 a tegories for the years 1965, 1970 and 1973. 
In table 6.8 column la shows those categories that 
depended on the regional market for over 50% of their 
exports in every year, Ib shows those in 1973. Column 2 
shows those whose percentage share increased over the 
period. Column 3a shows those that rely on the external 
market I with a regional share of less than 20%, in every 
yeari 3b shows those in 1973. Column 4 shows those 
whose share declined over the period. 
The main pOint is that the majority of the categories 
that depend on the regional market can be classified as 
manufactured goods tas opposed to non-manufactured), while 
those that depend on the external market are generally the 
primary oriented categories (ie. food, fuel and raw 
materials) . 
The importance of the regional market can be seen in 
certain categories below i where the intra trade share of 
each category of exports is greater than 80% in 1973. 
Barbados - Animal/Vegetable oils and fats, Chemicals, and 
Manufactures. 
Guyana - Fuels, Animal/Vegetable oils and fats. Chemicals .. 
Machinery and Transport Equipment, and 
miscellaneous goods. 
Jamaica - Animal/Vegetable oils and fats, Chemicals: and 
Hachinery and Transport Equipment. 
Trinidad-Tobago - Machinery and Transport Equipment, and 
miscellaneous goods. 
It seems that generally non-traditional exports 
depend to a high degree on the regional market, and 
although for some of the categories this was true prior to 
integration, manufactured goods in general have increased 
their dependence more on the regional market. 















4 6 6,7,8 
2 3a 3b 
0,1,3,4,6,9 0,3 0,3,7 
0,1,2,3,4,5,6,8 1,2 1,2,9 
0,1,3,4,5,6,7,8 0,1,2 0,1,2,9 
0,1,2,3,5,6,7,8 2,3 1,2,3,9 
la Depend on regional market for over 50% of exports (1965-73) 
lb Depend on regional market for over 50% of exports in 1973 






3a Depend on external market, with regional share of less than 20% (1965-1973) 
3b Depend on external market, with regional share of less than 20% in 1973 





section 6.3: Evaluation by Objectives and Instruments 
In section 6.2, integration was evaluated by the more 
traditional method based on trade flow data, however, as 
economic integration can be described as a process or 
structure of objectives and instruments to achieve these 
objectives, in this section we will evaluate integration in 
terms of the success of objectives and the application of 
instruments. Basically we are looking at the extent to 
which instruments have been implemented. This approach 
is important especially as seen in chapter one that many 
of the problems associated with the success or failure of 
various aspects of integration were associated with the 
non-application or misapplication of the designed 
instruments. To an extent this is an exercise in judging 
the degree to which the members or those in control of the 
integration process applied the treaty. Although this is 
not an evaluation of integration as such it can be used as 
part of a discussion of the problems facing the region. 
The instruments discussed are those associated with the 
common market - free trade area and common protective 
policy - and the common economic ?rogrammes. 
T~1e free trade area has been discussed above and 
little needs to be added here. Overall the free trade area 
was successfully implemented~ qualified by a Basic Materials 
List that allowed intermediate inputs not produced within 
the region to be treated as though they were of regional 
origin. However the freedom of trade was limited in 1978 
by the adoption of protectionist trade policies by Jamaica 
and Guyana to deal with foreign exchange shortages and 
balance of pa~~ents difficulties. Jamaica r~noved these 
restrictions in 1979. There were also complaints that 
price controls and the activities of state trading 
corporations were also restricting trade. 
This led to a review of Article 28 of the Treaty 
(import restrictions arising from balance of payments 
difficulties). As a result, the Caricom Council decided 
that even when a member state was forced to impose 
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restrictions, special consideration would be given to tr.e 
position o£ the ldc's. 
The Common Protective Policy (CPP) which consists of 
the common external tariff (CET) and a regime for regional 
quantitative restrictions is still not totally implemented. 
The agreement establishing the CET was signed in July 1973, 
coming into effect Eor the MDC's in August 1973, although 
a phasing in period was allowed for certain sensitive 
products. By the end of 1977, almost all the CET rates 
had been implemented among the MDC's. The CET agreement 
is qualified by an Exemptions List vlhich allovls duty free 
exemptions on certain imported inputs. This list is 
however a consolidated list of all the nationally exempted 
industries. 
In practise there are still four separate tariff 
regimes - the CET for the HDCts, the ECCM tariff, the 
" Belize tariff and the Montserrat tariff. All of these 
regimes were to be phased in by the end of 1981. The 
schedule of the CET was expected to be fully adopted by 
all the member states by 1985, but the 13th Common Market 
Council meeting held in December 1973, after examining 
the progress member countries had made, decided that the 
process of integration could better be served by advancing 
the date for the adoption of a CET. Consequently the MDC's 
agreed to introduce the restructured CET by 1979. 
Under Article 3·3 of the Treaty the members were to 
administer their quota regulations and to consult on 
harmonisation with a view to attaining common regional 
quantitative restrictions as soon as possible after 1931. 
However the difference between the national quota 
re(j"ulations as well as those of the Exemptions List 
provisions have created a regional trade regime that 
provides little common protection on inputs or outputs. 
Certainly throughout the 1970's, the common 
protective regime has not achieved the application required 
ior it to be considered a common policy, although it is to 
be hoped that in the future it will be £ull~r implemented. 
However the effects of the levels of tariffs and the 
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exemptions to common import tariffs has contributed to a 
structure of effective protection that has created a bias 
against the production of industrial inputs and backward 
linkages. As a result the growth of manufacturing is 
likely to be constrainea by the size of the regional 
market ana export markets will have to provide future 
--.----" 
impetus to growth. At the same time this type of 
manufacturing will do little to help in reducing imports 
as the rest of the world supplies the necessary inputs. 
One of the more important areas of 'positive' 
integration is concerned with the active encouragement of 
economic activities and involves coordination of economic 
policies and development planning. In third world economic 
integration, hhe greatest benefits are expected from 
intervention in the allocation and planning of industry in 
particular. In the case of Caricom the two main areas 
under this category were the promotion of industrial 
aevelopme~t by the programming of industries, and the 
adoption and application of the plan for the rationalisat-
ion of agricultural production. 
The objectives of industrial planning cent~ed around 
the greater use of regionally available raw materials, the 
establishment of interconnected industries, the achievement 
of economies of scale and industrial efficiency, and the 
equitable distribution of the benefits of industrialisation. 
The last has been a maJor problem area in most other 
regional groupings. (6) Industrial policy also included 
the harmonisation of incentives to industry. 
Although substantial technical work has been done for 
ex~nple on the pulp and paper, and the cotton and textile 
industry. and projects for the production of aluminium, the 
programme of industrial development has not made notable 
progress. Overall the productive sectors of the members 
have not been integrated to the extent that would be 
required if the area was to support any major industrial 
base. 
6. In particular the East African Community 
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'Caricom has approached the issue on a sector by sector 
basis rather than with the use of a grand macro-economic 
pers?ective plan. Thus there is no provision for major 
regional planning and regional programmes are seen as 
additions to, rather than as substitutes for national 
sectoral proyrammes'. Although a sector by sector 
approach may be easier to implement, with the small size 
of the regional economy a macro plan may be the most 
efficient in guiding efficient resource use. Furthermore, 
tat the institutional level the multinational enterprise 
has been used as the mechanism for implementation ... 
these do not undertake the entire regional production but 
will seek to promote the development of production in 
member states and operate in a manner similar to 
management and service companies'. (7) 
By 1978 with plans to establish joint development 
projects having been abandoned by most member governments, 
Trinidad-Tobago, with their funds from the oil industry. 
embarked on its own development programme To an extent 
this underlines the role regionaw planniJ.ng-· has played as 
an addition to, rather than as a replacement or framework 
for national plans. 
Cooperation in agriculture has a longer tradition 
than that of industry, starting with varruous producers 
associations in the sugar and banana trade. At the time 
of the Carifta treaty the Agricultural Marketing Protocol 
(M~P) was signed. The AMP was an arrangement for 
marketing agricultural products under which certain 
specified products were traded on ~he basis of agreed 
prices. The fu~P was extended by the Guaranteed Market 
Scheme (GMS) under which the MDC's agreed to purchase 
specified quantities of certain agricultural products from 
the Idc's. aowever these instruments did not have the 
effect of increasing intra-regional trade at the expense of 
imports to any marked degree. 
The AMP was a cautious approach to intra-regional 
7. El-Agraa (1982) p.197 
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trade promotion tor a limited range of commodities. It 
also appeared that the MDC's were using the AMP as a means 
to restrict the quantity of imports from within the region 
by not declaring deficits and thus encouraging domestic 
import substitution at the expense of the ldcts. (8) 
The treaty establishing earicom also created new 
instrmnents and institutions for the promotion of 
agricultural development; in particular a regional food 
plan (RFP) was approved in 1975. The RFP was intended as 
a supplement to national programmes, with the objective 
of greater regional self-sufficiency in the production of 
foodstuffs. In 1976 the Caribbean Food Corporation (CFC) 
was created as an instrument for the operations of the food 
plan. 
Various projects have been started under the RFP 
including a dairy project in St.Vincent, feasibility 
studies in Belize for production and processing of milk! 
in Jamaica for sheep and goat multiplication, calf rearing 
and dairy production. In 1975 the gove~nments of Trinidad-
Tobago, Guyana and St.Kitts-Nevis agreed to found a 
multinational enterprise for the production~ storage, 
transport and marketing of maize and soybeans, and in 1978, 
the first crop of the corn and soybean project in Guyana 
was harvested, 
The coordination of agricultural policy appears to 
have been relatively more successful to date than the 
industrial projects. In part this may be the result of 
the growth in the region's imports of food that mean there 
is extensive potential for agricultural import substitution. 
Section 6.4~ Policy Implications and Recommendations 
Economic Integration in the Commonwealth Caribbean has 
a long history, especially when compared to many other 
third worla groupings. It has been successful in some 
areas, for example the free trade area, whereas it has not 
reached full potential in others, however, to some extent 
it can be considered a success in that it is still 
8. See Chernick (1978) p.127 
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functioning and evolving. To a degree some of the problems 
of Carifta/Caricom are common to all of the Third World. 
In particular those associated with first the oil price 
rise and then the subsequent world recession as well as the 
trend toward greater protectionism in the North. All of 
these factors have contributed to the less than full succ-
ess of economic integration. As such, Caricom does provide 
a base for future developments. 
Whereas Carifta may be considered a success to the 
extent that the free trade area was implemented and 
regional trade flows increased as manufacturing industry 
developed, this yrowth seems to have been restricted by the 
size of the regional market. 
The formation of CARICOM should have provided the 
framework for further growth and development through 
'positive' integration - through the regionwide planning 
of industry and agriculture, the development of backward 
linkages, ana industry interconnected across the region. 
However Caricom has failed to achieve this objective to 
date, though this should be qualified, as integration is 
viewed here as a long term strategy and hence positive 
results may not be expected for some time. However 
Caricom as a basis for future development may be questioned. 
As seen above the common protective regime is not 
considered to be common, and has not yet had the effect of 
providing consistent 2rotection across the region. The 
result of the structure of the CET i and the Exemptions List 
has not:led to a regionwide framework of industry; rather 
protection still seems effectively to be at the national 
level (as a result of the Exemptions List). The structure 
of effective protection has not encouraged backward 
linkages, resulting in a manufacturing sector dependent on 
imported inputs, and this lihas been a major cause of the 
slow trend towards regionalism and the retention of a good 
deal of national auturkyll. (9) It is also questionable 
whether most of the manufacturing activity in the region 
9. Ranis (1982) p.6. 
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would be competitive in world markets, (10) and continued 
dependence of this sector on the regional market will be a 
problem for future growth. 
In 1980 the Caricom Council reviewed the functioning 
of the Caribbean integranion movement and made 
recommendations for its improvement during the 1980's. 
The evaluation was prompted by the ~erception of some that 
CARICOM was serving largely as a trading group, whereas its 
role as outl~ned in the Treaty was to promote Economic 
Integration and to consolidate and strengthen the bonds 
which have historically existed among the Caribbean member 
states. 
The evaluation indicated that CARICOM's lack of 
progress was attributable to an absence of understanding 
as to what actions were required to implement integration, 
and not to weaknesses in the concept of integration itself. 
Central to the integration strategy is an increased 
~nphasis on jomnt planning and cooperation in the areas of 
production,. external trade, and economic policies and 
progranunes. 
To an extent part of the problem is a lack of dynamism 
in the integration process, that is perhaps to be expected 
during a period of world recessi~n when most countries 
tend to become increasingly protecbionist. However 
although some of the members of Caricom in particular 
Trinidad-Tobago, are capable OI developing outside of the 
integration framework, some form of economic integration is 
necessary for the development of the region as a whole. 
Some of the possible directions that CARICOH could 
take are discussed below in the framework of general 
policy recommendations. These recommendations are more 
general comments on development and integration than 
detailed policy recommendations for CARICOM alone, and 
may be viewed as some possible solutions to the problems 
faced by third world groupings in general. 
Based on the problems observed in other third world 
10. Ranis (1982) 
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integration groupings and what appear to be the basic 
problems in CARICO~li we can suggest the following 
recommendations. 
(i) Free Trade Area 
Although it has been suggested that the free trade 
area is one of the more successful aspects of CARIFTA/ 
CARICOM, it has faced certain problems like those in 1978 
with Guyana and Jamaica imposing trade restrictions. In 
general, if free trade is viewed (within the region) as 
being desireable, then all factors that restrict trade 
should be removed. Ra~oving tariffs on their own does not 
create an area of free trade. It is accepted that some 
members, in particular the ldcts do require some protection 
of their economies within the region, and this should be 
allowed for, although strict allocation of industries or 
plants in line with regional demand could make even this 
protection redundant. It is also desireable that the free 
trade area not be open to negotiation in terms of the rate 
of tariff removals; as seen in the CAC.1I.1, immediate and/or 
automatic tariff reductions seem to have been a more 
successful strategy. The free trade area in CARICOM is 
reasonably established and the likely problems it faces 
are perhaps more easily dealt with by policing of the 
system. 
(ii} Common Protective Policy 
As has already been discussed above, the common 
protective poliay currently favours final products and 
tends to d~scourage backward linkages in industry. It has 
been suggested that this is the result of the escalating 
tariff and the Exemptions List that encourages the 
importation of intermediate inputs and the export of a 
limited range of manufactured consumer goods. Apart from 
the effect of constraining industry, this process results 
in a low value-added in industry. This is a serious 
concern for the region as import substitution based on 
consumer goods will be restricted by the size of the 
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regional market, and manufacturing 
significant degree on the regional 
protective policy therefore has to 
still de~ends to a • 
market. The common 
be ammended in such a 
way as to encourage the local production of required 
intermediate inputs. Higher rates of CET or removal irom 
the exemptions list would be one means of encouraging the 
groduction of selected inputs. However this is likely to 
be opposed by those companies producing final products who 
would nave to face initially higher costs of inputs from 
regional producers. Direct allocation of intermediate 
industries aided by subsidies is also likely to be needed. 
(iii) Common Economic Policies - Industrial Planning 
As has already been argued, a free trade area or 
customs union although it may provide a necessary framework 
for, will not on its own be a successful policy of 
industrialisation, industrial planning being necessary if 
industry is to be developed. However, the CEP has not 
been particularly successful in CARl COM , with few projects 
being implemented to date. As mentioned above the region 
does not have a 'grand macro-economic plant for regional 
industrialisation and it may be that some broader 
framework for industrialisation is needed. At the same 
time national indus"trialisation plans should be a oart of - . 
the regionwide plan, rather than at the moment where the 
national plans dominate. One approach to developing 
industry has been to identify and then allocate industries 
to each of the members, thereby assurimg a fairer 
distribution of industry as well as ensur±n9 that the 
individual plants or industries fit together in an 
integrated framework. For most of the heavy and 
intermediate industries the regionwide market is required 
and haphazard development of industry in such a small 
regional economy may be a hindrance to development. It 
may also be possible to allocate different categories of 
industry to the MOe's and to the ldc's, according to 
available labour and other resources and infrastructure. 
For example, heavier industry may be allocated to Trinidad-
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Tobago and Jmnaica, whereas the ldc's would be encouraged 
to concentrate on the food industry; textiles, general 
consumer goods, as well as take a part in the heavier 
industries by providing certain inputs that can be 
j?roduced on a smaller scale. Overall the argument is for 
a regional plan for industry in which linkages between 
processes and sectors are emphasised, individual plants 
being allocated by regional comparative advantage, and with 
a view to a fairer distribution of the benefits of 
industrialisation. 
(ivL Exports 
It appears that the basis for most industry in Caricom 
has been the regional market. However this will place a 
restriction on the extent bo which industry can grow. 
Growth of manufacturing industry in the future will depend 
on the extra-regional market, and to be able to access this 
market Caricom industries will have to be competitive and 
efficient. Although it may be possible to establish 
industries speoifically for the world market: this would 
leave the region in a vulnerable position; especially 
during periods of recession. However, because of the small 
size of the regional market, greater emphasis will have to 
be placed on expanding into the world market, to the 
industrialised countries as well as in the context of 
regional cooperation among developing countries, and 
changing the structure of exports away from primary 
products. This process is a necessary complement to the 
regionwide industrialisation pollcies and programmes. 
(v) Agriculture 
Alchough agricultural p0licy appears to have been 
reasonably successful; continued emphasis should be placed 
on this sector if the regional food deficit is to be 
reduced substantially. Agriculture is also important not 
only as the main activity in the Idc's, but as an input 
to processing and the food industry, an area whieh is 
liuportant for the development especially of the Ide's. 
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These recmnmendations are very general and are not 
intended as specific detailed policy, but should be viewed 
as the possible directions or main areas of emphasis that 
may help in the future development of the Caribbean region. 
Section 6.5; Conclusions 
In this chapter we were interested in two basic 
questions. First, based on the trade flow model, expendi-
ture share and import elasticities, how successful was 
Carifta/Caricom and what were the effects on the region as 
revealed through trade flows. Second, based on the 
evaluation of Carifta/Caricom and the results of chapter 
five to what extent could the trade flow model isolate the 
effects of economic integration on trade flows. The second 
question is addressed in the concluding chapter. 
The evaluation of Carifta/Caricom was based on a 
limited number of indicators associated with trade flows 
and so only eertain aspects of integration mainly associat-
ed with the common market, could be commented on. 
The effects reported in section 6.2 can be largely 
attributed to the liberalisation of regional trade and the 
common external tariff. We also have to include here the 
effects of the structure of protection as defined by 
escalating tariffs and the exemptions list. 
Although for the region at the aggregate level there 
was evidence to suggest gross trade creation, this must be 
qualified as the trend was evident prior to the formation 
of Carifta in 1968, and may in part be attributed to past 
Commonwealth and regional associat±ons. Although there 
was an increase in total regional trade associated with the 
free trade area, this was not as marked as in the EEC or 
the CACM for example. 
Two of the main features 6f the region have been the 
oolarisation of most of the activity in the MDC's at the 
~ 
expense of the ldc's; and the concentration of trade on 
certain members and in particular the large trade flow 
between Trinidad-Tobago and Guyana. By category of product 
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three trends can be observed: (i) the decline in food 
production and trade; (ii) the increasing importance of 
manufactured products in regional trade; and (iii) the 
importance of the regional market for manufactured exports. 
Al though the free t'~ade area enhanced the opportuni t-
ies for development of manufacturing industry based on the 
regional market, a greater role can be attributed to the 
incentives given to manufacturing, and to the structure of 
effective protection that has been developed. In 
particular, the more processed imports from outside of the 
region face the highest tariff barriers with very low 
rates (6 ... 8%t applying to capital goods and raw materials. 
This is further affected by the Exemptions List which 
allows duty exemptions on imported inputs. As a conseque-
nce the structure of effective protection provides 
excessive protection to final products while discouraging 
backward linkages. 
The majority of inputs are imported from outside of 
the West Indies with producer goods accounting 'for over 
70% of total imports, with less than 10% imported from 
within Caricom'. (II) The types of industries encouraged 
have therefo~e been consumer and assembly type activities. 
Expansion and growth of this type of production will 
rapidly be limited by the size of the regional market, and 
the stagnating and declining shares of intra trade in 
total trade provides some evidence that these limits have 
been reached. 
By 1973 close to 50% of manufacturing output went to 
the regional market, and in certain categories over 80% of 
manufactured exports were destined for the region. Althou-
gh these exports do not represent the majority of aggregate 
exports, in some cases, notably Barbados, this trade is 
important. Moreover as manufacturing exports do depend to 
a large degree on the regional market, any restrictions 
L~posed by the size of the market will affect severly the 
growth of industry in the region. Although the regional 
11. Ranis (1982) p.6. 
221 
market may have provided the initial impetus to industry, 
exports to outside of the region are likely to be verJ 
important for the future growth of industry, and this 
trade will depend on competitiveness in world markets. 
The effects of economic integration associated with 
the free trade area and customs union have certainly 
?rovided a basis for industrialisation. However this has 
generally been restricted to final consumer goods, the 
structure of effective protection inhibiting backward 
linkages. This in turn has required large imports of most 
inputs to industry and created an unchanged or increased 
dependence of the region on the industrial countries. 
The decline in the importance of foodstuffs in 
agqregate regional trade is probably associated more with 
national neglect of the sector and with the growing 
importance of industry than with regional integration 
itself. However, there are also indications that more food 
is being produced for domestic consumption in some members 
and in the light of the regional food plan greater trade 
in this category would be expected. 
In tenns of the success oi objectives and instruments, 
(section 6.3) the free trade area has in general been 
successfully implemented, although in the late 1970's 
dOluestic economic problems as well as the effects of the 
international recession resulted in some temporary erosion 
oi the principle of free trade. 
On the other hand the common protective policy (common 
external tariff and the regime for regional quantitative 
restrictions) is still not totally implemented. By the end 
of 1977 almost all of the CET rates had been implemented 
among the MDC's. However, the differences between the 
na~ional quota regulations as well as those of the 
exemptions list provisions have created a regional trade 
regime that provides little common protection of inputs or 
output. Certainly throughout the 1970's the common 
~rotective regime has not achieved the application 
required for it to be considered a common policy. 
Although substantial technical work has been done on 
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the common economic policies for industry, the programme 
of industrial development has not made notable progress. 
Overall the productive sectors of the members have not been 
integrated to the extent that would be required if the area 
was to support a major industrial base. However; 
cooperation in agriculture which has a longer tradition 
within the region has by comparison been relatively 
successful. 
Finally, based on this evaluation, and the problems 
observed in other third world regional groupings we were 
able to make several general policy recommendations. 
(i) Although the free trade area has generally been 
implemented, removal of tariff should be 






The common protective policy currently favours 
final products and discourages backward linkages. 
It is suggested that the common protective 
policy be ammended in such a way as to encourage 
the local production of required intermediate 
inputs. Higher rates of common external tariff 
or removal from the exemptions list vlould be one 
means of encouraging the production of selected 
inputs. 
The co~non economic policies associated with the 
development of industry has not been particularly 
successful, and we argue for a regional plan for 
industry in which national plans are integrated. 
The objective is to create linkages between 
processes and sectors with individual plants being 
allocated by regional comparative advantage, and 
with a view to a fairer distribution of the bene-
fits of industrialisation. 
Because of its small size the regional market will 
restrict the growth of manufacturing in particular. 
It will be necessary in the future to place 
greater emphasis on expanding non-primary categor-
ies of export into the international market. 
Although agriculture has been reasonably successf-
ul, continued emphasis on this sector will be 
required if the regional food deficit is to be 
reduced substantially. 
Based on the trade flow analysis, Carifta/Caricom may 
be considered a success to the extent that the free trade 
area was implemented and regional trade flows increased. 
However, Carifta/Caricom has failed to achieve the 
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objectives of positive integration associated with region-
wide planning of industry and agriculture and the 
development of backward and sectoral linkages. In a review 
by the Caricom Council in 1980, it was suggested that lack 
of progress was attributable to an absence of understanding 
as to what actions were required to implement integration, 
and not to weaknesses in the concept of integration itself. 
To an extent part of the proqlem is a lack of dynamism in 
the integration process and underlines the importance of 
non-economic factors in determining the success of regional 
integration. 
In chapter seven we draw together the conclusions of 
the thesis, and in particular we discuss the extent to 
which the analysis of trade flows can isolate the effects 
of economic integration on trade flows. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Main Conclusions and Areas for Imp~ovement 
Section 7.1: Introduction 
The purp.ose of chapter seven is to draw together the 
main points of this study based on the preceding analysis. 
One of the principle objectives of the study has been to 
evaluate the extent to which the trade flow model is 
capable of isolating the effects of economic integration 
on trade flows. ~ti[e suggested in chapter four that 
evaluation of integration should not be based on one 
partial measure, but should be conducted in a general 
framework consisting of a set of partial methods, that 
together provide a vector of attributes associated with 
the effects of integration. This allows not only a 
broader evaluation, but should a~so facilitate comparisons 
between regional groupings. The analysis of trade flows, 
and of the trade flow model in particular should be viewed 
as just one component of this broader evaluation framework 
and as such the evaluation of Carifta/Caricom in chapter 
six must also be seen as partial. 
Based on the r~sults of chapter five and the 
evaluation in chapter six we will discuss in section 7.3 
the extent bo which the analysis of trade flows was able 
to isolate the effects of economic integration on tnade 
flows, the main problems and defects associated with the 
trade flow model and to suggest possible solutions to 
these problems. 
First; in section 7.2 we will outline the main pOints 
and conclusions associated with the role and evaluation oE 
economic integration in the third world. 
Section 7.2: Summary of Main Conclusions 
Practically every independent nation in the world has 
been involved in regional groupings in one form or another. 
In particular, in the third world, economic integration 
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can be viewed as a necessary complement to oolitical ... 
independence. Without economic independence, political 
independence is restricted, and economic integration is 
one approach to overcoming the constraints and nroblems .,; 
of uncierdevelopment associated with small economic size, 
a narrow resource base and limited range of economic 
activity. Many, if not all or the integration groupings 
formed in the third world have faced severe problems, 
and success has generally been only moderate. The schemes 
have been ambitious and at least in terms of their stated 
objectives have not been simple free trade areas or 
customs unions. In many cases there are mechanisms to 
ensure a fair distribution of the costs and benefits of 
integration, to give special status to the less developed 
members and to encourage industry and agriculture with the 
overall aim of 'harmonious and balanced developement'. One 
of the major problems however has been that in many schemes 
the process has lost its earlier dynamism. In most cases 
some form of free trade area has been established, and in 
some a common external taniff. There have however been so 
many loopholes or restrictions, as well as structures of 
effective protection that discourage linkages between 
sectors and industries, that for all their intentions, 
economic integ-ration has in many cases regressed to what 
is no more than a form of free trade area, and certainly 
not what was originally envisaged. However, although 
integration has apparently not produced all the expected 
results,. much of -the failure has been a problem of 
implementation and is not a criticism of the concept of 
economic integration as such. 
However, it has been suggested that models based on 
the industrial economies need not necessarily be 
applicable or relevant to the problems of third world 
oevelopment. At the same time it is also realised that 
models applying to one country or area of the third world 
at large. In the example of models of economic integration 
the same is true when referring to the regional schemes in 
the third world where '9ractically all these schemes were 
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attempting, with traditional, very committed means, 
borrowed mostly from the trade experiences of the advanced 
countries, to solve non-traditional problems of economic 
non-viability and social backwardness in the South. (1) 
Based on the aspirati.ons and problems of third world 
economic integration we have to question the relevance of 
the traditional theory of economic integration to the third 
world, and in particular to establish the role of economic 
integration in the third world and the extent to which the 
traditional theory could provide a useful basis for 
analysis of third world integration. Establishing a theory 
relevant to the particular case and problems being 
considered is irnportan t, as methods of evaluating the : ~ 
effects of integration and the actual effects we look for 
will be derived from theory. 
However ( the preconditions existing in the third 
world do not generally correspond with those expected in 
the model ana required for successful integration. 
Furthermore, the assumptions made effectively discounted 
the basic problems that concern the third world, and the 
theory did not address the questions of how the process of 
integration would dynamically change the structural 
condltions of production and technology; the composition 
of investments and the capacity to absorb externalities. 
We suggested that economic integration should be 
viewed in terms of a framework for development policies at 
the regional level. Economic integration provides an 
alte.rnative to nationally based import substi tution or 
export-led strategies and helps to overcome some of the 
basic constraints facing development by providing a 
fra~mework for the development of an interconnected 
regionwide industrial base. In the shor~ rlli~ economic 
integration creates the preconditions that allow the 
exploitation of economies of scale and dynamiC effects 
associated with industrialisation. Economic integration in 
the third world shoula not be constrainea to 'negative 
1. Wionezek (1978) 
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integration', nor should it be viewed as an alternative to 
other development policies, rather it should be approached 
as a catalyst that creates conditions conducive to regional 
development. 
As the evaluation of integration using partial 
measures such as the effects on trade; the degree of 
integration or the distribution of costs and benefits -
does not provide full coverage of the effects of integrat-
ion in the third world, we outlined a tentative framework 
for evaluationtJ.based on the role of integration in the 
third world. Basically this approach consists of an 
extended list of partial methods covering the main effects 
of integration. In particular we suggest analysis of 
trade patterns, of the growth of industry associated with 
integration, of employment and income, and of price and 
cost changes. However the contents of this framework are 
not exhaustive and should also include aspects of social 
and political integration. The outcome of this approach 
would be a vector of attributes that could be used as the 
basis of a full evaluation of integration. 
In this study we concentrated on one particular aspect 
of the framework of evaluation based on the trade flow 
model. One of the objectives of the thesis is to examine 
the extent to which the trade flow model could isolate the 
effects of integration on trade flows. This is based on 
an evaluation of the effects of integration in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. In section 7.3 we discuss the 
extent to which the analysis of trade flows and in 
particular the trade flow model can be used in the context 
of evaluation. 
Section 7.3; The Analysis of Trade Flows and the Problems 
Associated with the Trade Flow Model 
The trade flow model has certain advantages over other 
methods of isolating the effects of economic integration on 
trade flows that make it an important component in 3. 
broader evaluation. First, and perhaps the most important 
is that the trade flow model allows a direct measurement of 
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the impact of integration on a reg ion's trade f 10'\.oIs by 
incorporatiny a dummy variable to represent changes in 
regional trade flows. In general the other less 
sophisticated approaches rely on the 'residual' approach 
that basically attributes to integration .3ny changes in 
income elasticities of trade between pre and post 
integration periods. These methods therefore, do not 
directly allow for any other autonomous changes that may 
be unassociated with integration. Second,. the trade flow 
model by including income, population and distance as 
independent determinants of the size of trade flows, to 
an extent take into account some of the possible effects 
on trade flows that are not associated with integration. 
In chapter five we attempted to derive more 
information on the integration effects by estimating the 
trade flow model on various subsamples of the available 
data. These included the imports and exports of Carifta/ 
Caricom, intra and extra regional trade flows, as well as 
an aggregate model and equations for the individual MDC's. 
Although each of the equations on their own were 
restricted in the information that could be derived, 
together they provided a much broader picture of the 
effects or integration on the region than the aggregate 
equation alone. 
The aggregate equation (equation one) was restricted 
as the dummy variable for the integration effect did not 
differentiate between the effects of integration after 
1967 and pri.or' trade expanding effects. ,lIAs a result we 
had to speculate whether this was a problem of the data, 
the inapplicability of the model or prior trade expanding 
effects. However, the results of the individual country 
equations identified Guyana as a likely source of this 
problem, with the three other MDC's showing clear 
indications of trade expanding effects associated with 
integration. 
Disaggregation by MDC exports and imports (equations 
four and five) revealed the greater impact of the region on 
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the export side, and this result was sU9ported by data 
(see section 6.2) that indicated the i.Lllportance of the 
regional market for exports of regionally produced 
manufactured goods. 
The individual country equations (equations 9 - 12) 
allowed for the diversity in the timing and magnitude of 
the integration effect across countries, and provides the 
clearest indication of integration effects on regional 
trade. In these equations if we exclude Guyana, the dummy 
variable was insignificant prior to integration, 
increasing in value thereafter. These results indicated 
the general timin~ of the initial integration effects as 
well as their impact over: time on the individual countries. 
Information on the progress of integration was also 
derived from the elasticities of the independent variables 
determining trade flows, in particular the proxy for 
resistance to trade ~ the distance variable. It was 
observed that first, this elasticity was greater for intra 
regional trade (equation two) than for extra regional 
trade (equation three) reflecting the generally less 
developed transport and marketing infrastructure within 
the region. Second, the elasticity of distance for intra 
regional trade decreased over the sample time period 
indicating both the improvements in the regional 
infrastructure, as well as the broader range of goods that 
were included in regional trade. 
The adjacent year regression equation (equation seven) 
was an attempt to measure directly the effects of 
integration on both intra and extra regional trade. This 
equation was not totally successful as the dummy variable 
for extra regional trade WaS not significant. However, 
this could be an indication of the small net effect of 
economic integration on extra regional trade which is 
plausible given the dependence of the MDe's on the 
industrialised countries for inputs to their import 
substituting industries, and that the composition of extra 
regional trade was largely unchanged. However, this type 
2JO 
of equation although relatively undeveloped here, could 
be an bnportant component in the direct measurement of 
integration effects on trade. 
Overall, although there are obvious areas for 
improvement which are discussed below, the trade flow model 
was useful in isolating the effects of economic integrat-
ion on trade. It was able to indicate the presence of 
gross:trade creation, especially at the individual MDC 
level, it indicated the magnitude of effects on the 
individual MDC" s and also provided further indica,tions of 
integration effects through changes in the distance 
variable. 
However, the extent to which the trade flow model was 
not able to isolate the effects of economic integration are 
also important especially as an indication of the areas in 
which improvement and changes are needed. This exercise 
has also demonstrated the importance of regarding partial 
measures as only one part of an overall evaluation and the 
need for other complementary measures in every area of 
evaluation. It was found that the trade flow model had to 
be supported by the expenditure share results and the 
changes in thel income elasticity of import demand. Using 
these two other less sophisticated methods, we were able 
to get an indication of the effects of economic integration 
on total, intra and extra regional trade, and to 
disaggregate the trade flows by SITC catergories thereby 
allowing an analysis of the changes in the composition of 
trade associated with integration. It was found that even 
the simplest methods using the percentage share of regional 
in total trade contributed to the analysis. 
Estimating the trade flow model for Carifta/Caricom 
allowed us to pinpoint various defects and problems of the 
model. Although some of these problems cannot be solved, 
others can be, and we now discuss three areas that could be 
improved on. 
First, the standard trade flow model was only able to 
account for either changes in intra or extra regional trace. 
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In general the model is used to estimate changes in intra 
regional trade - gross trade creation. ~'le attempted to 
solve this problem using adjacent year regressions (equat-
ion seven) which allowed direct measurement of integration 
effects on both intra and extra regional trade. This 
method substantially improves the extent to which the trade 
flow model isolated the effects of integration by allowing 
direct estimates of gross trade creation, trade creation 
and trade diversidln. From these results an index of 
integration effects' could be constructed, which would 
provide additional information on the relative impact and 
time profile of integration effects. Furthermore, it was 
also found that the adjacent year regressions produced 
more stable elasticities of the independent variables and 
should be used in preference to the standard aggregated 
form of the equation. 
Second, the model was estimated only by aggregate 
trade and did not differentiate between individual product 
cate gories. As was seen in the income elasticity results, 
disaggregation by SITe categories provided essential 
information on the types of activity that were expanding 
regionally and extra regionally. This approach gives a 
more extensive indication of the progress of integration 
and whether it is contributing to overall development 
objectives. Ideally the trade flow model should also be 
disaggregated by SITC category. However this would 
probably require additional or a completely new set of 
independent variables to determine the trade flows, as 
income and population are unlikely to be the most 
appropriate. This approach would also run into severe 
data restrictions, as although there is data available for 
trade flows disaggregated by SITC categories, we may be 
limited by country coverage and by the length of the data 
time series. 
Third, the resistance to trade variable (proxied by 
geographic distance} is important both in determining trade 
flows and in reflecti~g possible integration effects. 
However, not all of the aspects of resistance to trade are 
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adaquately reflected in the distance proxy and this varia-
ble should be disaggregated into a set of proxy variables 
that would include those that are most important for any 
particular regional grouping. 
Based on this study we can suggest two areas for 
future research. In particular the framework for 
evaluation outlined in ·chapter four needs to be refined 
and developed in mo~e detail. There are many other areas 
of integration that should be included, in particular those 
associated w±th political and social integration the 
benefits of increased bargaining power as a region, of 
joint research and development, of monetary zones and of 
fiscal harmonisation, Furthermore, the links between the 
various partial measures and how they would be 
incorporated in a full evaluation has to be developed. 
Finally in the case of Carifta/Caricom we only attempted 
an evaluation based on one component of the evaluation of 
the evaluation framework. The Caribbean Community would 
provide an interesting example in which the other 
components of the evaluation framework could be developed. 
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APPENDIX A 
Economic Background of Carifta/Caricom Members 
A The More Developed Countries 
Barbados 
Barbados, geographically part of the Lesser Antilles, 
is the most easterly of the Caribbean nations, lying 200 
miles northeast of Trinidad-Tobago. Population density lS 
among the world's highest at over 1500 per square mile, and 
virtually the entire island· (area of 166 square miles) is 
inhabited, with few sparsely populated or uninhabited areas. 
Of the population of 252,000 (1982), 92% are of negro 
descent. 
Barbados has been under the British Crown since 1624. 
Its House of Assembly, which began meeting in 1639 is the 
third oldest legislative body in the Western Hemisphere. 
Historically, the economy was dominated by the growing and 
processing of sugar into rum, molasses and syrup. Until 
slavery was abolished in 1834, the plantations were worked 
by African slaves, who following emancipation became rent 
paying tenants as little farmland remained unclaimed and 
there were few alternative means of subsistence. The tenant, 
for the most part paid their rents by working for the 
owner's sugar related enterprises, thus ensuring the con-
tinuing importance of sugar. Internal self-government was 
attained in 1961 and full independence in 1966. 
Of the total land area nearly 60% is cropland. The 
maj~rity of the land is intensively cultivated, with sugar 
cane accounting for over half the acreage. In recent 
decades diversification has reduced the importance of sugar 
and its related activities. The size of the sugar crop has 
diminished considerably since the late 1960's with sugar ex-
ports declining from over 65% of total exports in 1960 to 
12% in 1981. This has been the result of labour shortages 
during cultivation and harvesting, adverse weather conditions, 
depressed world prices, increasing production costs, and in 
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part because the land has been converted to other uses. 
In an effort to reduce food imports production of 
other farm commodities has been encouraged. All farmers 
are now required to plant at least 12% of their arable land 
with some foodcrops. Bananas have been i~1troduced on a 
limited scale, and sea-island cotton once grown extensively 
has been reintroduced. Livestock are mainly owned by small 
holders, although there are a few large dairies. There are 
no natural forests, and there is a relatively small fishing 
industry. 
Overall agriculture has declined in importance since the 
1960's when it accounted for 26% of employment and 26% of 
output. In 1970 the sector accounted for 16% of employment 
and 14.7% of output, and by 1980 only 10.7% of output. 
Economic policy has been based on the diversification 
of a sugar economy into non-agricultural activities. The 
government has provided incentives to firms establishing 
export or manufacturing industries on the island, including 
ten year tax holidays, guaranteed profit repatriation, ex-
emption from import duties on materials needed in manufac-
turing, as well as the construction of industrial parks. 
Consequently, Barbados has become a relatively inexpensive 
and convenient location for light manufacturing and 
assembly operations for the North American market. 
The manufacturing sector now includes food process-
lng, textiles, furniture, local handicrafts, electronic 
components as well as chemicals. Some construction related 
minerals are available and the government has launched 
cement projects in conjunction with both Guyana and Trinidad-
Tobago. 
The share of manufacturing in GDP has risen from 7.9% 
ln 1960 to 12.4% in 1980, and employed 14.6% of the labour 
force in 1970. 
Reserves of petroleum and natural gas have been discover-
ed, and by 1981 petroleum was being extracted at the rate of 
700 barrels per day, with the prospect of further offshore 
fields. Output of petroleum products in Barbados satisfies 
around 30% of total national requirements, and the island 
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1S self-sufficient in natural gas, which 1S produced in 
conjunction with crude oil. 
As in the rest of the Caribbean, tourism is an import-
ant source of foreign exchange. Since 1968 it has generated 
more foreign exchange than sugar, accounting for 4~% of 
total receipts in 1979, compared with 30% in 1977-78. 
Barbados has recently joined a number of Caribbean 
states in encouraging offshore banking, although the bene-
fits of this may be reduced as the US Federal Reserve Board 
has agreed to allow US banks to provide many of the same 
services currently offered by such traditional offshore 
havens as the Bahamas. 
The Barbadian economy is one of the most open in the 
world, until 1968 exports plus imports amounting to over 
100% of GDP. Between 1960 and 1968 exports share of GDP 
was above 30%, thereafter the share lay closer to 20%. 
Imports on the other hand have usually been greater than 
60% of GDP, reaching a peak of 77.4% in 1968. 
Traditionally Barbados has run a trade deficit, al-
though in many years this gap has been met by invisible 
earn1ngs, principally from tourist receipts. Up to the mid-
1970's sugar was the principal export, although its share 
in exports fell from 65.5% in 1960 to 12.2% in 1981. Manu-
factured exports are now of greater importance accounting 
for 27.5% of total exports in 1973. Major imports include 
foodstuffs, machinery, motor vehicles, lumber and fuels. 
Although petroleum imports have grown from 1.9% of total 
imports in 1966 to 5% in 1979, the discovery of local 
energy supplies means that petroleum imports are less of a 
problem for Barbados than for many other developing nations. 
The generally positive economic performance of Barbados 
over the last twenty years can be attributed to government 
policies that have fostered development. Although almost 
all the sectors had positive average annual growth rates 
over the period 1960 to 1980, agriculture declined on 
average by -2.5% annually, during the 1970's. After inde-
pendence, sugar production fell steadily. In the late 
1970's depressed world prices and increasing production 
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costs contributed to the industry's decline, although in 
1979 and 1980 there was some recovery with improved yields 
supported by increases in world prices. 
Rapid expansion in the tourism and manufacturing 
sectors brolJght about considerable growth in real GDP, wh~ch 
averaged 4.3% per annum between 1976 and 1980. Tourism was 
the most dynamic sector, growing at rates of 17% a year. 
However, in 1981, for the first time since 1976, real GDP 
declined by an estimated 3.1% compared with an average rate 
of increase of 4.5% during 1977-80. The main causes for 
this decline included rain handicapping agriculture, a 
reduction in petroleum output, softer sugar prices and 
the international recession. 
The rate of inflation rose to a maximum of 38.96% In 
1974 during the first oil crisis and subsequently fell to an 
average 7.6% in 1976 - 1978. In recent years inflation has 
once again been accelerating, averaging 14.5% in 1979-81, 
fuelled by higher import prices, price increases within the 
construction sector, shortages of fresh vegetables and wage 
increases in the public sector. Barbados has experienced 
high unemployment rates, but this has been reduced from 
16% to 12% over 1979-80. 
Guyana 
Guyana (formerly British Guiana) lies on the northern 
Atlantic coast of South America, with Venezuela to the west, 
Suriname to the east and Brazil to the south and southwest. 
Guyana is the largest of the Caricom members with an area 
of 83,000 square miles and a population of 870,000 (1982) 
concentrated along the narrow coastal belt. Guyana is 
divided into three major geographical zones: a coastal 
plain 10 - 40 miles wide, a forest zone and a grass covered 
savanna. 
Guyana was first settled by the Dutch in 1616, being 
placed under the direction of the West Indian Company of 
the Netherlands in 1621. The British began migrating to 
the colony in large numbers and by 1760 constituted a 
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majority of the population of Demerara. The British 
occupied the colony in 1796, again in 1803 and finally 
gained formal possession in 1814. African slaves and later 
East Indian labourers were imported to work on sugar plantat-
ions, most of the Indians arriving between 1844 and ~9l7 
under the indenture system. Currently 50% of the populat-
ion is of East Indian origin (mainly associated with 
agriculture),31% African (principally urban dwelling), 12% 
mixed blood and 4% indigenous indians. Guyana was granted 
full self-government in 1961, independence in 1966 and 
declared itself a Cooperative Republic in 1970. 
Only 15% of Guyana is classified as agricultural land, 
with the narrow coastal belt the only area suitable for in-
tensive farming. The economy is based primarily on agricult-
ure, with sugar and rice being the principle crops, al-
though the sugar plantations also produce bananas and the 
rice farmers coconuts, coffee, cocoa and citrus fruit. 
Other crops include groundnuts, oil palms and a variety of 
vegetables. 
Traditional smallholdings and modern plantations co-
exist in this sector, but with differing scales of effic-
iency; mechanisation and use of fertilisers being limited 
to plantations. Rice production is highly mechanised but 
farmed in uneconomic units of an average of 11 acres. 
By 1979, Guyana had become self-sufficient in sugar, 
rice, vegetables, fish, meat, poultry and fruit, although 
output of key commodities fluctuates widely, depending on 
weather and availability of fertiliser, machinery and spare 
parts. 
Livestock includes cattle, pigs, sheep and goats, but 
these have been decreasing in numbers because of a shortage 
of pasture and reduced demand for draught animals. Guyana's 
coastal and inland waters are rich in a wide variety of fish 
especially shrimps which are exported. 
Over 80% of Guyana is covered by tropical forest with 
an estimated annual volume of marketable timber of one 
million cubic metres of which 25% is accessible. Forestry 
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1S expected to become an increasingly significant industry 
1n the 1980's. 
Although one of the chief aims of the development plans 
(1966-72 and 1973-76) was a reduction in the nation's depend-
ence on sugar, bauxite and rice, there are agricultural de-
velopment projects aimed at expanding rice production, with 
three irrigation and land recovery projects. Guyana has 
an important role as a major food producer in Caricom, and 
further investment in this sector is central to the reduct-
ion of the region's food import bill. 
The agricultural sector employs about 30% of the labour 
force, but its contribution to GDP has fallen from 24% 1n 
1960 to 17.2% in 1980. Sugar alone contributed 31% of 
total exports in 1980 (a fall from 47.4% in 1960), and r1ce 
contributed a further 9% in export earnings in 1980. 
Until 1970, Guyana was a free-market economy with a 
dominant private sector. In that year the country was pro-
claimed a cooperative republic and the government embarked 
on a policy of nationalisation and central planning. By 
1975 nationalisation of the bauxite mining industry was 
completed and a similar program affecting the sugar industry 
was virtually completed by 1976. By the end of the 1970's 
80% of the country's productive capacity was within the 
public sector with cooperatives accounting for another 10%. 
The largest state enterprises are involved in the two 
most productive sectors of the economy - agriculture and 
mining. The Guyana Sugar Corporation Ltd. (Guysuco) was 
established following the nationalisation of the British 
based Demerara Sugar Company and Booker McConnell estates 
in 1975 and 1976. The Guyana Mining Enterprises Ltd. 
(Guymine) was founded in 1977. Both Guysuco and Guymine 
maintain a monopoly on foreign sales as does the Guyana 
Rice Board (established in 1973). 
The mining and manufacturing sector consists mainly of 
the bauxite - alumina industry, although gold and industrial 
diamonds have been mined since the 1880's. Guyana is the 
fifth largest producer of bauxite in the world,accounting 
for over 4% of world production, and has a near monopoly 
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in calcined bauxite used in the manufacture of refractory 
bricks for the steel industry. Total bauxite and alumina 
exports consistently account for 40 - 50% of foreign ex-
change earnings, while mining and manufacturing together 
employ about 30% of the work force. The contribution of 
mining to GDP has fallen from 20.3% in 1970 to 11.4% ~n 
1980, while manufacturing overall has increased its share 
from 13.3% in 1960 to 18% in 1980. 
However, manufacturing, (excluding sugar and r~ce pro-
cessing) most of which is conducted by small private firms, 
remains undeveloped, producing 8 - 9% of GDP ~n 1976-80. 
The main products are processed food, clothing, rum and 
beverages, assembled components and metal manfactures. 
Recent additions to industry include a textile mill financed 
by China, a glass factory and a bicycle plant. 
In general the economic performance is sensitive to 
international economic conditions, which determine demand 
and prices for the country's main products. Industrial de-
velopment depends on the expansion of energy sources and a 
750MW hydro-electric project scheduled for completion in 1985 
should make possible the construction of a local aluminium 
smelter. 
Guyana's economy is highly dependent on foreign trade 
as shown by the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, which 
rose from between 90 - 100% (1960-73) to a maximum of 146% 
in 1976 but subsequently fell to 108% by 1982. Exports 
share of GDP rose from 43.4% in 1960 to a high of 72.2% 
in 1975 and has since fallen. For imports this share has 
risen from 50.4% in 1960 to 83% in 1976 and fallen to 58.8% 
~n 1982. 
Three commodities, bauxite-alumina, sugar and rice, 
together have accounted for over 80% of foreign exchange 
earnings since before independence. Since 1965 bauxite 
and alumina have dominated export earnings (on average over 
40%) and sugar has taken second position as an export earner. 
Sugar's share of export earnings fell from over 47% in 1960 
to 36% in 1982. Rice exports have also declined in im-
portance (12.1% ~n 1960) but still provide around 8% of 
export earnings. 
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Steadily increasing export earnings in the key sectors 
have tended to mask diminishing output. Although foreign 
exchange earnings from sugar grew each year between 1972 
and 1980 (apart from a marginal downturn in 1978) export 
volume has fluctuated. Collaterally output of bauxite and 
alumina which peaked in 1970 has stagnated since a drop-
off of 27% in 1976, even though earnings have risen. At the 
same time higher export earnings have been more than offset 
by a rising import bill. 
Most trade is still conducted with the developed west -
USA, Canada, the EEC, but Caricom members now account for a 
significant proportion, with Trinidad-Tobago being the major 
source of oil. Following independence, Guyana fostered trade 
relations with China and Eastern Europe which in 1975 collect-
ively accounted for about 10% of exports; however, this trade 
has subsequently declined. A trade agreement with Cuba was 
concluded in 1981. 
During the 1960's Guyana experienced an average annual 
rate of GDP growth of 3.4%, however, the economy has been in 
a crisis since the mid-1970's. Despite its considerable de-
pendence on imported petroleum the economy performed reason-
ably well during 1974-76, mainly because of high sugar prices, 
which in turn supported a large expansion in expenditure, 
particularly in the public sector. However, a sharp de-
cline in international sugar prices, coupled with a decline 
in sugar production plunged the economy into a recession in 
1977, and it has been on a downward trend ever since. Real 
GDP fell by a cumulative 4.8% during 1977-81, notwithstand-
ing a slight recovery in 1980-81. Sectoral output has in 
general been rather volatile with the exception of the mis-
cellaneous manufacturing subsector (mainly food and bev-
erages), which showed positive growth rates over the entire 
period. 
The recession that began in 1977 was accompanied by a 
severe weakening of the balance of payments as international 
reserves were depleted and external obligations grew rapidly. 
This weakness continued in the following years, and by 1981 
the current account deficit was the equivalent of 35% of GDP. 
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Following international price trends, domestic in-
flation decelerated from 20% in 1978 to an average of 16% 
in 1979-80, but in contrast with the direction of inter-
national price movements it accelerated again in 1981 to 
25%. 
Jamaica 
Jamaica 1S a mountainous island located 90 miles south 
of Cuba. The third largest island in the Caribbean (4,411 
square miles) it is the largest and most populous of the 
independent Commonwealth islands in the Caribbean. About 
77% of the population of 2.3 million (1982) is of African 
descent, and another 15% of mixed Afro-European heritage. 
Jamaica was discovered by Columbus in 1494 and subse-
quently settled by the Spanish. The Spanish were expelled 
by the British and the island formally ceded to Britain ln 
1670. A successful plantation economy based on African 
slave labour was developed, but the abolition of the slave 
trade (1807) and of slavery (1834) as wellas theremoval of 
tariff protection for Jamaican produce in Britain destroyed 
the basis of the plantation economy. A crown colony govern-
ment was established in 1866 and the administration and the 
economy gradually rebuilt. Jamaica achieved a measure of 
internal self government in 1944 and after her withdrawal 
from the Federation of the West Indies, gained independence 
ln 1962. 
Jamaica was historically dependent on agriculture with 
sugarcane as the leading crop, although after 1870 bananas 
became predominant. After World War Two the granting of a 
preferential market by the UK helped sugar to re-emerge as 
the leading agricultural export. However, the development 
of a modern economy can be traced to the early 1950's with 
the discovery of extensive bauxite reserves. 
Of Jamaica's total land area, 21% is arable, 23% 
meadows and pastures and 19% forests. The island also has 
considerable resources of freshwater and marine fish. 
Jamaican agriculture is divided into a modern sector, 
consisting of plantations, now in decline, and the traditional 
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sector, consisting of smallholders. The main crops are 
sugarcane, citrus fruit, bananas, pimento, coconuts, coffee, 
cocoa and tobacco, - which are exported, and yams, potatoes, 
maize, vegetables, plantains and pumpkins - primarily for 
domestic consumption. 
Both sugar and banana exports, the two most important 
export crops, declined substantially during the 1970's. 
Sugar exports as a share of total exports declined from 
23.8% in 1960 to 10.3% in 1970 and to 5.7% in 1980. Other 
smaller export crops such as coffee and citrus fruit also 
declined during the 1970's. The sources of this decline 
include: a shift of production into products for domestic 
consumption; the breakup of large estates into less 
efficient smallholdings and cooperative farms; a variety 
of crop diseases affecting sugar, coffee and coconut pro-
duction; and a shortage of imported agricultural inputs 
such as fertilisers, created by the scarcity of hard currency. 
However, domestic food crops have been performing relative-
ly well. 
In 1972 the government introduced a program called 
'Growing and reaping our wealth', (GROW), in an effort to 
increase production and redistribute land. But agricultur-
al output showed an average yearly gain of only 1.4% during 
the 1970's and its share of GDP fell from 11% in 1960 to 
8.7% in 1980. 
During the 1960's and early 1970's economic develop-
ment policy was aimed at the expansion of the bauxite-
alumina industry and import substitution of consumer 
durables. During the 1970's manufacturing developed from 
the processing of a few agricultural products into the 
largest economic sector contributing 14.9% of GDP in 1980 
and approximately the same in employment. Industry has 
diversified and now includes a wide range of goods: cloth-
ing, footwear, textiles, processed foods and beverages, 
tobacco, furniture, sporting equipment, glass, paper and 
paperboard, paints, cement, steel, machinery and tools, 
fertilisers and refined petroleum products. Several laws 
have been enacted to encourage and facilitate industrial 
development, including tax relief and liberal profit and 
capital repatriation provisions. 
Since the mid-1970's though, severe foreign exchange 
shortages, partly associated with the oil price rises In 
1973/74 have caused cutbacks and the closing of many 
factories unable to purchase imported raw materials, equip-
ment and spare parts on which manufacturing in Jamaica 
relies. 
The aluminium industry is critical to economic growth, 
foreign exchange earnings and government revenues. By the 
early 1970's with reserves of 500-600 million tons of 
bauxite, Jamaica was second only to Australia in world pro-
duction of bauxite (in 1978 production of bauxite was approx-
imately 20% of total world output), which along with its 
principal derivative alumina accounted for over 75% of 
total exports in 1980 as compared with 48.6% in 1960. 
However, this mineral-led development strategy came 
under a severe strain after the 1973-74 oil price rises 
as Jamaica depends on imported energy as a major component 
of total costs in the aluminium industry. 
In 1974 the government increased the taxes on bauxite 
and alumina, imposed controls on output and profits, and 
entered into negotiationp with the companies to achieve 
eventual nationalisation. This created friction and pushed 
up the cost of bauxite (which had been among the lowest in 
the world). This combined with the world recession, a 
slowdown in demand and labour disputes contributed to an 
almost 3.5 million ton annual drop in output in the late 
1970's. 
Since then to increase bauxite· and alun:"::.-:c. output the 
government has been actively seeking to increase invest-
ment in new and expanded mining and producing facilities. 
Although the output of bauxite has failed to regain pre-
1975 levels, high world market prices have helped to improve 
earnings since 1977. 
Tourism is Jamaica's second largest foreign exchange 
earner although bad publicity, civil unrest and rising 
crime caused a recession in the industry during the 1970's. 
In terms of the share of exports and imports in GDP, 
Jamaica has become an increasingly more open economy. Ex-
ports as a percentage of GDP have risen from 23.9% in 1960 
to 36.1% in 1980, and imports from 32.7% in 1960 to 43.9% 
in 1980. The combined share of exports and imports has 
risen from 50-60% over the period 1960-1968, to 60-70% over 
1968-1978 and 70-80+% over 1978-1982. 
Three commodities dominate both the Jamaican economy 
and her exports - sugar, bauxite and alumina. Sugar ex-
porGas a share of total exports has declined in importance 
from a high of 31% in 1963 to 5.7% in 1980. Bauxite's share 
in exports in 1960 stood at 19.2%,but has gradually declined 
to 20.6% in 1980 from a peak of 43.7% in 1967. Alumina on 
the other hand increased its share from 29.4% in 1960 to 
60.4% in 1981. Together alumina and bauxite have dominated 
Jamaican exports, with alumina increasing as bauxite declined, 
in combination rising from 48.6% in 1960 to 78.1% in 1981. 
Jamaica relies totally on imported fuels, industry 
depending to a large degree on imports of raw materials and 
intermediate goods. As such, foreign exchange constraints 
play an important role in the development of the industrial 
sector and any fluctuations in bauxite-alumina earnings 
(the main foreign exchange earner) will affect the rest of 
the economy. 
Until 1973 fuel imports were generally less than 10% 
of total imports, but with the first oil price increase 
doubled to 20% in 1974 and grew to 32.7% by 1980. Other 
major imports include food, manufactures and transport and 
machinery. Jamaica's main trading partners are the USA, UK 
and Canada. 
The Jamaican economy after recording an average annual 
real growth rate of around 5% during the 1960's, experienced 
aseries of disruptions during the 1970's. Between 1970 and 
1980 GDP declined at an average annual rate of almost 1%, 
manufacturing fell by 2.3% per annum and construction by 
8.4% per annum. 
The inauguration of the Manley government in 1972 
quickly led to a rise ln government expenditure, much of 
which was financed by borrowing from foreign commercial 
banks. When foreign credit diminished In 1976, the country's 
international reserves were drawn down to finance trade and 
budget deficits, while wage increases and overall higher 
production costs made sugar and bananas as well as bauxite 
and alumina less marketable. Rising oil prices after 1973 
and the resultant world depression aggravated the problem, 
as did growing uncertainty on the part of private enterprise. 
Capital flight was accompanied by emigration of businessmen, 
professionals and technical personnel. 
In 1976 the IMF agreed to provide 65 million US dollars 
to support oil imports as well as to cover export shortfalls. 
In August 1977 a two-year IMF stand-by credit of 75 million 
US dollars was arranged, but pressure from Jamaican unlons 
and higher public sector wages contributed to the govern-
ment's inability to implement a program of fiscal adjust-
ments, with the IMF therefore interrupting Jamaica's drawing 
rights in December. During this two year period the country's 
import bill fell by over 23%, but the cutbacks precipitated 
a drop in total output as capital equipment, spare parts, 
and such key inputs as raw materials became scarCB. In 
1978, to reverse declining investment and to restimulate 
growth, the IMF approved a new three year credit of 280 
million US dollars in support of a government program that 
included a series of currency devaluations, loosened price 
controls, wage moderation and greater foreign assistance 
at concessional terms to reduce the need for domestic 
credit creation. Once again, several major components of 
the plan proved unattainable, and in mid-1979 the IMF In-
creased its commitment for the remaining two years of the 
extended arrangement to 475 million US dollars. Emphasis 
was placed on expanding output of export related industries, 
which required additional imports and thus acceptance of a 
continuing trade deficit. 
Various factors worked against the success of the 1979 
program. These included the second round of OPEC oil price 
increases, rising international interest rates, midyear 
floods that damaged agricultural output, lower than 
anticipated revenues, and labour strife that affected the 
bauxite-alumina industry, public utilities, transport and 
even the central bank. Domestic credit was allowed to ex-
pand to finance the budget deficit, which in turn generated 
inflation of 29% for the year. Meanwhile, production in 
key sectors continued to decline. Discussions were re-
opened with the IMF in September, but in February 1980 de-
bate over the terms for further credit resulted in the 
Manley administration's decision to call an early election 
In March, Jamaica broke off talks with the IMF. 
On election of Edward Seaga links were renewed with 
the IMF and a three year loan of 698 million US dollars 
from June 1981 was negotiated. Seaga's three year economic 
recovery plan called for a considerable injection of 
foreign investment into the private sector. Government 
policy had not succeeded in stemming the decline in ex-
port growth, but a major achievement has been the reduction 
of inflation from 29% in 1980 to around 5% in 1982. The 
unemployment rate, however, remains at over 25% of the 
labour force. 
Trinidad-Tobago 
The islandsof Trinidad and Tobago are located off the 
northeast coast of Venezuela, at the southern extremity 
of the Lesser Antilles. The islands cover an area of 1980 
square miles, with Trinidad the larger accounting for 
nearly 95% of the country's area and population of 1.2 
million in 1982. 
Although Trinidad was discovered by Columbus in 1498, 
the Spanish did not appoint a governor until 1552. In 
1797 a British expedition captured the island, which was 
ceded formally to the UK in 1820 by the Treaty of Amiens. 
Tobago became a crown colony in 1877 and was amalgamated 
with Trinidad in 1888. Following participation in the 
short lived, British sponsored Federation of the West 
Indies (1958-1962), Trinidad-Tobago was granted full in-
dependence within the Commonwealth in 1962 and adopted a 
republican constitution in 1976. 
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Trinidadian society is ethnically diverse, with 
approximately 43% of the population descended from African 
slaves, and a further 40%, descendents of East Indian 
indentured labourers imported during the nineteenth 
century 
Until the discovery of petroleum in the 1930's, the 
economy of Trinidad-Tobago was largely dependent on export 
oriented agriculture, principally sugar and sugar by-
~roaucts, including molasses, rum and bagasse. 
Of the total land area, 28% of Trinidad-Tobago is 
classified as agricultural and 43% as forest. The 
dominance of the plantation in agriculture has resulted 
in a type oi development geared to metropolitan 
interests and the creation of a dualistic structure. 
There is a basic dichotomy between peasant and plantation 
agriculture, with the former characterised by 
undercapitalisation and low yield, and the latter by 
relatively large inputs of capital and high 
~roductivity per acre. Agriculture has also suffered 
trom a g-eneral movement away from the land, partly a 
result of education and of opportunities in manufacturing, 
tourism and the oil industry, but is also as a consequence 
oi the stigma attached to agricultural labouring 
associated with the history of slavery and the plantation 
system. 
With the increasing importance of especially the oil 
industry, the movement of labour away from the land and 
unfavourable movements in prices for cash crops, the 
agricultural sector has been in a general decline at 
least since the early 1960's, when Trinidad-Tobago was a 
net food exporter. By 1980, three quarters of the 
country's fOOd valued at 350 million US dollars had to be 
imported. In 1951 agriculture accounted for over 17% of 
output, in 1962 it accounted for 10% of output and 20% of 
employment, by 1980 it contributed 2.8% of output and less 
than 15% of employment. The share of sugar in total 
exports has declined from 7.6% in 1960 to 1.5% in 1979, 
this being the result of both price and output levels, 
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and the greater share of petroleum in trade. 
The cocoa industry is the second largest agricultural 
foreign exchange earner, but fears of disease for example 
have discouraged farmers from specialising in such crops. 
The other main commercial crops are coffee and citrus 
products. 
Widely fluctuating world prices for Trinidad-Tobago's 
major export crops, a widening urban-rural wage 
differential, rising production costs, insufficient 
agricultural services and a weak marketing system for 
domestic food crops have all contributed to the decline of 
the agricultural sector during the 1970's. The government 
is determined to reverse the trend toward greater 
dependence on food imports and, to that end, has adopted 
a system of subsidies and price supports as well as a 
priority program of investment in the agricultural sector, 
including land settlements, mixed farming with tree crops 
for hillside areas, the establishment of extensive 
acreages of fruit crops, and the rehabilitation of old 
cocoa plantations where possible. 
Trinidad is one of the main oil producing countries 
outside of the Middle East, with reserves of 68 million 
tons. Over the past twenty years petroleum has dominated 
and been central to Trinidad-Tobago's economic growth and 
development. By the end of the 1970's this sector was 
accounting for around 50% of GDP, 90% of export ear~ings 
and the major part of government revenue deriving from 
~roduction and refining. In the late 1960~s oil revenues 
declined, but this trend was reversed in 1972 when 
substantial reserves of offshore oil were located, and 
that coupled with the subsequent discovery of some 198 
billion cubic metres of natural gas, reestablished the 
country as a major oil and gas producer. The dominant 
2os i tion of oil in the economy was further reinforced by 
the oil price increases in 1973-74 and 1979. The 
strategic geographic location of the islands has favoured 
the establishment of a large refining complex; the 




tons annually. Because of the excess capacity of the 
refineries, it is necessary to import over 75% of t~e 
crude oil input. More recently (1982) falling world 
demand threatened heavy redundancies in the two 
refineries. Although petroleum revenues have significant-
ly enhanced Trindadts economic capability, the industry 
employs fewer than 10,000 workers. 
In the late 1960 J s in an effort to reduce an 
excessive dependence on petroleum, the government 
undertook a 3.5 - 5 billion dollars industrialisation 
program, which included major investments in a steel 
plant and rolling mill, an aluminium smelter, a cement 
factory, and a methanol plant, as well as enterprises for 
the production of polyester fibres, plastics and 
electronic equipment. Other projects have included the 
establishment of petrochemical and fertiliser facilities, 
while a liquified natural gas plant is projected. 
Manufacturing, the second major growth area in the 
economy is dominated by the refining of petroleum and 
sugar, assembly type operations (including motor vehicles) 
and the manufacture of fertilisers, cement; furniture, 
garments, processed foods, chemicals and non-metallic 
p~oducts including asphalt. 
The food processing industry, which is expected to 
create linkages with the agricultural sector and 
contribute to a reduction in the food import bill, has 
only been having very moderate success. 
Manufacturing has been actively encouraged since the 
1~40ts through a combination of government measures with 
emphasis on import substitution. In addition to fiscal 
incentives to tpioneer industries', Trinidad-Tobago began 
in the early 1960's to allow duty free imports of 
intermediate inputs to approved firms in certain industries 
as a means of promoting industrial growth. This concession 
has come to be extended to the majority of manufacturing 
establishments in the organised sector. The government 
is the largest investor in the sugar industry; petroleum 
~roduction and distribution, meat packing, hotels and 
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related industries. The Industrial Development Corporat-
ion serves as the principal agency in promoting industrial 
investment and development. 
Although tourism is the second largest source of 
foreign exchange in Trinidad-Tobago, and has created 
many jobs it has also been perceived as a creator of 
social tensions between natives and tourists and is seen 
as corrupting the values of locals. This sector is 
seasonal, may not oe the most efficient way to create 
jobs, there has been a tendancy for high leakages of 
tourist earnings to import western foods etc. for the 
tourists, as well as repatriation of profits of the hotel 
chains, and its linkages with the rest of the economy 
especially agriculture and manufacturing has been weak. 
Services as a whole, both private and government 
related, contributed 35% to GDP in 1978, with the drop 
from 46% in 1960 attributable to growth of the hydrocarbon 
industry rather than to an absolute decline in services 
output. Over the same period employment in the services 
sector grew by 4% to 48% of the workforce. 
Tobago is primarily a tourist centre with virtually 
no industry. 
Like themajority of Caricom members, Trinidad-Tobago 
is an open economy. Between 1960 and 1973 the share of 
exports in GDP was generally greater than 50%, in 1974 it 
stood at 97.8% and between 1975 and 1977 greater than 60%. 
Imports as a percentage of GDP (1960-79) was only less 
than 50% in 1979. Between 1960 and 1974 Trinid~d-Tobago 
typically experienced trade deficits, but since then the 
balance has been consistently positive, largely because of 
the dominance of petroleum in the export sector. With 
respect to non-oil trade, the deficit almost tripled 
between 1974 and 1979 and the dependence of the economy 
on imports of food and intermediate and capital goods 
has remained high, averaging 80% of merchandise L~ports. 
Petroleum exports have generally accounted for over 
80% of total exports apart from the period 1966 - 1972 
when oil revenues declined as reserves fell, although this 
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was reversed with the discovery of new offshore reserves. 
By 1979 petroleum represented over 90% of exports. 
Conversely the share of sugar in exports has been on a 
long run decline, from 7.6% of total exports in 1960 to 
1.5% in 1979. This has been the result of both the 
decline in the sugar industry and the growth of the 
petroleum sector. 
Petroleum has also been an important component of 
imports as a result of the excess refining capacity. In 
1960 it accounted for 31.5% of imports, rising to a peak 
of 72.8% in 1974 and falling to 28.3% in 1979. Crude for 
the refineries is supplied almost exclusively by Saudi 
Araoia and Indonesia. Trinidad-Tobago's major trading 
partners are the USA, the UK and Japan. 
After relatively slow growth during the 1960's 
when the annual average growth rate of real GDP was just 
under 4%, the last six years of the 1970's witnessed a 
dramatic change in the sectoral development of the 
national economy. In particular, the petroleum sector 
under the impetus of the steep rise in oil prices and 
si~nificant new offshore discoveries, has increasingly 
dominated the economy. Although the growth of real GDP 
fluctuated around 7% over 1976 - 1980, because of sluggish 
growth in petroleum output, it fell to an estimated 6% in 
1981, GDP grew by an average of 10% per annum during the 
post oil shock period. 
With large gains in net international reserves (from 
oil revenues) I the country has been able to pursue a 
development policy relatively free from external 
constraints. Moreover, they have attempted to use oil 
revenues to diversify the economy, particularly by 
concentrating on petrochemical industries based on natural 
gas feedstocks. 
However, this impressive performance has gone hand in 
hand with a drop in agricultural production since 1972, 
due to internal terms of trade moving against the primary 
sector. vvhile import substi tution raised the internal 
price of consumer goods, export prices for the countr~Tts 
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three major export crops, sugar, cocoa and coffee, 
fluctuated and then declined in recent years. The 
result was a shift of employment into services, 
construction and industry, but it less than fully 
compensated Lor the decrease in the share of agricultural 
output in GDP. 
The second major growth sector in the economy has 
been manufacturing. Manufacturing output (excluding 
petroleum and sugar refining) has been growing; although 
at a declining rate: 20% in 1977, 8% in 1980 and 4% in 
1981. Construction grew for several years at rates of 
over 20% per annum, but since 1979 shortfalls in the 
output of construction materials, especially of cement, 
as well as labour scarcity, have hampered the growth 
prospects of the industry. 
Trinidad-Tobago suffers from an unemployment problem 
although it has fallen from 15.2% in 1975 to 11.9% in 
1979, as a result of the rapid expansions of especially 
the construction sector. Oil related and other new 
industrial projects have tended to be capital intensive 
with skilled labour requirements that are unable to ease 
unemployment. 
Inflation is an equally intractable problem. After 
low rates of inflation during the 1960's, the annual rate 
for 1970 - 1978 was over 20%. In an effort to halt these 
spiraling increases, the government instituted a package 
of price controls as part of its national economic policy, 
and also subsidises such commodities as gasoline, cement, 
rice~ flour, cooking oil and livestock in order to 
maintain lower prices. The net effect of such actions has 
been limited because of recurrent wage increases granted 
to the powerful oil, sugar and transport workers unions. 
B the Lesser Developed Countries 
Belize 
Belize (formerly British Honduras) lies on the 
Caribbean coast of Central America, with Mexico to the 
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northwest and Guatemala to the southwest It covers an 
area of 8867 square miles, and had a population of 150, 
000 (1982) comprised of 51% negro, 22% mestizo and 19% 
Amerindian. 
Belize was first colonised by British settlers in the 
seventeenth century_ In 1935, a twelve member legislative 
council was introduced, and the colony was granted 
internal self government in 1964, with the UK retaining 
responsibility for defence, external affairs and internal 
secu~ity. Belize gained independence in 1981. 
Of the total land area, 38% is agricultural (5% of 
which is cultivated) and 46% is exploitable forest. 
Agriculture accounts for 25% of GDP and 39% of the 
labour force. The most important agricultural products 
are sugarcane, citrus fruit, corn, molasses, rice, beans, 
bananas and livestock products. 
The economy was formerly based on timber exports, 
but the cultivation of sugar, bananas and citrus fruit, 
which in 1980 represented about 75% of the total value of 
exports, is now more important. Sugar exports alone 
account for more than half of the total value of domestic 
exports. 
The government is funding irrigation schemes for new 
banana plantations which will serve markets in Europe. 
The fishing and livestock industries are also being 
developed, and under a ten year plan, Belize will become 
a major cattle producer for the Caribbean Food Corporation. 
Manufacturing, especially of clothing, accounted for 
13% of GDP in 1980. Other industries include sugar refin-
ing, timber and forest products, furniture, rum and soap. 
An industrial park is to be constructed to stimulate 
growth in the manufactu~ing sector, but shortage of 
manpower remains a serious constraint. 
Tourism is being promoted but has suffered from 
unfavourable publicity over the Guatemalan border dispute. 
Belize is an open economy with an export to GDP ratio 
of 72.9% and ~n import to GDP ratio of 105.8% in 1979. 
Exports are dominated by foods - sugar, fish, molasses and 
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Citrus fruit - as well as garments. The main L~ports 
include rnachinery and transport equipment, food, 
manufactured goods and fuels. The USA and the UK are 
Belize's main trading partners. 
Antigua and Barbuda 
The islands of Antigua, Barbuda twenty five miles to 
the north and their dependency Redonda twenty five miles 
to the southwest with a total area of 170 square miles, 
lie along the outer edge of the Leeward Islands chain. 
The population of 77,000 in 1982, is almost entirely 
African negro, 
Antigua was colonised by the British in the 
seventeenth century. The island of Barbuda, formerly a 
slave stud farm for the Codrington family, was annexed to 
the territory in 1860. Until 1959 Antigua was administer-
ed with eight surrounding British territories under a 
federal system as the Leeward Islands. The colony 
participated in the West Indies Federation. In 1960 a 
new constitution came into force in Antigua and the other 
Leeward Islands, g.iving each its own administrator and an 
enlarged legislative council. Attempts to form a smaller 
East Caribbean Federation failed and Antigua became an 
Associated State with full internal self government in 
1967. The territory finally became independent, as 
Antigua and Barbuda in 1981, remaining within the 
Commonwealth. 
Of total land area 54% is arable, 5% pasture and 14% 
forest. Agriculture has been declining in importance 
since the 1960 t s largely due to the collapse of sugar in 
1972. However, efforts are being made to revive this 
sector with the refurbishment of a sugar factory. There 
are also plans to establish a fish processing plant by 
1984. It has been estimated that up to 4,000 tons of 
fish per year could be yielded from the deep sea fishing 
grounds. The government is also hoping to increase the 
area currently under sea island cotton, once the main 
export crop. The main crops include cotton, bananas, 
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vegetables and maize. 
~ven in the last few years the share of agriculture 
in GDP has fallen from 9.2% in 1977 to 7.8% in 1980. 
Over the same period the share of employment has fallen 
from 11.7% to 9.3%. 
Manufacturing employs 7% of the labour force and has 
increased its share of GDP from 5.2% in 1977 to 8.9% in 
1980. It consists mainly of import substituting industries 
~ consumer goods (rum, garments; household appliances) , 
building materials, tyre retreading and motor vehicles for 
export. The West Indies oil refine~J which is partly 
government owned, was reopened in 1982 after a six year 
closure, ~Ld has the capacity to refine up to 20,000 
barrels of imported crude petroleum per day The refinery 
will process supplies of petroleum obtained at concession-
ary rates from Mexico and Venezuela for all seven member 
countries of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States 
(OEeS) and possibly supply petroleum to neighbouring 
French dependencies. The government is holding 
negotiations with s,everal companies to begin offshore 
oil exploration in the near future. The establishment 
of offshore banks in Antigua and Barbuda is being 
encouraged to provide an additional source of revenue. 
In the last five years Antigua has also established 
itself as an entrepot and distribution centre. 
Tourism is the main economic activity. Antigua was 
one of the first Caribbean states to actively encourage 
tourism in the early 1960's and by 1981 the industry 
accounted for 60% of employment and an estimated 40% of 
GDP. Antigua and Barbuda draw an increasing number of 
tourists from the USA; Canada, the UK and other Caribbean 
countries. 
The composition of exports has changed in the last 
twenty years. In 1965 almost 93% of domestic exports 
were of food but when the oil refinery was operational in 
the early 1970'S petroleum products dominated, accounting 
for 87% of exports in 1975. With the reopening of the 
refinerj-' petroleum products are likely to once again 
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dominate exports. Re-exports are also an important 
component of trade, in 1980 accounting for 66% of domestic 
plus re-exports. Other exports include clothing, rum and 
lobsters. The three major imports are fuel, food and 
machinery. In 1980 food accounted for abnost 30% of 
imports, and the accelerated growth of imports can be 
traced to the food import bill associated with tourism. 
Antigua's main trading partners include the UK and the 
USA although the major export partners have 
traditionally been the Commonwealth Caribbean, which 
accounted for 75% of total domestic exports in 1981. 
Growth in GDP between 1977 and 1979 averaged 7.5% 
annually, falling to 3% in 1980 and 4% in 1981. The 
decline in GDP growth is largely associated with the 
drop in the number of tourists attributable to the 
recession in the major industrial countries. During 
1977 - 80 the growth of the manufacturing sector 
mirrored the intensified activity in the export 
oriented industrial subsector. The rate of inflation 
was estimated at 16% and unemployment at 20% in 1982. 
Montserrat 
Montserrat is one of the Leeward Islands, lying 
about 35 miles north of Guadeloupe. With an area of 39.5 
square miles and a population of 12,000 (1980), Montserrat 
is the smallest member of Caricom. 
Ministerial governnentwas introduced in 1960, and 
in 1967 Montserrat elected to remain a British colony 
rather than become one of the west Indies Associated 
States. 
About 4% of the land is under cultivation, the 
princi~al crops being cotton, limes, potatoes, tomatoes 
and hot peppers. A further one half is potential 
agricultural land and the government is pursuing a 
resettlement programme for small scale farmers. 
Although there is only a limited area suitable for 
arable farming, the prospects for livestock are good and 
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in recent years exports of cattle have contributed a 
significant part to Montserrat's balance of trade. An 
area of 5,000 acres is covered by forests anu trial plots 
of pinel eucalyptus and mahogany have been established. 
Agriculture has been in decline from the 1950's 
since the collapse of the plantations, and the government 
is trying to revive agriculture through its Agriculture 
Sector Plan 1979-82. 
Recently, agriculture's share of GDP has declined 
from just over 10% in 1975 to under 8% in 1981. 
Employment in this sector has also fallen from 19% in 1970 
to 9.4% in 1981. 
Light industry is expanding on the island's industr-
ial estate, and manufacturing, mainly of plastic bags, 
textiles and electronic appliances, accounted for 80% 
of the total value of exports in 1981 
Because of the small size of the country and of the 
labour force any ona project is likely to have a 
substantial effect on the economy and limits the scale 
and type of industry that can be established. 
The government is committed to developing a strong 
private sector based on export oriented private investment 
to reduce the economy's reliance on tourism and agricultu-
re. The government has played an important role by 
constructing factory shells and direct promotion of 
cottage style industries. Currently (1981) manufacturing 
contributes around 8% to GDP and over 10% to employment. 
Tourism contributes about 25% of GDP annually, and 
after a lull in the early 1970's is active again. With 
around 21,000 tourists in 1981 the tourism sector remains 
dominant in the economy. 
Between 1975 and 1980 GDP grew at an average annual 
rate of over 4%, only agriculture declining. Because of 
its small size, the economy is extremely sensitive to 
major investment projects. For example the strong growth 
and burst of inflation in 1979-80 were largely 
attributable to construction of a medical college. The 
current account balance o~payments developed large trade 
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deficits in 1979-80 also because of construction related 
imports and the rise in fuel costs. 
St. Kitts Nevis 
The islands of St.Kitts and Nevis are situated at the 
northern end of the Leeward Islands. The total land area 
covers 153 square miles. The population of 52,000 (1982)' 
is mainly of African negro descent. 
St.Kitts was settled in 1623 as Britain's first 
colonial foothold in the West Indies. The French settled 
part of the island in 1624 and conflict over possession 
of the island continued until 1783 when St.Kitts was ceded 
to Britain under the Treaty of Versailles. Nevis was 
colonised by the British in 1628. In 1816 St.Kitts, Nevis, 
Anguilla and the Virgin islands were united to form one 
colony. Under the Leeward islands Federation, formed in 
1871 the uni~ was reduced to St Kitts and Nevis; although 
Anguilla was shortly rejoined to the territory. St.Kitts-
Nevis~Anguilla participated in the West Indies Federation 
from its inception in 1958 until its dissolution in 1962. 
Anguilla was formally separated from the other islands in 
1980. St. Kitts-Nevis has had full inten.nal self 
government since 1967, and is a dependent territory with 
full internal autonomy as a British 'Associated State'. 
Of the total land area 40% is arable; 10% pasture and 
17% forest. The economy is based on agriculture, 
particularly the cultivation of sugarcane, traditionally 
the major factor determining economic performance. Not 
only is sugar the dominant export; but the government is 
still dependent on the proceeds from the sugar levy and 
export duties for one fifth of current budget receipts. 
Agriculture accounted for 25% of GDP in 1980 compared 
with 35% in 1977, and employment in this sector has 
fallen from 37% in 1970 to 33% in 1980. Sugar production 
has been declining since the late 1960~s, and as sugar 
is the main employer and foreign exchange earner, the 
government is attempting to halt a general economic 
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decline by restructuring the industry, which is state 
owned, and encouraging agricultural diversification. St. 
Kitts-Nevis has the potential to expand several other 
agricultural activities including cotton, groundnuts, 
livestock and fruit and vegetables. 
In Nevis the main economic activity was sugar 
production up to the 1950 t s, when emphasis switched to 
cotton, livestock and to a lesser extent coconuts. 
The development of agriculture and its associated 
industries, and manufacturing is geared to import 
substitution to satisfy local food markets and the 
tourist trade and provide raw materials for agro-
industries. Nearly one third of the factoLies in the 
small industrial sector makes garments: shoes or textiles. 
other industrial activities include metal working, 
assembling electronic components, equipment and 
televisions data processing, food processing and 
bottling especially of beverages. 
Tourism is developing rapidly and receives 
considerable government support. In the past, external 
transport has been a problem, but in recent years the 
government has invested heavily in transport 
infrastructure. 
Because of the small size of the economy, export 
promotion is an integral part of the development strategy. 
Exports are dominated by sugar and the main imports 
include food, manufactures and fuel. The UK and USA are 
the main tradiling partners. 
After several years of satisfactory growth, the 
economy stagnated in 1981. Although there was expansion 
in manufacturing, tourism and construction, this barely 
compensated for the continuing decline in sugar output, 
that has suffered since 1978 from disease. In 1981 the 
value of sugar exports fell by 13% due to the decline in 
volume and the lower world prices 
In Nevis the economic decline in the last decade has 
resulted in heavy emigration, the population falling 
from 11,000 in 1970 to 9,000 more recently. 
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Dominica 
Dominica is the largest of the Windward islands (area 
290 square miles) population 80,000 in 1982). It is 
located off the northern end of the Windward chain of the 
Lesser Antilles, between Guadeloupe and Martinique. The 
island is dominated by a high moutain range running like 
a spine with lateral spurs on either side. 
Dominica was claimed by both France and Britain 
during the seventeenth century, but in 1148 it was 
stipulated that the island should be left in the hands of 
the Caribs. In 1763 it was assigned to Britain under the 
Treaty of Paris, although it was subsequently captured by 
the French in 1778, and finally restored to Britain in 
1783. After 1833 it was administered as part of the 
British Leeward Isalnds until 1940 when it was transferred 
to the Windward Islands. In 1967 it attained internal 
self government as one of the West Indies Associated 
States, finally achieving independence in 1978. The 
majority of the population are descendents of West African 
slaves who were imported in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries as plantation workers. 
Of Dominica's total area, 24% is designated as arable, 
2% as pasture and 67% as forests. Agriculture is the 
principal economic activity accounting for one third of 
GDP, employing 40% of the workforce and supplying 80% of 
merchandise exports. 
Bananas are the main crop, constituting 70% of the 
nation's exports in 1978, and 20% of GNP. Dominica's 
bananas are sold almost exclusively to the UK, with Geest 
Industries as the sole exporters. 
Coconuts are also important, providing copra for 
export (mainly to Barbados) as well as edible oil and soap. 
Limes and other citrus fruits are also grown; other crops 
include cocoa, cinnamon, sugarcane, roots and tubers, red 
beans and tobacco Dominica is the world's largest 
exporter of bay oil 
There is a small amount of livestock including 
cattle, pigs, sheep and goats, but this is reared mainly 
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~or domestic consumption. Fishing is a traditional 
occupation for the islanders and a number of 
coperatives hav,e been established to provide vessels and 
equipment to fishermen on a hire basis. 
Attempts are being made to exploit Dominica's 
extensive timber reserves to provide lumber for export 
and to supply furniture manufacturers. The government 
established a Forestry Industries Development Corporation 
in 1977, but a~nost 90% of the timber was destroyed during 
1979 by two hurricanes. 
One of the reasons for low per capita ~NP in Dominica 
is that agricultural production on the island is 
constantly hampered by poor soil conditions as well as 
the vagaries of the weather. 
Industry and manufacturing is only begining to evolve 
in Dominica, accounting at present for less than 5% of 
GDP. An Industrial Development Corporation was 
established in 1974 to promote and encourage the growth 
of new industries, especially export oriented, l.abour 
intensive light industry. The island's ~ajor industries 
involve the refining or processing of basic agricultural 
products such as crude edible oil as well as import 
substitutes such as soap; garments tobacco and beverages. 
A concession granted to a US firm in 1981 to export some 
two million tons of water annually is expected to produce 
revenues of around one million US dollars per year. In 
1980, West German interests agreed to begin construction 
of a 300 million dollar cement plant, while prawn farming 
and marketing of cut flowers and ornamentals are among the 
activities to be introduced in the near future. 
The major obstacles to development in general, and to 
industrial development in particular has been the lack of 
natural resources (apart from pillnice wfiich is mined) and 
inadequate infrastructure. 
Despite its many natural attractions, Dominica has 
never achieved the tourist success of its neighbours, and 
the sector is as yet undeveloped. Since 1979 the 
government has encouraged the industry by improving the 
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international airport, and has designated areas of tje 
island as nature reserves to ensure that there will al~lays 
be areas of natural beauty to attract visitors. This 
sector was dealt a severe blow by hurricanes in 1979, the 
number of visiuors falling from 27,944 in 1978 to 16,611 
in 1981. 
Dominica is an open economy that depenns on one 
commodity, bananas, for 70% of export earnings, agriculture 
in total accounting for 80%. Imports as a share of GOP 
have been rising in the past few years to 93.6% in 1980. 
Exports share of GDP on the other hand has been declining 
from over 40% in 1976 to just 17.8% in 1980. This lower 
share is largely the result of hurricane damage in 1979 
that meant that there were no banana exports during a 
large partiof 1980. Othe~ exports include lime juice and 
oil, and cocoa. 
Dominica has faced a significant trade imbalance 
during the 1970's because of its needs to import food, 
rnost machinery and manufactures, and such building 
materials as cement. As a result of the hurricane of 1979 
this imbalance will worsen as it will take the economy 
several years to recover. 
The UK remains the main trading partner accounting 
for 56% of Dominica's exports and 25% of her imports in 
1979, while the market share of the members of Caricrnn has 
increased since 1974. 
Dominicats economy was crippled by the hurricanes of 
1979 and 1980, nearly 95% of the bananas and citrus 
plantations and 75% of the coconut plantations were 
destroyed along with a large part of the fishing fleet. 
As a result GDP fell by 17% in 1979 and another 10% in 
1980. Dominica also suffers from a high rate of 
unemployment estimated at over 24%. A five year economic 
reconstruction program was launched in 1980. 
Grenada 
Grenada with a population of 109,000 in 1982 and area 
of 133 square miles, encompasses a mountainous group of 
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islands located approximately 90 miles north of Trinidad-
Tobago, and is the most southerly of the Windward Islands. 
The country includes the main island of Grenada, the 
smaller islands of Carriacou and Petit Martinique and a 
number of small islets. 
Grenada was discovered by Columbus in 1498, and 
attracted French settlers during the s~xteenth century. 
The island remamned under French control until 1762 when 
it was captured by Britain The French were in control 
after 1779, but the Treaty of Versailles in 1783 
acknowledged British dominion. Grenada was a member of 
the Federation of the West Indies and the West Indies 
Associated States until it attained independence in 1974. 
The population is mainly of African negro descent. 
Of Grenada's total area, 44% is cultivated, 4% is 
pasture and 12% forests. Grenada· s economy is essentially 
agricultural, this being the largest sector, in terms of 
employment (around 40% of the labour force), although 
largely at the subsistence level. Four products alone, 
bananas, cocoa l nutmeg and mace represent about 75% of 
this sectors value added, the remaining 25% accounted for 
by sugarcane, fruits and spices, and root crops. Nutmeg, 
cocoa and bananas are the principal exports, although mace, 
sugar, cotton, citrus fruit and minor spices are also 
significant. 
Although Grenada remains dependent on the export of 
agricultural commodities, the diversity of the crops allow 
a degree of flexibility when crop fails as the impact can 
usually be buffered by income from other farm products. 
Nutmeg, of which Grenada is second only to Indonesia 
among world producers, was traditionally the largest 
export earner; however, an upward turn in the world 
market price for cocoa in 1978 pushed total income for 
cocoa ahead of nutmeg. 
A sizeable amount of Grenada's farillland consists of 
smallholdings including one fifth of the area producing 
cocoa, one quarter oi the area producing bananas and half 
the area producing nutmeg. 
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Livestock production is important for local 
consumption though meat and milk still have to be imported. 
Fishing is still largely a subsistence occupation, 
although Cuba and the USSR have provided Grenada with 
equipment and expertise to develop its fishing industry. 
In 1980 a fish processing plant was established, and in 
1981 the government formed a National Fishing Company. A 
reforestation program has been established to augment the 
10,000 acres of forests, 75% of which are government owned. 
Development of manufacturing industries has not kept 
pace with other activities, owing mainly to the small 
size of the local market. Industry remains small scale 
and is geared toward the processing of domestic 
agricultural products - sugar, rum, spices as well as a 
factory producing soap, coconut oil and meat - other 
activities include a cigarette factory, a bottling plant, 
paper products, while others such as a flour mill, beer 
~lant, soft drink plant and garments use almost 
exclusively imported inputs. 
An asphalt plant has been built with Cuban assistance, 
and another new factory has begun processing coffee, both 
locally grown and imported from Guyana and Trinidad, and 
there are plans to expand into cocoa processing. 
A timber milling complex recently purchased from 
Australia is expected to raise the domestically produced 
component of timber needs from 2% to 80%-90% within five 
years. 
The government's economic p~licy is based on 
development of agro-industries and fisheries geared to 
import substitution and the promotion of tourism. 
Manufacturing contributes around 2,5% of GDP. 
Grenada shared in the rapid growth of tourism in the 
Caribbean in the late 1960's and early 1970's, and this 
sector was an important source of foreign exchange which 
was relied on to offset a consistently adverse balance of 
trade. However, 
substantially as 
the coup in 1979. 
in the mid-1970's the sector declined 
a result of the world recessio~ and of 
In 1982 only 82,300 tourists arrived, 
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compared with 148,667 in 1978. A further obstacle to the 
development of the sector is that airline connections are 
presently made through Venezuela, Barbados and Guadeloupe, 
although an international airport at Pointe Saline is 
under construction. 
The tourist sector accounts for around 10% of GDP 
and provides direct and indirect employment for 6% of the 
labour force. 
Grenada is a relatively open economy that remains 
dependent on the export of agricultural commodities. The 
main exports are cocoa, nutmeg, mace and bananas, in 1980 
accounting for 39%, 18%, 4% and 23.7% of total exports 
respectively, although these shares do vary depending on 
world prices. In general these four commodities account 
for more than 90% of total exports. More than half of 
merchandise imports are accounted for by consumer goods, 
especially of food products, although capital goods, 
fuels, chemicals and fertillisers are also important. 
Local manufacturing is geared primarily to the 
domestic market although exports of certain products 
including furniture, garments and, processed food 
products have increased in the last few years. 
The majority of exports are to the UK, West Germany 
and the Netherlands also being important (43.9%, 8.1% and 
10.4% respectively in 1980). The West Indies, at 37.4% 
is Grenadats most important source of imports followed by 
the UK (17.9%) and the USA (19.4%). 
Most of Grenada's export trade has been the 
responsibility of statutory marketing boards: the Grenada 
Cocoa Association, the Grenada Cooperative Banana Society 
and the Grenada Cooperative Nutmeg Association (which 
also includes mace). Since 1974 the National Import and 
Marketing Board has directed the importation of basic 
foodstuffs. 
After a sustained economic recovery following the 
massive destruction caused by Hurricane Janet in 1955, 
economic activity declined in the early 1970's, and 
bottomed out in 1974 in the wake of acute domestic crises 
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accompanying Grenada's independence. In the following 
years, the economy first grew rapidly, propelled by 
favourable terms of trade for agricultural products and 
growing tourist receipts, but the growth rate progressive-
ly declined as early losses were recouped and structural 
weaknesses began manifesting themselves. After the change 
in government in 1979, tourism levelled off and then 
dropped while agriculture was badly hit by weather, 
including a hurricane in 1980, and by drastically falling 
international prices for Grenadats principal exports. In 
1981 agricultural production recovered significantly, but 
tourism continued to worsen and the terms of trade 
deteriorated. A drastic fall in GDP was avoided through 
the growth of the construction sector (which experienced 
the highest growth rate in the economy), spurred by public 
investment programmes in the international airport and 
roads. Although unemployment fell from 35% in 1980 to 
27% in 1981 it has remained a prob~em. Because of the 
small internal market, long term growth depends on export 
performance. 
St. Lucia 
St. Lucia with an area of 238 square miles and a 
population of 119,000 in 1982 is the second largest of 
the Windward Islands, lying between Martinique and St. 
Vincent. The island is of volcanic formation and is 
relatively hilly. The population is mainly of African 
negro descent. 
St.Lucia was established as a French colony in 1651, 
this status not being challenged until 1664 when one -
thousand Barbadians and Caribs invaded the island and 
took it without any resistance. This event marked the 
begining of a struggle between the French and British for 
the island that lasted for over a century. Britain had 
undisputed control 
British dependency 
1833, St.Lucia was 
after 1803, and the island became a 
by the Treaty of Paris in 1814. From 
administered as part of the Leeward 
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Islands, and in 1940 was incorporated into the Windward 
Islands. In 1967 it became a West Indian Associated 
State, and an independent member of the Commonwealth in 
1979. 
Of St.Lucia·s total land area, 50% is arable, 3% 
pasture and 19% forest. Agriculture is the largest 
economic sector in terms of employment (40% of the labour 
force) and is the main export earner (60% of export 
earningsl. The most important crop is bananas, of which 
St. Lucia is the principal exporter in the Windward 
Islands. Although a hurricane in 1980 destroyed 97% of 
the banana crop, bananas export share of total exports is 
usually oyer 40%. Bananas from St.Lucia have a 
preferential outlet in the UK under Lome. 
The island also produces coconuts, cocoa, roots, 
vegetables, other fruits, spices and sugar. Agriculture 
is vulnerable because of high dependence on bananas and 
coconuts, both crops suffering from periodic natural 
disasters, low productivity and possible market 
constraints. The sector also faces the problem of an 
antiquated system of land tenure; since most farms are 
smaller than ten acres, they are not optimal development 
targets. 
Considerable efforts are being made to diversify 
agricultural production and to reduce the substantial 
food import bills. 
Livestock consists of cattle, pigs, sheep and goats. 
Fisher.men.ts cooperatives account for most ~f the annual 
catch of 2,500 tons, and a modern fishing complex with 
cold storage facilities is planned. Forest covers 
approximately 20,000 acres in the mountainous interior, 
with 100 acres being replanted every year. 
In the absence of any significant mineral resources, 
industry is largely confined to processing of agricultural 
output and the manufacture of import substitutes, 
including paper and paperboard (mainly cartons for 
shipping such products as bananas), garments and textiles. 
Since 1972 there has been considerable expansion in 
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the industrial sector and by 1979 the manufacture of 
plastics, garments; beer and industrial gases and the 
assembly of electronic components were established 
industries. An official industrial programme has aimed 
to reduce St.Luciats dependence on agriculture, notably 
by attracting foreign investment. Under the direction of 
the National Development Corporation, established in 1971, 
a major industrial development area, including a free zone, 
is under construction, Anobher development area is the 
site of the country"s largest single venture, an oil 
transshipment terminal, intended for storage and 
transshipment of crude oil for delivery to refineries in 
other Caribbean islands, was opened in 1982, and is hoped 
to produce revenues of 8 million East Caribbean dollars 
per year. Current plans also call for construction of an 
oil refinery and in mid-1981, it was announced that Saudi 
Arabia may build a second oil terminal on the island. 
By 1976 the effects of the programme were apparent; 
exports of manufactured goods represented 48% of total 
exports, compared with 25% in 1974. 
In the latter part of the 1970 t s, manufacturing 
contributed.between 7% and 8% of GDP and employed 6% to 
8% of the labour force. Construction contributed 11% to 
16% of GDP and employment rose from 0.8% in 1970 to 11.6% 
in 1975 and subsequently fell to 7.3% in 1980. 
Tourism is the third most important economic activity. 
St.Lucia is promoted as one of the last truly unspoilt 
Caribbean islands. However, it i~ only since 1966 that 
the island's tourism potential has been developed. 
During the 1970's the tourist industry became the 
area of fastest economic growth, emerging in the second 
half of the decade as St.Lucia's second most important 
source of foreign exchange. However, by 1981 there was 
a marked slump in visitor arrivals. The majority of 
tourists come from Canada, the USA and Europe. 
Between 1976 and 1982 exports share of GDP was 
between 30% and 40%, and imports share between 79% and 
109%. Banana exports consistently account for over 40% 
of exports except during 1980-1982 when hurricane damage 
destroyed the crop. As mentioned above, manufactured 
exports are becoming increasingly important. 
Despite expansion of non-traditional agriculture and 
of manufactured goods, which together contribute 40% of 
export earnings, St.Lucia ran a large deficit between 
1975 and 1979. Income from tourism and remittances from 
overseas workers have however restrained the current 
account deficit. Contributing to the imbalance have been 
imports of intermediate goods, machinery and transport 
equipment needed for industrial development, particularly 
for the oil transshipment terminal. More recently there 
has been a slowdown in exports and tourists receipts. 
St. Lucia depends entirely on imported fuel from 
Venezuela and Trinidad-Tobago for energy requirements. 
Caricom members account for a significant share of 
St.Lucia's trade, but the UK, which has accorded 
preferential treatment to the island's banana exports, 
continues to be its leading trade partner. The USA in 
1977 accounted for 25% of St.Lucia's imports. 
St. Lucia experienced a rapid expansion during the 
1960 l s and 1970 t s, prinicpally in agriculture and tourism. 
More recently, especially since the mid-1970's, 
manufacturing has been of increasing importance. Between 
1976 and 1978 manufacturing output increased at an annual 
average rate of 16% and contributed significantly to 
growth in exports and real GDP. Over the same period 
construction grew at an average of 33%, the result of 
the biggest construction activities in tourism and the 
execution of large public sector projects and the 
construction of an oil transshipment and storage terminal. 
Between 1975 and 1978 agricultural output rose by an 
annual average of 14%. Real GNP grew around 11% annually. 
The St.Lucian economy experienced a severe downturn 
in 1980, the result of natural disasters and a decline in 
private invesb~ent due to political instability. The 
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hurricane of 1980 caused GDP to drop by as much as 15%, 
with damage estimated at 93 millimn dollars. By 1981 the 
three main sources of foreign exchange (agriculture, 
tourism and industry) were all suffering from reduced 
demand. 
Although inflation fluctuated between 9% and 11%, in 
1980 it accelerated to around 20%, and stood at 16% in 
1981. This reflected higher import prices, increased 
prices of locally produced clothing and beverages and 
increased wage pressures. Given the high degree of 
openess of St. Lucia, domestic price trends are influenced 
largely by price developments. abroad. Since the early 
1960'5 the Price Control Division of the Ministry of 
Trade has enforced price ceilings on selected consumer 
goods and has administered prices for petroleum 
derivatives, 
Unemployment which was around 15% during the 1970's 
was above 30% in 1981. 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
St. Vincent is located in the Windward group of the 
Eastern Caribbean, south of St.Lucia and west of Barbados. 
Its jurisdiction encompasses the northern Grenadine islets 
of Beguia( Canouan, Mayreau, Mustique; Prune Island, Petit 
St. Vincent and Union Island. St. Vincent has an are of 150 
square miles and a population estimated in 1981 at 117,000: 
mainly of Afri~can negro descent. 
St. Vincent was discovered by Columbus in 1498, but 
remained in the possession of the Carib Indians until 
1627. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
it was claimed by both Britain and France, and was 
finally assigned to Britain in 1783 by the Treaty of 
Versailles. In the 1830'5 it became part of the general 
government of Barbados and the Windward Islands, and 
after separation of the two in 1885 was administered from 
Grenada. St Vincent was a founding member of the 
Federation of the West Indies in 1958, and on the failure 
of negotiations to form the East Caribbean Federation it 
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joined the West Indian Associated States in 1969, finall"'! ... 
attaining independence in 1979. 
Of the total land area 50% is arable, 3% pasture and 
44% iorest. Ayriculture is the basis of the economy, 
employing over 60% of the workforce and accounting for 90% 
of export earnings, although its share of GDP fell from 
40.3% in 1961 to 18.1% in 1978. Bananas are the main crop, 
in 1981 providing 60% of total export earnings. In 
addition to bananas, the major crops include arrowroot 
CSt.Vincent is the world's leading producer), coconuts, 
nutmeg, cocoa, mace, ginger, sugarcane, tobacco and 
locally consumed vegetables, roots and fruit. 
Approximately 70% of both bananas and arrowroot are 
produced from smallholdings of ten acres or less. Bananas 
generate a regular cash income to smallholders and have a 
guaranteed income, although low productivity is a problem. 
Livestock raising is limited to small farmers, and 
includes cattle, sheep, pigs and goats. Although fishing 
is encouraged the island is a net importer of fish. The 
greater part of the central highlands is covered with 
forests owned by the state. Of this some 15,000 acres 
are designated as forest reserves. 
Apart from fOOd j?rocessing (with leading products 
being arrowroot starch, coconut oil and flour), there was 
very little manufacturing in St. Vincent until the 1970's. 
Expansion of this sector was primarily the ~vork of the 
St. Vincent Development Corporation established in 1971 to 
~romote Joint ventures. To encourage growth in this 
sector; two industrial estates have been established and 
tne government is oifering incentives including tax 
exemptions to foreign investors. One of these, a flour 
mill serving all four Windward Islands was opened in 1978. 
In early 1981 the country's sugar mill, reopened nearly 
twenty years after a fire forced its closure, and it is 
hoped it will eventually replace brown sugar imports. In 
1978 manufacturing contributed 22.6% of GDP and by the end 
of 19.80 surpassed agricul ture in share of GDP for the 
iirst time. The sector includes anl0ngst its products 
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concrete, furniture, wearing apparel and cigarettes. The 
government remains interested in attracting foreign 
investors, but scant resources make large-scale industrial 
projects unlikely. 
Although tourism has been relatively slow in 
developing, mainly due to the fact that the airport on 
St. Vincent has not been served by internal' airlines, it is 
growing in importance and after agriculture is the most 
important source of foreign exchange. Visitors are mainly 
from other Caribbean countries, and the USA and there are 
serious attempts to cultivate new markets in Latin America 
as well as expanding existing ones. In 1979 there were 
63,400 visitors, an increase of 13% over 1978 and 50% 
over 1977. 
St. Vincent "s exports are dominated by agricultural 
produce 2rincipally bananas, as well as arrowroot and 
copra. On the import side food, all capital goods and 
transport equipment, most consumer goods, chemicals, 
fertilisers ana fuels must be purchased abroad. In the 
second half of the 1970 r s the recurrent trade deficit was 
reduced as manufacturing and tourism expanded. But with 
the eruption of Mt.Soufriere in 1979 and the hurricane in 
1980 the loss 0f exports hampered trade recovery in 1979 
and 1980 and the current account deficit rose to 30% of 
GDP. 
Over 90% of exports are handled through statutory 
organisations such as St.Vincent Cooperative Arrowroot 
Association. 
St. Vincent's major export partners in 1972 were the 
UK (61% of total exportsL, Caricom (30%) and the USA (9%). 
On the import side Caricom supplies .29% of imports, the 
UK 28%, Canada 9% ana the USA 9%. 
Although the economy has undergone major structural 
adjustments in recent years, with rapid development of 
offshore processing and increases in the tourism sector, 
St. Vincent, with the third lowest per capita GDP of the 
count.rl.' es 01:- the western hemisphere, has also inuei-Jendent 
experienced an unsettled economic climate as a result of 
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several factors: heavy reliance on foreign assistance, 
dependence on one crop - bananas, for much of foreign 
exchange earnings, a high rate of unemployment 
estimated at 60% for the early 1970's and 20% more 
recently, and extensive damage to agriculture resulting 
from the eruption of Mt.Soufriere in 1979 and Hurricane 
Allen in 1980. In 1980 the hurricane destroyed 95% of 
the banana crop and 75% of nutmeg production. 
The ilnpact of the recession in industrial countries 
on St. Vincent was small, only causing a modest setback 
in tourism, and foreign aid and private transfers has 
historically permitted consumption expenditure to exceed 
GDP. Inilation average 18% over 1979 - 80 due to the 
rapid increase in import prices and shortages caused by 
tile natural disasters. 
Gross domestic investment (1976 - 1980) has been 
relatively high at 25% of GDP and real GDP grew at 14% 
in 1976, 4.5% in 1976 and 11% in 1978, compensating for 
several years of low or negative growth earlier in the 
decade. 
• 
MDC BASIC INDICATORS 
BARBADOS 
Area (sq. miles) 166 
Population-thousands (1982) 252 
GDP (1979)a 540.7 
Per Capita GDP (1979)b 2,206 
Exports/GDP (% ) 23.1g 
Imports/GDP (% ) 62.8g 
Unemployment (% ) 7.7d 
a millions of US dollars 
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PERCENTAGE VALUE-ADDED IN GDP Hi SECTOR 
BARBADOS GUYANA 
1960 1970 1980 1960 1970 1980 
Agriculture 25.9 14.7 10.7 24 19.2 17.2 
Mining 0.1 0.1 0.2 14.2 20.3 11.4 
Manufacturing 7.9 8.3 12.4 13.3 12.1 18.0 
Utilities 1.4 1.3 2.3 a a a 
Construction 12.6 7.3 7.4 8.9 7.8 7.2 
Wholesale and 
Retail Trade 22.1 19.5 20.5 12.0 11.4 9.4 
Transport and 
Communications 5.3 7.1 6.5 7.1 5.9 6.8 I\) 
--..) 
Financial Services 13.8 28 26.5 5.4 5.8 6.0 
Q'\ 
O-i.:.her Services 4.7 3.8 2.2 
Government 10.9 13.7 13.4 10.3 13.7 21.9 
a) Included in the Government Sector 
Source: Economic and Social Progress in Latin America: 
Inter-American Development Bank 
Table A.3 
PERCENTAGE VALUE-ADDED IN GDP BY SECTOR 
JAMAICA TRINIDAD-TOBAGO 
1960 1970 1980 1960 1970 1980 
Agriculture 11.0 7.6 8.7 7.5 5.7 2.8 
Mining 7.5 7.0 8.8 6.9 21.0 12.2 
Manufacturing 16.7 17.6 14.9 25.5 9.4 10.4 
Utilities 0.4 0.8 1.3 0.9 2.0 2.4 
Construction 11.5 13.2 5.2 4.6 4.7 9.5 
Wholesale and 
Retail Trade 26.7 21.4 15.1 16.9 18.7 17.4 
Transport and N -.....J 
Communications 5.0 5.5 6.8 16.0 13.9 17.7 -.....J 
Financial Services 9.8 11.1 13.4 8.2 9.1 14.0 
Other Services 6.5 6.8 6.1 6.4 7.9 6.1 
Government 4.9 9.1 19.6 7.0 7.6 7.5 
Source: Economic and Social Progress in Latin America: 





(i) Choice of Sample 
The accuracy and availability of statistical data 
can act as the most important limitation to any quantitat-
ive study, and this thesis was no exception. To estimate 
the trade flow model and isolate the effects of economic 
integration requires data over a number of consecutive 
years. It is also preferable that all of the members of 
Carifta/Caricom included in the sample actually trade with 
all of the external partners chosen. These desired con-
ditions restricted the country coverage within the West 
. Indies, and in particular presented problems for including 
the LDC's whose trade flow and national income data was in-
complete. It was decided therefore that the trade flow 
model and other quantitative estimates of the effects of 
integration would be limited to the four MDC's - Barbados, 
Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago - who dominate regional 
trade. 
The choice of time period was also constrained by 
data availability and it was felt that if the economic In-
tegration effects were to be isolated, the period chosen 
should be relatively stable. 1967, just prior to the 
formation of Carifta was chosen as the start of the period 
and given the disruptions caused by the 1973/74 oil price 
increases and the subsequent world recession, 1976 was 
chosen as the end point of the period. It was hoped there-
fore, that 1967-1976 was both long enough and stable enough 
to allow isolation of the effects of economic integration on 
trade flows. 
(ii) Data Sources 
The data used in the estimation of integration 
effects is described below: 
279 
a Trade Flow Model 
Trade Data - imports, millions of US dollars. 
(Source: United Nations Yearbook of International Trade 
Statistics, United Nations: New York). 
Income - GOP, t~'1ousands of US dollars. (Source: 
Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 
United Nations: New York, and United Nations Yearbook of 
National Account Statistics, United Nations: New York). 
Population - thousands. (Source: United Nations 
Demographic Yearbook, United Nations: New York). 
b Income Elasticity of Import Demand 
Imports - thousands of East Caribbean dollars. 
(Source: Chernick (1978), Statistical Appendix). 
Income - GOP, thousands of East Caribbean dollars. 
(Source: Chernick (1978), Statistical Appendix). 
c Expenditure Share 
Trade data - imports 
Caribbean dollars. (Source: 
and exports, thousands of East 
Chernick (1978), Statistical 
Appendix) . 
Income - GOP, thousands of East Caribbean dollars. 
(Source: Chernick (1978) Statistical Appendix). 
The trade flow model was estimated using the ord-
inary least squares (OLSQ) technique, and all econometric 
computations were carried out on the Edinburgh Multi-Access 
System (ICL 4-75 computer) using a Time Series Software 
Package, TSP (1978) 
(iii) SITC Section Codes and Section Headings 





Food and Live Animals 
Beverages and Tobacco 













Mint~ral Fuels, Lubricants and 
Related Materials 
Animal and Vegetable Oils and 
Fats 
Chemicals 
Manufactured Goods Classified 
Chiefly by Material 
Machinery and Transport Equipment 
Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles 
Commodities and Transactions not 
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